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Abstract 
 
The health care system in Turkey has undergone a transformation process 
since the Health Transformation Programme (HTP) launched in 2003 and 
significantly increased marketization in health care provision. This study 
asks the following questions: What political dynamics enabled the 
introduction of health care reform in Turkey? What kind of political 
conflicts did the reform generate? How and to whose benefit have these 
conflicts been resolved? As a historically grounded, single country case 
study, this study draws on 33 in-depth interviews conducted with major 
political actors who were involved in the HTP. This study concludes that 
the reform under consideration was a product of two factors: the World 
Bank’s pro-market approach to health reforms that became internalised in 
the health care bureaucracy in Turkey after the mid-1980s, and the 
controlled populism of the Justice and Development Party (the AK Party). 
With the introduction of the HTP, the power distribution upon which 
Turkey’s health care system is based has been changing in three ways. 
First, the Turkish Medical Association (TTB) lost its leverage in health care 
policies. Excluded from the reform process, the only success of the TTB was 
using judicial activism to block the government’s attempts to introduce a 
full time work requirement for medical doctors. Second, the reform gave 
birth to the emergence of a new political actor in health care politics, namely 
private health care provider organisations. Private health care provider 
organisations, which avoided confrontational discourse in their relations 
with the government due to the financial dependency of the sector on the 
state, succeeded in altering the legal and administrative limits that the 
reform put on their opportunities for capital accumulation. Finally, the 
transformation of the AK Party from a catchall party to a cartel party that 
undermines the electoral competition in Turkey might put the 
representation of the citizens’ interests on health care policies at risk.   
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Chapter 1: New Politics of Health Care in Turkey 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Turkey’s health care system has been through a significant 
transformation process since the launch of the Health Transformation 
Programme (HTP) in 2003. While the impact of the reform on different 
components of Turkey’s health care system has been researched (Hazama, 
2013; Adıyok, 2012; Ağartan, 2012; Ağartan, 2012; Baris et al., 2011; Yaşar 
and Uğurluoğlu, 2011; Elveren, 2008; Keyder, 2007; Üstündağ and Yoltar, 
2007; Adaman, 2003) the politics of health care which paved the way for the 
launch of the HTP, and the political contestations and negotiations between 
different actors during the implementation of this reform process, have not 
been investigated so far. In order to address this gap in the literature, this 
thesis examines the politics of health care in Turkey during the launch and 
implementation of the HTP in the last decade. 
In fact, Turkey has not been an outlier in transforming its health care 
system among other countries. The restructuring of health care systems has 
been on the agenda of the majority of governments for the last three 
decades. Contextual factors such as an ageing population and increasing 
health expenditures have been presented as the main drivers of health care 
reforms (i.e. Oxley and MacFarlan, 1995). While these factors might create 
the need for health care reform in a given country context, the mere 
presence of these factors cannot guarantee the introduction and 
implementation of reforms.  
The study of the American example might support this claim. The 2000 
World Health Report of the World Health Organization (WHO) ranked the 
American health care system 37th out of 186 countries. According to the 
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report, Americans spent the most on their health, yet their health care 
system ranked 72nd in terms of health outcomes and 54-55th in fairness in 
financial contribution (World Health Organization, 2000). As the report 
clearly demonstrates, the U.S. health care system needed a reform.  
However, Skocpol demonstrates that the low performance of the 
American health care system did not automatically lead to a health care 
reform. For instance, President Clinton’s attempt at comprehensive health 
care reform was doomed to fail (1997). It took more than a decade for the 
U.S. to ratify The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, better known 
as ObamaCare (Jacobs and Skocpol, 2010). Even the ratification of this 
reform did not guarantee its implementation. In National Federation of 
Independent Business vs. Sebelius, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the powers of Congress to enact key provisions of the Act, including 
the compulsory health insurance requirement. As the American experience 
suggests, the mere existence of factors that require health care reform is 
not sufficient to start a health care reform process.  
In cases where reform does happen, despite similar challenges 
including but not limited to increasing burden of health care expenditures 
on the public budget, the literature indicates that these reforms differ from 
one another in terms of the solutions they bring forward. For instance, Latin 
American and Southern European countries shared health care systems 
with similar problems, such as a lack of universal coverage, but they 
followed dissimilar paths in reforming their health care policies. While 
Spain and Greece carried out health care reforms aimed at transforming 
their social-insurance based health care systems into tax-financed health 
care systems (Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008), Argentina and Chile 
introduced reforms that altered the main parameters of their formerly 
social insurance-based health care systems into more private insurance-
based systems (Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000). As the 
abovementioned studies on health care reform in different countries 
suggest, shared problems do not explain if the reform will be introduced at 
all, nor what kind of health care reform will follow.   
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Both cases suggest that contextual and/or structural factors do not 
suffice to explain the emergence and implementation of health care reforms. 
What factor then is missing? The missing factor is politics. Whether it is 
defined as “the authoritative allocation of values (valued things) for a 
society” (Easton, 1985, p.134) or “the study of the influence and the 
influential” (Lasswell, 1936, p.295), politics play a significant role in either 
making health care reforms possible or preventing them from happening. 
In cases where reform is possible, politics influence the chances of the 
reform being implemented and shape its content. 
Despite the fact that the literature on health care policy and the 
welfare state seem to be relatively detached from one another, Moran 
rightly reminds us that health care has been the largest component of the 
welfare state since the end of Second World War (2000, pp.138-139). 
Therefore, Moran argues what happens to health care is the key for 
grasping what happens to the welfare state. However the existence of a 
strong linkage between health care and the welfare state does not suggest 
that the health care system is just a subset of the broader welfare system, 
as its direct link with the industry makes health care a theme that cannot 
be reduced to the welfare state (Moran, 2000, p.139). Without ignoring the 
strong linkages between the broader welfare state and health care policy, it 
should also be noted that like all welfare policies, health care policy has its 
own historical trajectory and set of policy actors involved (Kasza, 2002, 
p.282). Therefore, changes in health care policies imply alteration of the 
welfare state as well, yet these changes might have relatively autonomous 
dynamics from other changes in welfare policies. 
The literature on the politics of health care (i.e. Jacobs and Skocpol, 
2010; Klein, 2010; Harrison and McDonald, 2008; Giaimo, 2005; Freeman, 
1999; Marmor, 1999; Skocpol, 1997; Navarro, 1994; Immergut, 1992; Alford, 
1975) is also detached from the literature on welfare politics (i.e. Korpi and 
Palme, 2003; Rothstein and Steinmo, 2002; Baldwin, 1999; Pierson, 1996; 
Skocpol, 1992; Korpi, 1989; Korpi, 1980). However, both literatures 
approach policy reforms as critical arenas within which various actors 
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renegotiate political bargains that back welfare systems in general and 
health care systems in particular.  
In line with a worldwide trend, health care reform had been on the 
political agenda since the late 1970s in Turkey. While significant yet limited 
changes were made in Turkey’s health care system between the late 1970s 
and 2000s, fundamental health care reform was only introduced in 2003. 
Before the reform, Turkey’s health care system relied upon a combination 
of social insurance based health care finance and state-led health care 
provision. However, both the service delivery and health care finance 
structure had been fragmented and failed to provide universal coverage. 
The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK 
Party), a conservative neoliberal political party, introduced the HTP after 
the Party came to power as a single party government in the 2002 general 
elections. The three main objectives of the HTP are to increase the efficiency 
and the quality of health care services, to ensure cost-containment in 
Turkey’s health care system, and to achieve universal coverage while 
abolishing inequalities in access (Ministry of Health of the Republic of 
Turkey, 2003). In light of objectives that are almost universal blueprints of 
contemporary health care reforms, a series of legal changes significantly 
altered the main pillars of the health care system in Turkey, such as 
financing, provision, and the regulation of health care services (Yaşar, 
2011). 
Today Turkey spends less than all other Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) members on health care services in 
proportion to its gross domestic product (GDP) (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2012). However, the share of public 
expenditures in health care in Turkey has been higher than in other middle-
income countries (OECD and World Bank, 2008, p.99).  
Drawing on this health care reform experience, this research is 
inspired by the research agenda that Hall and Thelen suggest as follows, 
“the principal challenge facing analysts (of governmental reform) therefore 
is to identify the coalitions of social and political actors that provide the 
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support for a change in regulations or policy regimes and the factors 
motivating their support” (Hall and Thelen, 2009, p.20). Following the 
footsteps of the literature on the Varieties of Capitalism, Hall and Thelen 
argue that institutionalist perspective have the power to explain 
institutional change, in addition to accounting for institutional inertia (Hall 
and Thelen, 2009, p.21). For them, distributional concerns lie at the heart 
of the dynamics that drive institutional change (Hall and Thelen, 2009, 
p.21). 
In light of the research agenda described above, this study asks the 
following research questions: What political dynamics enabled the 
introduction of health care reform in Turkey? What kind of politics did 
health care reform in Turkey generate? What kind of political conflicts arose 
among different actors over the reform? How and to whose benefit have 
these conflicts been resolved? 
 
1.2. The contribution and significance of the study 
 
The literature on the politics of health care is skewed towards the 
economically developed countries of Western Europe and North America 
(i.e. Klein, 2010; Jacobs and Skocpol, 2010; Ham, 2009; Çalıkoğlu, 2008; 
Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007; Rothgang et al., 2005; Lister, 2005; Giaimo, 
2005; Batley, 2004; Freeman, 1999; Marmor, 1999; Moran, 1999; Giaimo 
and Manow, 1999; Wessen, 1999; Freeman, 1998; Immergut, 1992; Moran, 
1992; Alford, 1975). However, the literature on health care reform in 
developing countries concentrates on the results of health care reforms on 
access and coverage while leaving the politics of health care that leads to 
reform and during the reform process under-researched (i.e. Dannreuther 
and Gideon, 2008; Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; 
Muntaner et al., 2006; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2005; Homedes and Ugalde, 2005; 
Guillén and Palier, 2004; Laurell, 2001; Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 
2000; Berman and Bossert, 2000; Schieber and Maeda, 1999; Sen and 
Koivusalo, 1998; Reich, 1995). The literature on health care reform in 
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developing countries tends to underestimate the role of domestic political 
actors (including the government) and the interplay between global and 
domestic actors, and overestimate the impact of global players on the 
reforms.  
Therefore, the originality of this work derives from the original 
empirical knowledge it seeks to produce on the politics of health care that 
paved the way to the introduction and implementation of a specific health 
care reform in a developing country context. I believe that this study on the 
politics of health care reform experience in the Turkish context is a 
significant contribution to the literature, as the literature on this topic has 
been skewed towards Western European and North American countries. 
Indeed, Turkey’s recent experience of health care reform attracted 
immense scholarly attention. Research on the health care reform experience 
of Turkey has generally focused on the impacts of the reform on access, 
coverage and the working conditions of medical doctors (i.e. Hazama, 2013; 
Adıyok, 2012; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2012; Ağartan, 2012; Belek, 2012; 
Demirci, 2012; Barış et al., 2011; Sönmez, 2011; Yaşar, 2011; Yaşar and 
Uğurluoğlu, 2011; Erus and Aktakke, 2010; Uçku and Elçi, 2010; Teksöz et 
al., 2009; OECD and World Bank, 2008; Kılıç, 2008; Pala, 2007; Soyer, 2007; 
Soyer, 2004).  
Ağartan has been the only scholar that has examined the politics of 
current health care reform in Turkey so far (Ağartan, 2008; 2007). Ağartan 
briefly underlines the significant role of the expert network or the 
government’s change team, which is discussed in detail in the following 
chapters, in the preparation of Turkey’s health care reform. While 
Ağartan’s contribution has been significant, her study suffers from two 
shortcomings. First, her work does not examine the contestations and 
negotiations between different political actors over the reform period, with 
the exception of her emphasis upon the change team. Second, her findings 
do not cover the period after 2008. Several important dimensions of the 
health care reform process were not completed by 2008, and quite important 
political clashes occurred after 2008.  
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With the objective of addressing this gap in the literature, this study 
offers a detailed description as well as an analysis of the health care politics 
throughout the HTP. While this study does not claim the power of 
generalizability to other country contexts, I believe it has the power to 
contribute to the broader understanding of the changing political 
foundations of Turkey’s welfare system. Last but not least, this study offers 
insight into the explanatory power of different approaches in the politics of 
health care and the politics of social policies in developing country contexts. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
This thesis is an example of a historically grounded, qualitative single-
country case study. As mentioned in the earlier section, scholarly 
approaches to the politics of health care and welfare have been informed 
mainly by the Western European and North American experiences so far. 
Therefore, the main methodological problem in this study might be to apply 
these approaches to another geography with a different historical legacy. In 
order to compensate for this possible dissonance between the case and 
approaches, the study methodologically draws on the insights from 
Historical Institutionalism. In his work on the social policy regimes in the 
developing world, Gough argues that Historical Institutionalism, as “a 
middle way between teleological or functionalist approaches (both 
modernisation and Marxist) on the one hand, and post-modern approaches 
emphasising uniqueness and diversity on the other” (2004, p.240). Using 
Gough’s insight might compensate for the possible dissonance between the 
case and approaches that were developed from the analysis of cases 
significantly different from this case under investigation. 
Historical Institutionalist perspective suggests that the historical 
legacy of a given country has a decisive influence upon the contemporary 
form of its politics as well as prospects for political and policy changes. At 
its most extreme form, Historical Institutionalism—when accounting for 
the main political factors that shape reform—generally attributes the 
 21 
 
primary agency to the political economic legacy of the country and its 
institutions (i.e. the argument about ‘veto points’ in Immergut, 1992). 
While the focus of Historical Institutionalism is on the influence of 
history and institutions on policy outcomes and political dynamics, this 
focus has not led scholars using this approach to disregard the agency of 
actors to initiate political change. Scholars working within Historical 
Institutionalism aim to examine how power struggles have been mediated 
and framed by a particular historical and institutional context, and how 
these struggles change that context at the same time (i.e. Rothstein and 
Steinmo, 2002; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Therefore, scholars working within 
Historical Institutionalism primarily study the interaction between man-
made institutional structures and agency, without disregarding how and to 
what extent the options of the latter have been restricted by the former. 
This research employs Historical Institutionalism with the objective of 
integrating the political and economic legacy and health care system legacy 
of Turkey into the actor-based analysis of the politics of contemporary 
health care reform. This thesis takes a more critical stance with respect to 
purely institutionalist arguments and intends to keep Historical 
Institutionalism as a way of bringing history and institutions into the final 
analysis without discrediting the impact of actual political struggles 
between existing political actors. Following the footsteps of scholars of 
historically informed qualitative political science, I developed the analysis 
by creating linkages between the empirical data and the broader socio-
cultural, economic and political frameworks (Vromen, 2010, p.264). 
 
1.4. Methods 
 
This study relies upon qualitative research methods. Qualitative 
research methods have been selected on the basis of their ability to capture 
the multi-layered and complex nature of health care reform processes 
(Caronna, 2010, p.71) and the politics of health care, which includes 
alterations in the power structure, subjective interpretations of the process 
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by major actors, and changes to the formal and informal rules that operate 
in the health service domain.  
Qualitative methods in general (Vromen, 2010) and case study 
research in particular are established approaches in the studies of political 
processes (Yanow et al., 2010). The benefit of using qualitative methods and 
the case study method in this research is to integrate both historical insight 
and the personal reflections of actors involved in the institutions, events, or 
processes that are under investigation (Vromen, 2010, p.249). The practical 
benefit of using a case study lies in the possibility of combining different 
qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and documentary analysis 
to understand the intensity of lived human experience (Yanow et al., 2010, 
p.109).   
It is a well-known fact that scholars who generate and use large-scale 
quantitative data generally contest the validity and reliability of case study 
results. Flyvbjerg summarises well-known critiques of the case study 
method under five headings: the limited use of context independent 
knowledge, the lack of generalizability in case study research, the 
suitability of case research for generating a hypothesis rather than testing 
it, the tendency of a case study to verify the hypothesis of the researcher, 
and the inappropriateness of case study to develop general propositions or 
theoretical conclusions (2006, p.221).  
All of these critiques originate from a positivist take on approaching 
social and political issues. The majority of scholars who produce case 
studies using qualitative methods, however, do not share these positivist 
assumptions. I am convinced that the strength of social sciences lies in its 
ability to produce context-dependent explanation and rich knowledge 
(Vromen, 2010, p.257) rather than exploring the ‘objective’ laws of the 
society and politics as well as making predictions about the future 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.223).  
The criteria for selecting informants in case study research do not 
follow the logic of random selection in quantitative methods. In case study 
research, cases are selected with respect to the researcher’s expectation 
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about what kind of knowledge this particular case can probably generate 
(Vromen, 2010, p.259; Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.230). In this regard, case study 
method has always been open to the subjectivity of the researcher. The 
subjective element in case study research, however, has not been dissimilar 
to the hidden subjectivity in quantitative research, in which scholars 
construct categories and variables with which they conduct research and 
make analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.235).   
This research relies upon in-depth interviews and desk research. Desk 
research covered the review of literature on politics and health care policies 
in Turkey. I reviewed all major legislative documents, reports, position 
papers, and media stories on health care reform. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with the representatives of main political actors (i.e. the AK 
Party, the WB, Turkish Medical Association (Türk Tabipleri Birliği, TTB) 
and private health care provider organisations) and state institutions 
(Social Security Institution (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, SGK) and the 
Ministry of Health (MoH)) in order to gain insight to the power struggle on 
particular junctures and issues. This research did not collect original data 
from patients. However, findings from public opinion surveys that 
investigate the abovementioned themes are used instead. 
 
1.5. Fieldwork 
 
I conducted 33 face-to-face in-depth interviews mainly in Ankara and 
İstanbul. The majority of the interviews were conducted between August 
2011 and December 2011. Interviewees were divided into two groups. The 
first group included members of the reform team, key bureaucrats in the 
MoH and the SGK, and the WB experts. The second group of interviewees 
included representatives from different political organisations involved in 
health care politics. This group was composed of executives from private 
health care provider organisations, the leading cadre of the TTB and trade 
unions organised in the domain of health care services and politically 
engaged experts of health care policies.  
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Arranging face-to-face interviews with people who hold key positions 
is not always an easy task. For interviewees who could not be reached, I 
employed an alternative strategy of organising academic workshops on 
health care reform in Turkey and inviting key people (with whom the 
researcher might not succeed in conducting interviews otherwise) to give 
public speeches at these workshops. In doing so, the researcher organised a 
workshop 2  and co-organised two panels. 3  This strategy proved to be 
successful as the author managed to get the accounts of three people holding 
key positions in the first workshop and an additional three people in the 
second workshop via their presentations. In addition, the researcher 
collected additional information by attending conferences and workshops of 
medical associations and exchanging ideas with medical doctors and 
activists at those conferences.4 
 
1.6. Limitations 
 
Two dimensions of health care policies and politics lie beyond the scope 
of this research: the provision of primary health care services and the 
regulation of pharmaceutical sector. While primary health care services 
have been an important part of the HTP, the major impacts of changes in 
primary health care services will lend itself to empirical research in the long 
run. Given the fact that the HTP failed to introduce the referral system that 
would make the health care provision into a unified delivery system, it 
became possible to focus on secondary and tertiary health care services 
without analysing the changes in primary health care services. Second, the 
regulation of the pharmaceutical sector has been left outside the scope of 
                                                        
2 “Transformation of Turkey’s Health System” on November 25, 2011 in Bogazici 
University, Istanbul. I would like to thank Boğaziçi University Social Policy Forum and 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Istanbul for their support. 
3 “Turkey’s Health Care Reform and Its Critiques,” 7th National Congress of Bioethics on 
October 13, 2012. 
4 Crisis of Capitalism and Health, organised by International Association of Health Policies 
and Turkish Medical Association, Ankara, October 2011; Transformation and Changes in 
Health Care, Çukurova Scholars Association, February 2013; National Congress of 
Turkish Thoracic Society, Antalya, April 2013. 
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this research because it is the only domain that has not been directly 
affected by the HTP.  
Another source of limitation in this research project may derive from 
the selection of Ankara, İstanbul, Samsun, İzmir and Adana as the main 
field sites. All of these cities are metropolitan cities in Turkey. While 
Ankara was selected as the capital city, all the other cities were selected 
because they are home to all three types of major actors in health care 
delivery: public, university and private hospitals. Due to this selection of 
field sites, conclusions drawn from this research might not include 
sufficient input from political actors in smaller cities. However, due to the 
centralised structure of the Turkey’s political system, it would not be 
erroneous to assume that the impact of political actors in smaller cities 
would be limited. 
 
1.7. Ethical considerations 
 
The Ethics Committee of the University of Leeds reviewed and granted 
a favourable opinion to this research. Informed consent was taken from all 
informants through the use of participant consent forms and information 
about the research was provided in Turkish. This research did not involve 
informants from vulnerable groups and did not include sensitive issues that 
might put undue stress upon informants. The researcher used an audio 
recorder only when the informant agreed. In cases where the informant did 
not wish the researcher to record the interview, the researcher took 
extensive notes during and after the interview. The data generated by 
interviews was anonymised with the method of assigning numbers in line 
with the chronology of interviews (i.e. Interview no. 30). 
This research was conducted in Turkey. However, given that the 
working language of the research is also the researcher’s native language, 
no translators were used. No inducements were provided to the informants. 
The main objectives of the research were transparent to the informants. No 
data was disclosed to the authorities. The researcher did not come across 
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any situation such as the discovery of any form of a criminal offense and/or 
the possibility of physical and psychological harm to other people. This 
research included at least one informant from all organised social actors 
that represent the reform team, the WB experts, trade unions organised in 
health care services, the medical profession, and the private hospital sector. 
The data generated in this research has been kept secure. The general 
rules of information security in social science research, which are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, were followed. The main data to 
be secured in this research was the audio recordings of the interviews with 
state officials, representatives of organised interest groups, and medical 
doctors. Audio recordings of these interviews were kept in the researcher’s 
space in the university’s LUTube, and the researcher’s personal external 
hard drive. Access to audio recordings was restricted to the researcher in 
LUTube. The University’s secure Remote and Mobile Access Service was 
used to upload the audio recordings immediately after the completion of the 
interviews. Audio recordings were kept encrypted in the researcher’s 
personal external drive. Audio recordings of interviews will be kept for two 
years after the completion of the Ph.D. degree. After the completion of the 
degree, the data will be kept encrypted in the personal external hard drive 
of the researcher.  
 
1.8. The organisation of chapters 
 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Following this introductory 
chapter, the second chapter reviews the literature on the politics of health 
care in order to set out the main theoretical framework and key approaches 
that are used in the analysis. The third chapter describes the historical 
legacy of Turkey’s health care system against the background of Turkish 
politics, upon which the HTP was introduced. The fourth chapter examines 
the HTP within the context of health care reforms in selected developing 
countries. The fifth chapter addresses the role of the WB in Turkey’s health 
care reform in order to understand how and to what extent the global health 
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reform agenda could make its way into Turkey’s health care system. 
Following this, the sixth chapter investigates the AK Party’s impact on 
health care reform. The seventh chapter examines the role of the TTB 
during the reform. The eighth chapter investigates the emergence and the 
role of private health care provider organisations during the reform process. 
The conclusion chapter offers insight into the political dynamics that made 
the HTP possible, and the impact of these dynamics upon the content of the 
reform. The conclusion also analyses how reform changed the power 
dynamics between different actors by investigating the political conflicts 
that arose during the health care reform process.  
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Chapter 2: The Politics of Health Care: A Critical 
Review of Literature 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Health care reform in Turkey has been a platform for critical 
contestations as well as alliances among different actors including the AK 
Party, the WB, the TTB and private health care provider organisations. For 
instance, after the British Medical Journal published the article titled 
“Healthcare in Turkey: From Laggard to Leader” (Barış et al., 2011), a 
number of responses appeared in the same journal and painted a 
pessimistic picture of Turkey’s post-reform health care system (i.e. Civaner, 
2011). Such a debate, visible in the British Medical Journal alone, is just 
one manifestation of the heated political conflicts that have come about 
since the introduction of the HTP in 2003. The health care reform in Turkey 
has not been the only one to cause significant conflicts. Both ObamaCare in 
the U.S. and the reform of the National Health Service (NHS) in Britain 
generated similar political conflicts that are still present.  
How can we understand these political conflicts in health care today? 
What is at stake and for whom? With the objective of providing a sound 
approach to examining these questions, this chapter is divided into five 
major sections and a conclusion. The second section presents the historical 
foundations of health care policy. The third section presents the main 
characteristics of modern health care systems before the emergence of a 
worldwide reform trend in the late 1970s and early 1980s and situates the 
health care system in Turkey within a comparative framework. The fourth 
section lays out the debate among contesting scholarly approaches to health 
care politics. The aim here is to demonstrate the content of the political 
nature of debates around health care by introducing different theoretical 
takes on the question of how health care should be treated in today’s 
societies. Drawing on the theoretical debates with respect to the status of 
health care in contemporary societies, the fifth section discusses the context 
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within which health care reforms have come to the political agenda in 
different countries after 1970s. The main objective of the fifth section is to 
set the political economic scene within which the health care reforms 
emerged and to introduce the main concepts that have been widely used in 
explaining the reform-led changes in health care systems. Last but not 
least, the sixth section reviews different approaches to the study of politics 
of health care in particular and the politics of welfare in general.  
 
2.2. A short history of health care policy 
 
Public health measures are considered to be the first form of health 
care policy. Modern states initially developed these measures in the 18th 
and 19th centuries to combat communicable diseases, which were then the 
major cause of death in societies during the advent of industrial capitalism 
(Rosen, 1993).  
Three contesting explanations have been provided in the literature to 
account for the political dynamics that have contributed to the development 
of public health measures. The first one suggests that public health 
measures came about in order to ensure the well being of labourers, as they 
were considered to be an important infrastructure of capitalist production 
(Navarro, 1976, p.197). The second explanation identifies public health 
measures with the genesis of a new logic of government, or 
‘governmentality’, which centres its power base upon the regulation of the 
lives of the population at large (Foucault, 1991). The third explanation 
suggests that public health measures were developed thanks to the political 
reaction of organised labour against the social costs of capitalism (Leys, 
2010, p.5). Leys argues that public health measures emerged “in spite of 
capitalism as much as because of it” (2010, p.2). 
Public health measures introduced after the rise of industrial 
capitalism proved their effectiveness by increasing life expectancy and 
eliminating communicable diseases in most countries throughout the 19th 
and 20th centuries. In these countries, non-communicable diseases replaced 
 30 
 
communicable diseases as the prominent cause of health problems and 
death. The shift in medical needs of societies from the elimination of 
communicable diseases to the treatment of non-communicable diseases is 
commonly referred to as ‘epidemiological transition’ (Leys, 2010, p.2).  
In contemporary societies, the role of preventive care has been 
restricted to a marginal subsector within health care services.5 Preventive 
care is commonly associated with primary care services such as ambulatory 
care, visits to general practitioners, and/or health posts and centres. Health 
care services today have mainly taken the form of curative health care, 
which is associated with large hospital complexes, specialists, health 
technology and medications (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.18).6 In this context, 
health care policy refers to the courses of action pursued by the 
governments with respect to the financing, regulation and provision of 
public health as well as curative health care services in a given country 
(Blank and Burau, 2010, p.2).7 
                                                        
5 Increasing prioritisation of curative health care services over preventive health care 
services in last century has been harshly criticised in the literature (i.e. Navarro, 1976, 
pp.19-20).  
6 This dominance of curative health care in contemporary societies originates from the 
“therapeutic revolution” in Western medicine. Therapeutic revolution is known as the 
transformation of the dominant paradigm in medicine due to the genesis of the germ theory 
of disease, which promotes the idea that “each disease had a well-defined cause and its 
control could best be achieved by attacking the causative agent or if this was not possible, 
by focusing treatment on the affected part of the body.” See: DUBOS, R. J. 1987. Mirage of 
Health: Utopias, Progress and Biological Change, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press. 
Scholars argue that there is both an economic and ideological elective affinity between 
germ theory of disease and capitalism, which together culminated into the dominance of 
curative health care. See: NAVARRO, V. 1976. Social Class, Political Power, and the State: 
Their Implications in Medicine. Medicine Under Capitalism. New York and London: 
Prodist and Croom Helm, DOYAL, L. & PENNELL, I. 1994. The Political Economy of 
Health, London, Pluto Press. 
7 Health care policy could be defined as a subset of health policy. See: WALT, G. 1994. 
Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press, London and New Jersey: Zed Books, MORAN, M. 1999. Governing the 
Health Care State: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Germany, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press. Health policy is a term 
that refers to the whole set of policies that directly or indirectly affects the well being of 
individuals and the environment in which individuals live. In other words, as Blank and 
Burau put it, health policy could be defined as any policy action that has health 
implications. See: BLANK, R. H. & BURAU, V. 2010. Comparative Health Policy, 
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, ibid. According to this definition, health policy includes 
wide range of policy domains from urban planning to consumer protection. In line with 
these broad policy domains that health policy refers to, the literature on health policy 
addresses relationships between the wellbeing of societies and a wide range of other factors 
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Widespread production and consumption of curative health services 
dates back to the emergence of health insurance in 19th century Germany, 
when Chancellor Bismarck introduced pensions and health insurance 
programmes in order to appease workers who were mobilised by socialist 
ideas.  
After the Second World War, this trend became more popular. The 
welfare states8 of Western Europe and some developing countries (including 
former socialist bloc countries under the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics) played a critical role in giving shape to the health care policies, 
as we know them today. The consolidation of welfare states affected health 
care policy in two fundamental ways. First, welfare states had been 
committed to make curative medicine accessible to society at large. Indeed, 
all member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), with the exception of the US, succeeded in providing 
nearly universal access to almost free health care for their citizens.9 
Second, welfare states contributed to the creation of an immense 
health care industry, including the pharmaceutical sector and health 
technology controlled by the private sector (Moran, 1999, pp.177-178). 
Welfare states also opened up a pathway for greater employment in the 
                                                        
such as environment, demography, and social inequalities. See: WILKINSON, R. & 
PICKETT, K. 2010. The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone, London, Penguin 
Books. 
8 Welfare state generally refers to the state “which intervenes within the processes of 
economic reproduction and distribution to reallocate life chances between individuals 
and/or classes.” See. PIERSON, C. 1991. Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political 
Economy of Welfare, Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
9 The level of health care expenditures in countries is in positive correlation with the level 
of GDP per capita. The higher the country’s GDP per capita, the more it spends on health 
care. See: WALL, A. 1996. Conclusion. In: WALL, A. (ed.) Health Care Systems in Liberal 
Democracies. London and New York: Routledge, MORAN, M. 1999. Governing the Health 
Care State: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany, 
Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, BLANK, R. H. & BURAU, V. 
2010. Comparative Health Policy, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Comparative studies of health expenditures in countries with similar levels of GDP per 
capita, however, demonstrate that the levels of health care expenditures in these countries 
display a significant variation, which led to the growth of health care system typologies 
debate that I will discuss later in this chapter. See: WALL, A. 1996. Conclusion. In: WALL, 
A. (ed.) Health Care Systems in Liberal Democracies. London and New York: Routledge, 
WENDT, C., FRISINA, L. & ROTHGANG, H. 2009. Healthcare System Types: A 
Conceptual Framework for Comparison. Social Policy & Administration, 43, 70-90. 
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public sector (Leys, 2010, p.11). Through these mechanisms, welfare states 
acted as the primary engine behind the dramatic growth in the health care 
economy after the Second World War (Moran, 1999, pp.2-3), which has now 
become one of the largest sectors of the global economy.  
 
2.3. Is health care a commodity? 
 
Like in all other cases of institutional change (Hall and Thelen, 2009, 
p.21), distributional concerns, or the classic “who gets what” question, lie at 
the heart of health care politics. This section aims to look at the common 
assumptions that feed into the political debates around health care, and will 
also introduce different theoretical takes on the question of how health care 
should be treated in today’s societies.  
Although health care remains both a commodity and a right in the 
majority of countries today, neither notion is complete. Here commodity is 
defined as a thing that is being bought and sold by means of exchange which 
satisfies human want one way or another (Marx, 2008, pp.13-50).10 
Is health care a commodity today? From one perspective, the products 
of the health industry, including health technologies and pharmaceuticals, 
have long been global commodities. Rising medical tourism and increasing 
foreign direct investment in health care services, along with a greater 
movement of medical doctors across borders, would suggest that health care 
service provision is also becoming a global commodity. The 
transnationalisation of health care services accelerated after the 
ratification of the World Trade Organisation’s General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) and other regional conventions (Blank and Burau, 2010, 
p.8; Sexton, 2003, pp.39-40). More recently, The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) that the European Commission negotiates 
                                                        
10 Things gain meaning due to their use-values for human beings. These things that are of 
use for human beings start to bear an exchange-value when they stand in relation to each 
other. Imaginary construct that brings commodities in relation to each other is the idea of 
market. 
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with the United States of America poses a threat to the future sustainability 
of the UK’s National Health Service, as it opens up health care market to 
transnational companies without leaving any room for national 
governments to put restrictions on the commodification of health care 
services (Patients4NHS, 2014). In this regard, it could be suggested that 
the ratification of the TTIP, in case it happens, would increase the 
commodification of health care delivery. 
The establishment of health care as a right refers to the legal 
codification and implementation of the ‘decommodification of health care,’ 
that is the extent to which individuals’ access to health care is not 
dependent upon their market position and “the extent to which a country’s 
provision of health is independent from the market” (Bambra, 2005b, p.33). 
In fact, health care systems in different countries substantively restrict the 
commodification of health care by undertaking or regulating the finance, 
production and consumption of health care services. Taking both 
perspectives into account, it could be argued that the commodity status of 
health care is not fully formed, and the idea itself remains highly contested 
due to high levels of state regulation and/or involvement aimed at 
restricting the commodification of health care.  
The rise of health economics both popularised the use of economics 
discourse in the health care domain and contributed to the understanding 
and making of health care as a commodity. Fuchs succinctly summarises 
universal assumptions of the health economics approach (1996, p.3). 
According to Fuchs, health economics has three main assumptions: scarcity, 
substitutability, and heterogeneity. Scarcity here refers to the scarcity of 
resources. Substitutability refers to the idea that investing in health care 
has an opportunity cost of not investing in another domain. By 
heterogeneity, Fuchs emphasises the availability of alternative medical 
interventions for any health problem (1996, p.4).  
Health economics suggests that the uncertainty of demand for health 
care makes it a candidate for an insurance market (Appleby, 1998, p.39; 
Ranade, 1998, p.3). For health economists, a tax-financed health care 
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system that provides free health care at the point of service is doomed to 
suffer from the problem of moral hazard (Arrow, 1963, pp.961-962). The 
problem of moral hazard refers to the tendency of individuals to consume a 
good or a service more than they need to when they are not paying for the 
service themselves (Appleby, 1998, p.39). From the perspective of health 
economists, moral hazard becomes much more acute in the case of state-
organised health insurance; the system removes all incentives to economise 
not only for patients, but also for medical doctors. According to health 
economics, the best model for allocating health care services in a society is 
market distribution. 
Health economics was not left unchallenged (i.e. Mooney, 2009). For 
instance, Blank and Burau argue that perfect knowledge is not available to 
the consumer of health care services. Therefore, a consumer makes his/her 
decisions with limited knowledge and relies mainly on the medical doctor’s 
expertise. Second, the consumer of health care services does not know the 
value and costs of goods and services that he/she considers purchasing. This 
lack of price knowledge disempowers him/her as a consumer. Last, 
consumers may not be able to receive the full value of goods and services 
that he/she buys due to the unpredictability of the efficacy of medical 
treatment (Blank and Burau, 2010, pp.107-108). Therefore, Blank and 
Burau argue that, pure market solutions in health care cannot serve the 
service recipients. Others claim that the exchange value of health care 
becomes unaffordable at times when it is urgently needed and when its use 
value for the service recipient is the greatest (Lister, 2005, p.98; Skocpol, 
1997, p.17). These assertions are especially valid, as only the very rich can 
purchase high-technology health care on the spot (Moran, 2000, p.141). As 
these assertions suggest, it could be argued that the health economics 
approach totally ignores distributional questions in health care policy 
(Evans, 1997, p.463). 
Despite these criticisms, the health economics approach has become 
the dominant paradigm in policy circles since late 1970s. International 
organisations such as the WB and the OECD popularised the health 
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economics approach in developing countries (Freeman, 1998, p.398). Part of 
an international ‘epistemic community,’ health economists have been in 
charge of preparing most health care reform projects and therefore their 
assumptions have constituted the bedrock of these projects (Appleby, 1998, 
p.35). More importantly, health economics engendered ‘policy paradigm’, 
which is defined as the taken-for-granted “framework of ideas and 
standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the 
problems they are meant to be addressing” (Hall, 1993, p.279), that has 
shaped how different actors perceive health care. In this paradigm, previous 
terminology on health care policies changes significantly: patients become 
consumers, managers become necessary actors whose intention is to ensure 
consumer satisfaction and service efficiency, and medical doctors become 
unreliable providers whose practice should be closely regulated (Irvine, 
2002, pp.31-38). Meanwhile, universalist health care systems in Western 
Europe, which used to be the vantage point for reform in developing 
countries and in the US before the rise of neoliberalism, have been 
undermined ideologically; the US modified market model has emerged as 
the preferred source of inspiration in health care policy (Moran, 1998, pp.18-
19).  
 
2.4. Health care reform under neoliberalism 
 
The increasing popularity of health economics after the early 1970s 
and the rise of health care reform in the political agenda was not a 
coincidence. Neoliberalism, a new powerful political project, emerged as a 
response to the oil crises in early 1970s and the contraction of profit margins 
worldwide. As a political project, neoliberalism “proposes that human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, 
p.2). Neoliberalism is better understood as “a historically specific, on going, 
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and internally contradictory process of market-driven socio-spatial 
transformation, rather than as a fully actualised policy regime, ideological 
form, or regulatory framework” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p.353).  
Neoliberalism promotes five key ideas: confidence in the market as the 
most efficient way of allocating resources; the necessity of establishing a 
global free trade regime; the desirability of a state as a facilitator rather 
than as a substitute or alternative to the market; the need to subordinate 
fiscal to monetary policy to introduce budget discipline; and the necessity to 
institute flexible labour markets by lowering labour costs and social policy 
disincentives to market participation (Hay, 2004, pp.507-508). In its early 
phase, neoliberalism appeared as an overtly ideological project; over time, 
neoliberalism gradually became a technocratic and seemingly apolitical 
modus operandi (Hay, 2004, pp.511-518).  
What does neoliberalism mean for health care? In line with its premise 
summarised above, the neoliberal project aimed to deepen health care 
markets where they already existed, and to establish new health care 
markets where there were none before. It could be argued that neoliberal 
health care reforms generally rely upon a combination of four dynamics, 
which are not mutually exclusive, explained below. These dynamics are 
privatisation, marketization, commercialisation and economisation.  
Privatisation refers to a policy direction that promotes more reliance 
on the private sector and the non-profit sector to an extent, and less on the 
state in any domain of the economy. Privatisation can appear in three 
forms. The first one is to reduce the state’s role in producing goods and 
services and/or state ownership and to transfer this role and ownership to 
private hands. Second, privatisation can be put into practice by allowing the 
private sector to increase its shares in the production of goods and services 
and in the ownership of property vis-à-vis the public sector (Savas, 2000, 
pp.3-4). The first route for privatisation is politically contentious, especially 
in welfare domains such as health care policy. Governments can pursue the 
second route to privatisation as a long-term agenda in order to avoid 
political conflicts. In addition to these forms of privatisation, public-private 
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partnerships can also be considered a form of privatisation. Public-private 
partnerships broadly refer to arrangements between the state and the 
private sector that delegate formerly public responsibilities to the private 
sector (Savas, 2000, p.4). 
Another common pillar of contemporary health care reforms is 
marketization. Marketization can be defined as a policy paradigm aimed at 
redesigning a policy domain in the image of the idea of a market. In the 
domain of health care, the main objective of marketization is to establish a 
competition-based health care market in which the demand and supply of 
services belongs to different parties (Ewert, 2009, pp.23-24). Ideologically, 
the discourse on marketization of health care services prioritises consumer 
choice, innovation in health technologies, ‘value for money’ and 
diversification of health care services over the provision of equal benefit 
packages of health care services for all citizens. According to the 
marketization paradigm, the role of the state should be limited to the 
regulation of markets.  
However, especially in state-dominated health care systems, the 
retrenchment of the role of state to regulation is not an easy task in the 
short run. Therefore, the marketization paradigm is generally put into 
practice through the introduction of ‘quasi-markets’ in the domains of 
welfare services. Quasi-markets broadly refer to the policy arrangements in 
which the state ceases to be a provider and funder of welfare services and 
starts to purchase these services from a competitive market through 
mechanisms such as bidding (Le Grand, 1991, p.1257). Quasi-markets are 
labelled as ‘quasi’ due to their two distinct features: first, service providers 
in quasi-markets may include private actors as well as non-profit third 
sector and public actors who compete with each other for attracting 
consumer demand. A second feature of quasi-markets is that consumers are 
not always free individuals who are authorised to make autonomous 
consumption decisions. They are either represented by a third party actor 
or a ‘sponsor’ who purchases services on their behalf or selects services from 
a pre-determined portfolio of providers (Enthoven, 1993, pp.29-30; Le 
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Grand, 1991, pp.1259-1260). For example, in line with Enthoven’s policy 
suggestions for the UK (1993), quasi-markets in health care were primarily 
established in the NHS in 1991 (Ranade, 1994, p.63), to ascertain efficiency 
and promote consumer choice (Appleby, 1998, p.34). 
A third dynamic that neoliberal health care reforms generate is 
commercialisation. Commercialisation in health care services is defined as 
“the provision of health care services through market relationships to those 
able to pay; investment in, and production of, those services, and of inputs 
to them, for cash income or profit, including private contracting and supply 
to publicly financed health care; and health care finance derived from 
individual payment and private insurance” (Mackintosh and Koivusalo, 
2005, pp.3-4). Mackintosh and Koivusalo suggest that the concept of 
commercialisation can have a wider meaning that encompasses the 
processes of privatisation and marketization but is not limited to them. In 
their approach, the commercialisation of health care services represents the 
commodification of health care in general.  
Neoliberal health care reforms can also lead to economisation. 
Economisation can be defined as a policy approach that aims to establish 
efficient distribution of limited resources; however, it does not 
automatically imply the processes of privatisation, marketization and 
commercialisation. Economisation emphasises the scarcity of the state’s 
financial resources and other resources to be spent for health care services. 
On the basis of these assumptions, economisation in the domain of health 
care generally refers to the introduction of different mechanisms targeting 
cost-containment and/or better allocation of health care resources. These 
policies involve the restructuring of public health care services in order to 
ensure efficiency and value for money (Ewert, 2009, pp.23-24).  
The need for cost-containment has made priority setting in health care 
a critical issue (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.111) and is commonly known as 
health care rationing. Rationing, which is part of the economisation 
dynamic, refers to various sets of restrictions on eligibility, delay, 
deterrence and deflection (Wall, 1996, p.192). While rationing has always 
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been part of health care systems even before the age of neoliberalism, the 
distinctiveness of neoliberal-inspired rationing lies in its reliance upon 
market mechanisms that are considered to be the best form of rationing.  
Economisation generally manifested itself in the form of ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM) reforms. The UK was the first country to initiate NPM 
measures, and this paradigm then spread to other countries (Lane, 2000, 
p.3). Inspired by strong public sector criticism from the public choice school 
and the Chicago school of economics, NPM reforms imported management 
techniques from the private sector into the public sector (Ferlie et al., 1996, 
p.9). This idea originated from the belief that management tasks in the 
public and private sectors are similar and therefore best undertaken 
through the use of private sector managerial expertise (Ranade, 1994, p.90). 
Some of the best known examples of NPM mechanisms include: total quality 
management applications, the establishment of autonomous expert bodies 
in various domains of public policy, decentralised budgeting and 
management, managerial control and accountability tools, assessment of 
organisational efficiency based on input-output comparisons, and 
productivity-linked rewards and financing applications (Harrison, 2004, 
pp.173-174).  
Neoliberal health care reforms generally introduce a combination of 
the dynamics explained above. However, in light of Brenner and Theodore’s 
conceptualisation of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (2002) it should be 
noted that these reforms might be subjected to significant modifications as 
a result of the contestations and negotiations between different political 
actors in countries undertaking these reforms. Different approaches to the 
politics of health care are explained below in order to examine these 
contestations and negotiations over health care reforms. 
 
2.5. The politics of health care: Different approaches 
 
Whether politics is the leading factor for the emergence of modern 
health care systems and contemporary health care reforms remains a 
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contested issue. As noted earlier, several factors were important in 
providing the necessary conditions for the emergence of neoliberal health 
care reforms, including the budgetary crisis of the modern state; drastic 
rises in the cost of health care services, and the dramatic increase in 
demand for health care services. However, studies increasingly 
demonstrate that the politics constitute at least an important factor that 
affect the possibilities of the enactment, implementation, and content of 
health care reforms (i.e. Millar et al., 2013; Bhatia and Coleman, 2003; 
Chinitz, 1995).  
For instance, Baldwin suggests that broader economic dynamics might 
create a need for the development of social policies that have to perform 
some social functions. However, he emphasises the fact that social policies 
generally go beyond this minimal function. In addition, countries formulate 
different social policies to deal with common social problems (Baldwin, 
1999, p.5). Skocpol also agrees with the idea that long-term or structural 
factors, such as the level of industrialisation or the budgetary crisis of the 
modern state, might constitute necessary yet insufficient reasons for the 
emergence of the welfare state and/or different sorts of social policies. While 
long-term or structural factors might introduce new controversial issues 
and produce new social groups, Skocpol underlines that they determine 
neither the patterns of politics nor the policy outcomes (1992, pp.13-14). 
Korpi’s power resources approach also suggests that while industrialisation 
led to the emergence of organised labour, the political attempts of organised 
labour were the main factor that led to the creation of welfare states and 
social policies (Korpi, 1980, pp.296-297).  
Therefore, both the genesis and alteration of social policies have a 
significant political component to them. How are we going to understand 
this political component? There are as many approaches to the politics of 
health care as there are to politics in general. For the purpose of this study, 
I would like to review the most dominant approaches to the politics of health 
care, as these approaches have inspired seminal works on the issue. The 
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four major approaches include: the pluralist, the power resources, the 
institutionalist, and the new politics approach.  
 
2.5.1. The pluralist approach 
 
The pluralist approach to the politics of health care might be 
considered the application of a classical liberal perspective on health care 
politics. Schmitter defines pluralism, in direct contrast to corporatism, as 
follows: 
 
“A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, 
competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to 
type and scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, 
recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership 
selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise 
monopoly of representational activity within their respective 
categories” (Schmitter, 1976, p.96). 
 
As the quote above suggests, pluralism understands politics as a 
marketplace of ideas and actors competing with one another. It could be 
suggested that the pluralist approach relies upon three general 
assumptions. First, the pluralist approach presents the political domain 
and the economic domain as separate and limits the political domain to 
activities within formal political institutions. Despite the separation of 
these domains, the pluralist approach suggests that all actors including 
political actors are self-interested; however, the self-interest of political 
actors is defined within the limits of politics. Therefore, according to the 
pluralist approach, politics is mainly interest-group politics. The third 
assumption of the pluralist approach is that society can be understood as a 
free marketplace of ideas: individuals can express their preferences in 
general elections or can organise along with their own interests and lobby 
those in power.  
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To exemplify, Chinitz provides an example of the application of 
pluralist approach in analysis of health care politics in Israel. He suggests 
that the pluralist democratic system of Israel made the rise of a powerful 
government possible, which led to a non-incremental change in health care 
insurance policy of the country in spite of the traditional opposition of the 
labour federation and the Labour Party (Chinitz, 1995, p.923).  
According to the critiques of the pluralist approach, the main problem 
of this approach lies in its assumption that power is evenly distributed in 
societies. Nevertheless, political groups have different capacities and these 
changes the prospects of different political groups to influence the political 
outcomes (Giaimo, 2005, p.196). As Navarro’s study indicates, what the 
majority thinks on a particular topic might not be sufficient to change 
policies accordingly. Navarro argues that the U.S. has long been an example 
in which public opinion on health care policy was not in favour of the status 
quo in health care policies, yet the popular idea did not resonate at the 
political level (1994, p.173). In addition, as Alford successfully discovers, 
there might also be ‘repressed structural interests,’ which refer to the 
interests of sectors of society that have not been served by a social 
institution or political mechanism (Alford, 1975, p.15). Therefore, these 
critiques suggest that the pluralist approach to politics is fallacious in 
grasping how politics operate within the context of unequal power relations. 
Despite the theoretical strength of its critiques, it could be argued that 
it is not easy for researchers to escape the pluralist approach to politics. 
Empirical research generally involves investigating visible political 
conflicts between particular actors. If scholars fail to link these empirical 
observations to political, economic and historical contexts and positions of 
political actors in unequal power distribution, then results will most likely 
echo the pluralist approach. In addition, researchers might also strive to 
establish links between the political and economic domains in order to 
escape the naiveté of the pluralist findings. 
Last but not the least, the pluralist approach to politics might be 
suitable for the analysis of small-scale political processes. After the most 
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powerful actors set the general parameters of a political debate, Walt 
argues that ‘bounded pluralism’ might apply to sub-decisions (Walt, 1994, 
p.202). If applied to health care policies, it could be argued that powerful 
political actors determine issues of systemic importance in the high politics 
of health care. High politics of health care here refers to issues that are 
closely interlinked with wider economic and political decisions. 
Alternatively, a wide range of groups may have a say and even influence 
the final decision in low politics of health care (Walt, 1994, p.10). However, 
Walt adds a word of caution to his promotion of the bounded pluralist 
approach for issues of low politics of health care; he notes that even the 
bounded form of pluralism may not be appropriate for countries which are 
under the total hegemony of market ideology (Walt, 1994, p.203).  
 
2.5.2. The power resources approach 
 
The power resources approach can be regarded as the application of 
social democratic theory to the studies of welfare politics and policies. Korpi, 
the pioneering scholar of the power resources approach, suggests that there 
are basically two power resources in capitalist democracies. The first one 
derives from control over the means of production; the second one originates 
from political organisations (1980, p.298). While the power resources 
approach also represents politics and the economy as separate domains like 
the pluralist approach does, it identifies the broader system as capitalist, 
which distinguishes it from the pluralist approach. And unlike the pluralist 
approach, the power resources approach assumes that power is not evenly 
distributed in capitalist democracies. For Korpi, the capitalist system is 
based upon a class structure (1989; 1980). Similar to Korpi, Navarro 
suggests that interest groups are part of a broader class politics (1994, 
pp.174-175). The power resources approach proposes that distributive 
concerns are at the centre of most political processes (Baldwin, 1999, p.1). 
According to the power resources approach, social classes can only 
become political actors through different institutional forms (Korpi, 1989, 
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p.312). More specifically, Korpi evaluates the scope of a working class 
organisation based on the proportion of unionised workers in the labour 
force and the proportion of the constituency supporting political parties on 
the left end of the spectrum (1980, p.307). Esping-Andersen elaborates this 
approach by noting that the power of the organised labour always has to be 
assessed in relation to the contending actors (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.16). 
For Korpi, although the working class is the less powerful party in the 
economic realm, it might become a bearer of significant power in the 
political realm, as it is the numerical majority (1989, p.312). As a result, the 
power of the organised labour might infuse state intervention into 
distributive issues to the benefit of its members (Korpi, 1980, p.298). In 
other words, left parties and trade unions might institute social rights by 
assuming the power of the state, or they might act as powerful political 
alternatives that push governments to adopt (at least partly) their social 
agendas (Korpi, 1989, p.316). As the power resources approach assumes 
that the state is a relatively autonomous entity, organised labour can grab 
state power through democratic means and use it for their own interests. 
Once organised labour start to use the legislative power to introduce welfare 
policies, the introduction of these policies might further strengthen 
organised labour in return (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.16). 
Critics of the power resources approach include representatives of the 
institutionalist school (Skocpol, 1992; 1980; Immergut, 1992) and scholars 
who argue that Christian democracy, not Social democracy, has been 
decisive in the establishment of welfare states in most countries (Manow 
and Kersbergen, 2009; Van Kersbergen, 1995).  
Main criticisms of the power resources approach are as follows. The 
first is that the power resources approach imposes one form of political 
organisations (left parties and trade unions) upon the politics of welfare 
while disregarding all other forms of political organisations. However, the 
significant influence of trade unions and left parties on the development of 
welfare states is due to the particular historical experience of some 
countries, leaving a significant group of others as outliers to the norm. The 
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second criticism questions the portrayal of welfare politics as a class 
struggle between two broad categories of classes, namely the working class 
and the bourgeoisie. For instance, many scholars underline the importance 
of the middle class in the development of welfare states (Baldwin, 1999, p.9) 
and in the transformation of health care systems (Leys, 2010, p.19; Evans, 
1997, p.453). Skocpol also notes the significance of cross-class coalitions for 
various social policies (1992, p.25).  
In another criticism, Van Kersbergen questions the empirical validity 
of the power resources approach. He suggests that religiously motivated 
political actors, specifically Christian democratic parties, played a key role 
in the creation of welfare states and policies in European countries. He 
draws attention to the fact that Christian democratic parties were the major 
actors in the development of social policies in these countries. Van 
Kersbergen takes this claim one step further and argues that the content of 
the Christian democratic parties’ ideologies created a distinctive welfare 
state regime (1995, pp.239-240). Additionally, political coalitions 
established by Christian Democratic parties also influenced the social policy 
developments (Manow and Kersbergen, 2009, p.28). More generally, Manow 
and Van Kersbergen suggest that the state/church conflict as well as the 
conflict between different sects of Christianity had an immense effect on the 
development of social policies (2009, p.4).  
 
2.5.3. The institutionalist approach 
 
The institutionalist approach asserts that institutions frame politics 
by defining the terms within which political conflicts take place (Rothstein 
and Steinmo, 2002; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1992, p.243). 
Institutionalism has several variants, including sociological, historical, 
rational and ideational. Here I would like to focus especially on historical 
and ideational versions, as they are well-established approaches to the 
study of welfare politics. 
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Institutionalist arguments on welfare state development and reform 
can differ. While some literature points to the key role of political 
institutions in framing politics, others give political institutions a stronger 
agency. Immergut, who exemplified the latter trend, argues that 
institutional setting in a given country context has much more influence on 
the policy outcome than the initial ideas and organisational strengths of 
political actors involved in the process (1992, p.xiii). This institutional 
context refers to: what extent executive body can act independently from 
the legislature, the courts, or the electorate (Immergut, 1992, p.26); what is 
politically feasible (Immergut, 1992 p.xiii); where ‘veto points’ in the 
political system lie (Immergut, 1992, p.7); and which actors are excluded 
from the political process (Immergut, 1992, p.21). For Immergut, the 
political system determines “whether politics is best understood as ‘interest-
group’ politics, ‘professional’ politics, ‘bureaucratic’ politics, or ‘class’ 
politics” (1992, p.xiv). Therefore, in the eyes of the institutionalists, 
institutions generally have more power than social groups in affecting the 
political processes. 
Skocpol declares, “the degrees of success in achieving political goals -
including the enactment of social legislation- depend on the relative 
opportunities that existing political institutions offer to the group or 
movement in question (and simultaneously deny to its opponents and 
competitors)” (Skocpol, 1992, p.54).  In Skocpol’s words, “states and parties 
have their own structures and histories, which in turn have their own 
impact upon society” (1980). In practice, this contention implies that 
institutions shape the demands of both the capital and the labour. They do 
not have any a priori demands (Skocpol, 1992, pp.25-30). 
For institutionalists, institutions may affect political processes and 
policy outcomes by reproducing themselves; in other words, ‘institutional 
inertia’ affects policy outcomes. In this regard, the state bureaucracy is one 
of the most crucial yet most neglected political actors involved in the politics 
of welfare. For instance, Asiskovitch proposes that all democracies allocate 
power to the bureaucracy (Asiskovitch, 2010, p.548). In addition, relatively 
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specialised policy communities within a bureaucracy may also emerge as 
important actors (Walt, 1994, p.86). However, Asiskovitch notes that the 
power of bureaucracies vary according to the political importance of the 
issue at hand: if the issue might affect the electoral prospects of the 
government, then the power of the bureaucracy over that issue is limited 
(Asiskovitch, 2010, p.550). Moreover, the leverage of the bureaucracy vis-à-
vis elected governments varies according to the institutional structure in a 
particular country. As evidenced in the case of the U.S., the impact of the 
expert-run Central Budget Office on the design of health care reform was 
greater than that of the contending different political factions at the time 
(Skocpol, 1997, p.67).  
Another strand of the institutionalist approach called sociological 
institutionalism, draws attention to the norms and values produced and 
sustained by institutions. Sociological institutionalism suggests that 
institutions create and sustain legitimacy by establishing the prevalent 
norms and values. Freeman, one of the strongest advocates for this 
approach, suggests that health care systems are essentially cultural 
systems. For Freeman, the legitimacy of health care systems is in “their 
ability to reproduce the cultural norms on which they depend” (1999, p.93). 
Finally, ideational institutionalism is one of the dominant approaches 
in understanding health care politics. Béland argues that taking ideas 
seriously in researching policy change and health care politics can escape 
institutionalism from accounting mainly for the absence of change or the 
presence of limited change. It can do so by linking the politics of ideas with 
the mobilisation of political actors without underestimating the impact of 
unequal power distribution and the limits that existing policy structures on 
policy change (Béland, 2010, p.626). In their study on Canadian and 
German health care systems, for instance, Bhatia and Coleman exemplify 
the explanatory power of the ideational institutionalism in the domain of 
health care politics (for a similar case study see Millar et al., 2013). They 
argue that the presence of challenging discourse and the consensus among 
different political actors over that discourse contributed to the emergence 
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of significant policy change in Germany, the absence of which left Canada 
with minor policy changes (Bhatia and Coleman, 2003, p.717). 
The main benefit of the institutionalist approach is that it allows room 
for understanding different configurations of politics in different 
geographies. Bringing history and culture into the analysis, the 
institutionalist approach draws the scholars’ attention to the importance of 
the contextualisation of the subject matter.  
 
2.5.4. The new politics approach 
 
The new politics approach, which is part of the institutionalist 
tradition, emerged as a reaction to the once popular arguments that claimed 
welfare states have been in demise since the late 1970s (i.e. Clayton, 1998, 
p.1131). Against this claim, the new politics approach claims that the 
nature of welfare politics changed after the establishment of welfare states 
(Pierson, 1996). Despite the erosion of the political power of organised 
labour over time, Pierson underlines the fact that the welfare programmes 
still survived (1996, p.175).  
The resilience of the pre-established welfare programmes in the 
context of a disempowered labour force can be explained in two ways. First, 
power sharing in modern democracies has made radical reforms harder. 
Given that welfare programmes signify the new status quo, the 
conservative attitude of democratic institutions guarantees the resiliency of 
these programmes. Second, major welfare policies created their own 
beneficiary groups (Pierson, 1993, p.628), to punish politicians who might 
undermine the programme (Pierson, 1996, pp.174-175). 
Therefore, in contrast to the power resources approach, Pierson 
suggests that class-based political organisations do not play a key role in 
the politics of welfare today. He adds, “Today’s policymakers operate in an 
environment fundamentally shaped by policies inherited from the past, 
rather than suggesting that current politics will echo the conflicts of a 
previous era” (Pierson, 1996, p.179). In practice, the new politics approach 
 49 
 
generally accounts for sustained levels of public spending for welfare 
programmes and public support for the welfare state.  
One could make use of Pierson’s distinction between welfare 
programmes whose sole constituency is organised labour and welfare 
programmes whose constituency is not limited to this group (Pierson, 1996, 
p.175). In this categorisation, health care services fall into the second 
category. In Baldwin’s words, “although they intersect and often coincide, 
the actors who do battle over welfare policy and social classes in the more 
general sense are, in fact, two distinct entities” (Baldwin, 1999, p.11). The 
distinction that the new politics approach draws between these welfare 
recipients (i.e. members of a social health insurance fund for white-collar 
workers) and social classes (i.e. the working class) might have important 
political implications. In addition, beneficiaries of specific welfare 
programmes vary in their particular features. For instance, while income 
level might be the main criterion in determining who would be most affected 
from the reform of an income maintenance programme, changes in health 
insurance legislation might have the most influence individuals with 
genetic diseases. 
Neoliberal health care reforms that make citizens’ access to health 
care services more difficult are highly unlikely as they result in the electoral 
failure of the governments. According to the new politics approach, 
governments can only introduce neoliberal health care reforms if they are 
in a position to absorb the negative electoral consequences (Pierson, 1996, 
p.176) or if they face a serious budgetary crisis (Pierson, 1996, p.177). 
Otherwise, they will not be able to introduce a neoliberal health care reform.  
Nevertheless, in its current form, the new politics approach seems to 
offer a rather conservative understanding of welfare politics. Skocpol’s 
contribution might lend this approach a different spin from the conservative 
attitude. Skocpol agrees with the idea that previous policies affect the 
creation and type of new policies. In addition, she argues, “We must make 
social policies the starting points as well as the end points of analysis: As 
politics creates policies, policies also remake politics” (Skocpol, 1992, p.58). 
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2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates the importance of politics as a factor 
contributing to policy change in the domain of health care. This chapter laid 
out the main parameters of the political conflict within the realm of health 
care policies today. As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, this political 
conflict centres upon the commodity status of health care services, as well 
as distributive concerns about health care finance and delivery. The chapter 
also discussed the main characteristics of neoliberalism as the political 
economic model that led to the proliferation of health care reforms from the 
late 1970s until today, and the particular form of solutions that 
neoliberalism proposed in the health care policy realm. The chapter also 
outlined the major approaches to examining health care politics: the 
pluralist, the power resources, the institutionalist, and the new politics 
approach.  
Insights from all these approaches are used –where appropriate- in the 
analysis of the empirical data that this study collected. While generally 
drawing upon the insights of historical and ideational versions of 
institutionalism, I agree with Béland’s suggestion stated as follows: 
“Overall, rather than rely exclusively on monocausal models, the analysis 
of policy change could study the relationship between ideas and institutions 
while taking into consideration the role of specific actors and the changing 
social and economic circumstances they face” (Béland, 2010, p.627). The 
following chapter presents the historical, political and economic legacies of 
Turkish politics and the historical foundations and main tenets of Turkey’s 
health care system.  
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Chapter 3: Health Care and Politics in Turkish 
History 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
There seems to be an implicit consensus in the health care politics 
literature that domestic politics have shaped health care reforms in 
advanced capitalist societies in Western Europe and North America, while 
international influences have been decisive in framing reforms in other 
parts of the world (Immergut, 1992; Giaimo, 2005; Giaimo and Manow, 
1999; Harrison and McDonald, 2008; Jacobs and Skocpol, 2010; Navarro, 
1994). Apart from a small number of exceptions—i.e. Moran’s study (2000, 
p.152) on the health care state in Western Europe and North America, 
which demonstrates the United States’ impact on health care reforms in 
other advanced capitalist countries—the literature generally conforms to 
this disputable assumption.  
Without underestimating the global power inequalities between 
countries, corporate powers, and international organisations, it is argued 
here that this assumption renders nearly invisible the impact of three 
factors—inherited political and economic institutions, the political history 
of a country, and the role of domestic politics—on health care reforms in a 
developing country context. In fact, scholars suggest that health care 
reforms always arose as products of domestic politics (Blank and Burau, 
2010, p.2; Moran, 1999, p.17).   
Scholars employing the Historical Institutionalist perspective argue 
that all public policy reforms interact with inherited political and economic 
institutions in the context in which they are carried out (Ellison, 2006, p.1; 
Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p.351). In other words, national political 
contestations over specific public policy reforms do not occur in a vacuum. 
On the contrary, the historical institutional context frames, inspires, and 
provides health care reforms, and all other reforms, a meaningful platform. 
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In light of these insights, I would like to bring the history of the health 
care system and the politics of health care into the discussion on health care 
reform in Turkey. This chapter provides an overview of the historical 
development of Turkey’s health care system by linking this to the history of 
Turkish politics. In doing so, the main objective here is to provide a 
historical and institutional background to the political contestations over 
contemporary health care reform in Turkey.  
In addition to this introduction, the chapter has three sections. In the 
next section, the chapter outlines the history of the development of the 
health care system and the politics of health care in Turkey. The third 
section reviews the main tenets of Turkey’s health care system before the 
reform and locates it within a comparative framework. Lastly, the 
conclusion links the politics of health care in Turkey from the establishment 
of the Republic of Turkey in early 20th century until the rise of the AK Party 
and the launch of the HTP and the main parameters of health care system 
development in Turkey. 
 
3.2. The history of health care politics in Turkey before the 
reform 
 
This section gives an overview of the major developments in the 
Turkish health care system’s history while locating these developments 
within the history of Turkish politics. Özbek, suggests that this history can 
be split on the basis of critical developments and general trends into three 
stages: the first period (1850s —1940s) the second period (1940s—1980s) 
and the third period (1980s—present). Following Özbek’s periodisation, this 
section is organised into three parts. The first part explains the 
development of the health care system until the end of the Second World 
War (WW2). The second part examines the developments in the domain of 
health care between the end of WW2 and the military coup d’état in 1980. 
The final part investigates the history of the health care system 
 53 
 
development and the politics of health care from the military coup d’état in 
1980 until the AK Party’s rise to power in the 2002 general elections.  
 
3.2.1. The history of health care and politics until the end of WW2 
 
In order to understand the development of social policies in Turkey, 
Özbek argues that scholars should look to the late Ottoman period. Özbek 
suggests that the rise of the modern state and the state’s engagement with 
public health did not start with the birth of the Turkish Republic, but rather 
during the late Ottoman era (2006, p.19). Indeed, historical research 
validates this claim in the domain of health care. For instance, Aydın 
reports that the Ottoman state began to employ medical doctors as state 
officials in order to serve the public during the late 19th century and early 
20th century (2002, pp.11-25). The medical doctors were known as the 
fatherland’s physicians (memleket tabibi) or the government’s physicians 
(hükümet tabibi) at the time. The late Ottoman era signified the birth of 
modern statecraft and modern social policies in the Balkans and in 
Anatolia.  
The political history of the late Ottoman era suggests that the medical 
profession played an important role in popularising the Western ideals of a 
secular nation state. These medical doctors were graduates of the Ottoman 
medical schools. The first modern medical education within the boundaries 
of the Ottoman Empire dates back to the establishment of the Military 
Medical School (Tıbhane-i Amire) in the first half of the 19th century, which 
later became known as the first modern School of Medicine (Mekteb-i 
Tıbbiye-i Adliye-i Şahane).  
Medical school graduates formed a well-organised sector of society. In 
fact, the first medical association was founded in the second half of the 19th 
century. Medical doctors organised in ways beyond just professional 
medical societies; students and graduates of the School of Medicine were 
among the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti, or İTC). The İTC was considered to be the political 
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organisation responsible for the establishment of the Turkish Republic, and 
medical doctors were commonly in the higher ranks (i.e. Dr. Nazım Bey). 
Given their historic role in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 
the early 20th century and the elective affinity between their secular 
educational backgrounds and the official ideology at the time, doctors 
gained elite status within the social and political hierarchy in the Republic.  
Therefore, the medical doctors who once constituted the opposition in 
the late Ottoman era became part of the governing bloc in the early 
Republican period. Founded in 1923, the Republic was run by the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP) with its 
charismatic leader and founding father of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. The CHP ruled as a single-party government until the transition 
to a multiparty system in the early 1950s.  
While being part of the governing bloc would have empowered doctors 
politically, it hardly protected their professional autonomy from the state. 
A Law on the Practice of Medicine ratified in the early days of the Republic 
established provincial medical chambers (Medical chambers were known as 
Etibba Odaları in Turkish at the time) (The Republic of Turkey, 1928). In 
other words, the executive body founded the professional medical 
organisations. As part of this, the first medical chamber, the Istanbul 
provincial medical chamber, was established in 1929. It could be argued 
that the establishment of provincial medical chambers by law implied a 
corporatist tendency in the political structure of the Republic. State 
dominance over professional bodies might be considered a reflection of the 
Ottoman-Turkish polity’s ‘bureaucratic centralist’ character (Heper, 1991, 
p.12).  
One of the defining features of the origin of social policies in the period 
until the end of WW2, according to Özbek, is that the policies emerged in 
the context of limited industrialisation and the absence of a politically and 
socially significant social category: the industrial workers. For Özbek, in the 
first period of this history, the state mainly introduced social assistance 
measures and was involved in pro-natalist policies (2006, pp.20-21).  
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One of the critical developments in the first period was the 
promulgation of the Public Health Law. With this law, the state openly 
declared that it assumed responsibility for protecting the health of its 
population against communicable diseases (The Republic of Turkey, 1930). 
Günal notes that this was a necessary step at the time, as communicable 
diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, trachoma, syphilis and leprosy were 
prevalent among the citizenry in the early days of the Republic (2008, p.22).  
In the first period, the state only financed preventive health services 
and left curative health care services to resource-deficit municipalities. 
Financing curative health care services therefore constituted the most 
significant problem at the time. Although social insurance and taxation had 
both been mentioned as possible sources of health care finance during the 
National Economy Congress in 1923 (Talas, 1992, pp.94-95), the state did 
not assume any responsibility for initiating the establishment of public 
insurance funds until the end of WW2.  
While the state did not establish modern social security measures in 
this period, some scholars emphasise that it did pioneer significant 
legislative developments that began to regulate the labour market. One 
such example was the establishment of health insurance funds and 
provision of health care services in the mining sector, which employed the 
largest portion of industrial workers in the country at the time. The Turkish 
Parliament passed legislation to regulate the working conditions of coal 
mine workers in Zonguldak and the Ereğli basin (The Republic of Turkey, 
1921). This law required the owners of coalmines to contribute to their 
workers’ health insurance funds and provide free health care services. Talas 
argues that this legislation was the first social policy legislation of the 
Republic. Unlike Özbek, who dates the emergence of social policies to the 
late Ottoman era, Talas argues that the legislation symbolised the 
emergence of a new ‘policy paradigm’ that portrayed state as the regulating 
party in relations between workers and employers (1992, p.85-86). Although 
the state was involved in the labour relations of the mining sector, it did not 
make financial contributions to the health fund of the workers. The 
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revenues of the fund were collected from workers and their employers only 
(Talas, 1992, p.119). The state’s non-contribution to the workers’ social 
security funds became the norm in the second period. 
In the domain of health care provision, the state during this period 
lacked sufficient human, technical and institutional capacities to serve the 
health needs of the general population. As Buğra reports, all international 
observers declared that human resources and the institutional capacity of 
Turkey’s health care system were insufficient (2008, pp.120-121). 
Therefore, in the first period of the history of health care and politics 
in Turkey, Turkey’s institutional capacity for health care finance and 
delivery was limited. The major development in this period was the state’s 
involvement with public health measures that aimed to protect the 
population from communicable diseases. In addition, this period 
demonstrates how medical doctors emerged as a privileged ally of the 
official ideology. Lastly, in the first period, the basic features of the nascent 
social security system started to emerge in the mining sector.  
 
3.2.2. The history of health care and politics between the end of 
WW2 and the military coup d’état in 1980 
 
The end of the WW2 marked the start of the second period in the 
history of social policies in Turkey. Social policies developed in line with the 
national developmentalist economic policies. In this regard, it is suggested 
here that Turkey’s welfare system can be categorised as an example of 
‘protective welfare state’, which is defined as a system that makes social 
rights conditional upon labour market attachment that makes these rights 
available for only a limited stratum of the society (Rudra, 2007, p.384). 
Parallel to social policy developments in Western European countries, 
Turkey began to initiate modern social security measures and invest in the 
extension of public capacity for providing health care services. According to 
Özbek, this period marked the strongest developments in the history of 
social policies in Turkey (2006, pp.22-23).  
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3.2.2.1 Transition to electoral democracy and its impact on health 
care politics 
 
The second period commenced with the introduction of two consecutive 
National Health Plans. Mr. Refik Saydam, the first Minister of Health for 
Turkey, introduced the first plan in the late 1940s. The plan called for the 
extension of preventive health care services, better organisation of health 
care delivery, and the establishment of health chests or social insurances to 
finance these services (Aydın, 2002, pp.53-54).  
CHP had ruled the country as a single party government since the 
founding of the Republic in 1923. General elections in 1950 marked 
Turkey’s transition to a multiparty parliamentary democracy. The 
Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, or DP) gained more than half of the 
national votes, which led to a peaceful transition of power from the CHP to 
DP. Later, Mr. Behçet Uz, the DP Minister of Health, launched the Second 
Health Plan. Similar to Saydam’s plan, the major objective of the Second 
Health Plan was also better organisation of health care services and the 
extension of health care services to all parts of the country (Aydın, 2002, 
p.53-54).  
Keyder makes it clear that populism only became a powerful political 
tool and useful discourse after the ruling bloc was divided into two political 
parties, the CHP and DP (Keyder, 2007b, p.147). Toprak argues that this 
form of populism, which was blended with nationalism, was based on the 
idea that the social policies of the state might abolish class differences and 
create a ‘classless’ nation (Toprak, 1982, p.350).  
In fact, the emergence of the health care service provision as a 
democratic imperative seemed to yield some fruit in the DP period. Günal 
suggests that the share of the MoH’s budget increased substantially, and 
public capacity of health care provision also made significant progress 
(2008, p.23). Günal also notes that the DP government invested in the 
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development of curative health care services, the institutional capacity of 
which was quite restricted at the time (2008, p.145).  
The governments were also quite active in supporting the making of a 
national bourgeoisie. Toprak suggests that the state’s investment in the 
creation of the national bourgeoisie dated back to the late Ottoman era 
(Toprak, 1982, p.348). Boratav argues that the Republic was no different; it 
had always been committed to nurturing a national bourgeoisie (Boratav, 
2010, p.40). However, the state’s involvement in the creation of the national 
bourgeoisie did not resonate in the domain of health care, as health care 
were not considered to be a lucrative sector at the time. Therefore, health 
care services emerged and began to grow as part of the public sector. 
 
3.2.2.2 The 1961 Constitution and the socialisation of health care 
services 
 
The first military coup d’état in the history of the Republic overthrew 
the DP government on 27 May 1960 and condemned the former Prime 
Minister to death. The National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi) 
then ruled the country for over a year and ratified the new Constitution of 
Turkey in 1961 before transferring power to civilians. Professionals, 
including academics and other leading civil servants, collaborated with the 
political cadre in the establishment of the new regime. For instance, well-
known law professors joined the Constitution Making Committee of the 
military junta and prepared the new Constitution of the Republic.  
Despite the fact that the Constitution was the product of a military 
junta, many scholars consider it to be the most democratic and progressive 
constitution of the Republic. Talas, one of the pioneering scholars of social 
policy in Turkey, argues that the 1961 Constitution was a progressive 
development as it included clauses guaranteeing the right to union, the 
right to collective bargaining, and the right to industrial action for the first 
time in Turkish history (1992, p.70). Similarly, Boratav argues that the 
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1961 Constitution paved the way for the emergence of populist 
redistributive policies between 1962 and 1976 (2010, p.123).  
Indeed, the 1961 Constitution strengthened the social state 
components of the Republic and included a special ‘right to health’ clause 
that made the state responsible for universal health care provision. In this 
context, a 15-year long government project titled ‘the Socialisation of Health 
Services Programme’ or briefly ‘the Socialisation Programme’ (The Republic 
of Turkey, 1961) was launched. Mr. Nusret Fişek, a distinguished professor 
of public health, was the leading figure during this reform process. The 
main objective of this Programme was to establish a vertically organised 
health care delivery system to serve the country as a whole, from the 
smallest villages to the metropolitan cities. In line with this objective, the 
Programme aimed to establish public health care service provider 
institutions on different geographical scales: health posts, health stations 
and health centres. These would operate within a working referral system 
and integrate all health care delivery units in the country under the 
purview of the MoH (Günal, 2008, pp.380-381).  
The Programme contributed to the dissemination of primary care 
services to rural areas as well as socially and economically deprived 
neighbourhoods. However, the Programme only reached 26 cities in 14 
years, which left 41 cities, including three metropolitan areas, out of the 
programme (Günal, 2008, p.25). The main reasons for this failure were 
threefold: one, the Programme lacked sustainable financing from the public 
budget. Two, the Social Insurances Institution (SSK) started organising 
separate health care services for workers, most of whom were based in 
cities. Three, the majority of medical doctors were not willing to work in the 
deprived areas of the country. 
In leftist circles, the Socialisation Programme is considered to be one 
of the most significant historical moments in the Republican history, as the 
state attempted to strengthen its ‘social’ part. This Programme was believed 
to initiate a new policy paradigm aiming at the development of a 
universalistic national health care system. Indeed, the egalitarian impact 
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of the Programme extended the scope of primary health care services, which 
were provided for free at the point of need. In addition, the Socialisation 
Programme strengthened citizens’ perception that health care provision is 
the responsibility of the state.  
However, Günal argues that the Socialisation Programme failed to 
initiate the establishment of a universalistic national health care system, 
especially concerning health care finance (2008, p.26). Aydın argued that 
Nusret Fişek, the pioneer of the Socialisation Programme, supported the 
idea of health insurance rather than a tax-based health care finance model 
(2002, p.90). Therefore, Aydın suggests that the Socialisation Programme 
did not call for the establishment of a full-fledged state health care system 
(2002, pp.82-83). 
 
3.2.2.3 The developments in the social security  
 
In the second period of the history of social policies in Turkey, the main 
parameters of the health care finance were slowly consolidated. The Social 
Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu, or SSK), formerly known 
as the Workers’ Insurances Institution, was founded in 1946 as the first 
social insurance institution. While the active labour force numbered at 
around 14.5 million in the early 1950s, the SSK provided insurance 
coverage to only half a million workers (Buğra, 2008, p.161). Nevertheless, 
the number of insured workers substantially increased throughout the 
1960s. In the meantime, the SSK extended insurance coverage to workers’ 
family members (Buğra, 2008, p.178), which facilitated considerable 
number of citizens’ access to health care services.  
Shortly after the SSK was created, the Retirement Fund for Civil 
Servants (Emekli Sandığı, or ES) was established in 1949 (The Republic of 
Turkey, 1949). However, Turkey’s social security system only began to 
provide insurance coverage for the self-employed, including farmers, in 
1971, due to the establishment of the Pension Fund for the Self Employed 
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(Esnaf, Sanatkarlar ve Diğer Bağımsız Çalışanlar Sigorta Kurumu, or 
BAĞ-KUR) (The Republic of Turkey, 1971). 
While the health care finance model in Turkey started to take shape 
as a social security based model, the structure of the country’s labour 
market put serious restrictions on the model’s ability to provide universal 
coverage. For instance, in 1927, only one-fourth of the population resided in 
cities. It was only in 1985 that the urban population exceeded the rural 
population. Therefore, in this period, the social security schemes (especially 
before the establishment of BAĞ-KUR) failed to reach the large majority of 
the population working in agriculture.  
In order to compensate for this failure to provide universal coverage, 
the Hospitals Ordinance of 1955 included a special clause to provide free 
public hospital examinations for civil servants, medical professionals, 
pregnant women, people with infectious diseases, emergency cases, and 
people who acquired official documents from local authorities, namely 
muhtars, proving that they were poor (The Republic of Turkey, 1955). Buğra 
suggests that by dealing with the failure to provide universal coverage in 
this way, social policies emerged not in the form of formal social rights but 
rather through reciprocity relations between the people left outside of the 
formal social security system and governments in Turkey (2008, p.183). 
This practice was just one example of how informality and patronage 
relations played a significant role in social policy and other domains such 
as housing (Buğra, 2008, p. 183).11 
From another perspective, Günal views these features of the 
Ordinance as an indication of the hierarchal nature of the social security 
system in terms of access to health care services. Civil servants were in a 
favourable position at the top, while those working in the informal sectors 
and agricultural sector were at the bottom (Günal, 2008, p.185). In addition 
to these inequalities, the Ordinance also allowed public hospitals to offer 
                                                        
11 The Turkish state adopted a similar policy in the case of housing. As the migration from 
rural to urban areas gained pace, the state started to let migrants from the rural areas to 
settle in public lands and construct their houses upon public land rather than developing 
social housing projects (Buğra, 2008: 183). 
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private, first class, second class and third class rooms for their patients. 
Therefore, Günal argues that the objective was not to institute equality in 
access to health care but rather to facilitate access to services in line with 
social stratification. 
 
3.2.2.4 The politics of health care in the second period 
 
In the second period of the history of social policies, Turkey witnessed 
the establishment of institutions representing employers, workers and 
medical doctors. The Chambers of Commerce was established in 1950, and 
membership was compulsory. The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions 
(Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, or TÜRK-İŞ) was founded in 
1951 as the only trade union representing the workers at the time. Both of 
these institutions were weak in their ability to mobilise constituencies and 
they remained extensions of state institutions until the late 1960s.  
The TTB was founded in 1953 and replaced the provincial medical 
chambers. (The history of the TTB is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.) The 
TTB functioned as a corporatist professional body. In its early years, the 
TTB defended the privilege of medical doctors to open up private clinics 
without quitting positions in public hospitals. From the end of WW2 until 
the transfer of power to civilians after the 1960 military coup d’état, it can 
be argued that neither the TTB nor TÜRK-İŞ had a significant impact in 
the politics of social policies and health care in particular.  
Class-based political divisions in Turkey became visible only after the 
1960s. After the ratification of the 1961 Constitution, labour and capital 
organisations based on voluntary membership began to appear (Buğra, 
1997, pp.333-336). In 1961, the Turkish Confederation of Employer 
Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, or TİSK) was 
founded and became the political voice of the employers. In 1967, the 
Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions’ of Turkey (Devrimci İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, or DİSK) was established and became one of 
the most influential actors of the workers’ movement. In the late 1960s, 12 
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leading businessmen established the Turkish Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, or 
TÜSİAD) to act autonomously from the state with the objective of 
influencing political decisions. The TÜSİAD soon appeared to be the 
strongest representative of the employers.  
 
3.2.2.4.1 The political contestations over the Socialisation Programme 
 
In this period, two key parts of the Socialisation Programme sparked 
political debates. The first was the government’s proposal to require 
medical doctors to work full-time for public hospitals, which reappeared 
during the implementation of the HTP, which is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7. Ersoy reports that a significant number of medical doctors at the 
time strongly opposed this full-time work proposal (1998, p.11). Their 
opposition was mainly motived by self-interest. The number of medical 
doctors’ private clinics proliferated in İstanbul throughout the 1950s, and 
the newspapers were filled with private clinic advertisements (Günal, 2008, 
p.185). Not surprisingly, in the early 1960s medical doctors with their own 
private clinics resisted working full time for public hospitals, and the strong 
opposition eventually led to the dismissal of the proposal. Despite the fact 
that the TTB lacked ‘veto power’ in the political system, medical doctors’ 
ability to dismiss the full-time work proposal demonstrates their political 
power at the time. 
The second contested part of the Programme was its ambition to unite 
all public health facilities under the purview of the MoH. Public health 
facilities included public hospitals (affiliated with the MoH), the SSK 
hospitals and public university hospitals. Therefore, the MoH’s proposal to 
control all of the public facilities was not welcomed by SSK bureaucrats and 
university hospital academics. In a meeting organised by the Ministry, the 
Head of Health Affairs in the SSK Dr. Refik Erer argued that SSK hospitals 
were established thanks to ‘the labour of workers’ and thus they should be 
in charge of their hospitals. Erer concluded that a transfer of SSK hospitals 
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to the MoH was simply impossible (Ministry of Health and Social 
Assistance, 1966). Representatives of university hospitals also opposed the 
proposed transfer of public university hospitals to the MoH. The firm stance 
that SSK bureaucrats and academics took on this issue might be suggestive 
of their quest to keep their autonomy, as well as their distrust of the 
government.  
 
3.2.2.4.2. The power of trade unions and employer organisations in the 
Social Insurances Institution 
 
Although Turkey’s health care system was based upon a social 
insurance model, its governance model did not resemble the social 
insurance-based systems of Western Europe that gave trade unions (and 
sometimes employer organisations as well) exclusive power to administer 
funds. The Turkish social security system did not allow power sharing 
between governments and trade unions. In fact, the composition of the 
executive board of the SSK reflected the bureaucratic dominance over the 
SSK’s decision-making process. According to the constituent legislation of 
the SSK, five of the seven members of the executive board were state 
officials (The Republic of Turkey, 1964, 10th Article). One member was the 
representative of the employers, while another was the representative of 
workers. Therefore, it could be argued that the administration of Turkey’s 
welfare system was corporatist, yet the governance of this system was not 
based upon a corporatist pact between the state and other social actors. It 
was rather state-dominated or can be characterised as ‘state corporatism’ 
as Schmitter defines it (Schmitter, 1974, pp.103-104) 
 
3.2.2.4.3 The impact of the left on the politics of health care 
 
Keyder suggests that the dissolution of the world system induced by 
the Great Depression enabled the Turkish bureaucracy to introduce a state-
directed national economy model after the end of WW2 (2007b, pp.11-12). 
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For Yeldan, this model lent itself to the consolidation of the industrial 
bourgeoisie in the 1960s and 1970s, as the state transferred significant 
amounts of profits to the Turkish bourgeoisie in this period (2001, p.38).  
In general, the late 1960s and 1970s were the most successful years 
for the left in Turkey, both in terms of electoral success and ability to 
mobilise public support (Boratav, 2010, p. 221). Even though this period 
marked the strongest period for Turkey’s left, Keyder argues “neither 
farmers nor workers were politically strong and organised enough to 
influence directly the outcome of a political contestation” (2007b, p.13). For 
Keyder, the major influential political actors in Turkish politics were from 
different groups within the bureaucracy and the nascent bourgeoisie 
(2007b, p.13). Indeed, Keyder’s argument is validated to an extent as the 
institutional setting empowered the bureaucracy and gave a showpiece role 
for trade union representatives.  
However, the discursive power of the left constituted a strong vantage 
point for governments to shape their policies. The power of the left also 
paved the way for the transformation of the CHP into a social democratic 
party in the early 1970s. The main dynamic of the left mobilisation 
originated through trade unions and student movements.  
The second law on trade unions repealed the first legislation (The 
Republic of Turkey, 1947), and loosened restrictions on the organisation of 
trade unions (The Republic of Turkey, 1963). In this context, DİSK was 
established in 1967 as an alternative to TÜRK-İŞ. Unlike TÜRK-İŞ’s 
bureaucratic structure and consequent failure to mobilise workers’ 
demands, DİSK emerged as the most significant political actor of the 
workers’ movement and was able to organise massive, effective rallies. 
In addition to DİSK, a number of university student movements—
generally linked to different leftist organisations—were also quite active in 
setting the political agenda in the country. These youth organisations 
included but were not limited to the Revolutionary Youth (Devrimci 
Gençlik, or DEV-GENÇ), the Liberation Army of People Party-Front 
(Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, or THKP-C), the Revolutionary 
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Path Movement (Devrimci Yol Hareketi, or DEV-YOL), the Liberation Army 
of People of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, or THKO) and the 
Progressive Youth Association (İlerici Gençler Derneği, or İGD). 
As previously mentioned, the rise of the left in Turkish politics during 
the 1960s found a limited space within parliamentary politics due to the 
judiciary’s tendency to close down socialist parties and the left’s aversion 
towards the parliamentary route to socialism. The most significant 
initiative that the left pursued through parliamentary politics was the 
establishment of the Labour Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, or TİP). 
A number of trade unionists and intellectuals founded TİP in 1961. The first 
electoral success of TİP in Turkey came during the 1965 elections, in which 
the party received roughly 2.5 per cent of national votes and gained 14 out 
of 450 seats in the Parliament. TİP’s programme did not particularly 
address health care policies, the absence of which was not an exception in 
left politics in Turkey in general at the time, but it did declare that the 
workers’ participation in government would make social and economic 
rights in the Constitution as ‘lived realities’ rather than mere clauses on 
paper (The Labour Party of Turkey, 1964). However, the TİP experience 
was short-lived.  
In response to the tense political atmosphere, Mr. Memduh Tağmaç, 
the Commander of the Turkish Military Forces at the time, said, “Social 
awakening went beyond the economic development” (Günal, 2014). In 
response to the increasing mobilisation of the left, the military once again 
staged a coup and forced the centre-right AP to resign. The new government 
that followed the AP government was not a military junta, but rather a 
civilian, technocratic government.   
With the general election in 1973, Turkish political life once again 
started to resemble an electoral democracy. Before the general elections in 
1973, CHP went through a discursive change. This discursive change 
started with the endeavours of Mr. İsmet İnönü, one of the founding fathers 
of the Republic, to appeal to the newly emerging leftist youth by declaring 
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that the CHP was located at the ‘centre-left’ (ortanın solu) of the political 
spectrum.  
However, the success of this discursive change could only be possible 
with the change of the CHP’s chairman. Mr. Bülent Ecevit was elected as 
the new chairman of the CHP in 1972. Unlike İnönü, Ecevit brought 
different variants of the left under the umbrella of the CHP and succeeded 
in presenting himself as the child of the people. In addition, CHP’s election 
promises started to resemble the social democratic parties of Western 
Europe. In the 1973 election campaigns, CHP criticised the centre-right AP 
for “undermining the social state character of the state” (The Republican 
People’s Party of Turkey, 1973, p.7) and declared that a prospective CHP 
government would make the “health care system work for citizens” (The 
Republican People’s Party of Turkey, 1973, p.17). In doing so, CHP 
promised to abolish inequalities between the SSK, ES and BAĞ-KUR (The 
Republican People’s Party of Turkey, 1973, p.133); and establish a new 
governance mechanism for social insurances that would put premium 
payers in charge (The Republican People’s Party of Turkey, 1973, p.134). 
CHP won the general elections in 1973. Ecevit’s CHP succeeded in 
maintaining its victory in the 1977 election, which marked the highest 
share of votes (roughly 41 per cent) by a left party in the history of the 
Republic.12 
The rise of Ecevit’s CHP to power brought hope for the realisation of 
the ideal of health care for all. Indeed, Ecevit’s CHP tried to take critical 
steps to consolidate a public health care system. For instance, the CHP 
government re-introduced the full time work requirement for medical 
doctors (The Republic of Turkey, 1978). However, CHP government was 
also short-lived.  
Throughout the 1970s, unstable coalition governments ran the 
country, and armed conflicts between the leftist and the nationalist groups 
created a serious political instability. In this context, governments were not 
                                                        
12 Later scholars considered around one-third of all voters in Turkey to be traditionally left 
leaning, and the remaining two thirds traditionally right leaning (Ayata, 1993a, p.32). 
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in a position to carry out comprehensive and long-term reforms, which led 
to the deepening of problems in Turkey’s health care system. 
The only noteworthy political development in the 1970s in health care 
politics was an ideological shift in the leading cadre of the TTB, which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. The rising popularity of the left in Turkish 
politics during the 1960s and 1970s found its echo amongst medical doctors 
and medical students. Organised socialist groups nominated their 
representatives in the elections for the General Council of the TTB in 1977 
and succeeded in electing Dr. Erdal Atabek to head the TTB. This election 
implied a historic change in the political positioning of the TTB. Once 
established as a corporatist professional body, the TTB used to take its 
legitimacy from the state. The rise to power of socialist medical doctors in 
the TTB resulted in the recalibration of the source of legitimacy for the 
medical profession. Socialist medical doctors turned their faces to the people 
and declared that they would search for legitimacy from the people rather 
than from the state. As a result, the TTB emerged as the defender of the 
socialist perspective to health care services. 
 
3.2.3. The history of health care politics since the military coup 
d’état in 1980 
 
The military coup in 1980 marked the start of the third period in the 
history of social policies in Turkey within Özbek’s periodization. Following 
the junta, the pro-market Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, or ANAP) 
emerged as a single-party government and ruled the country throughout 
the 1980s. After the fall of the ANAP, the country was ruled by a coalition 
of social democratic SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP) and centre-
right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP).  
While these marginal political developments left footprints on the 
health care system of Turkey, the general health care policy environment 
from 1980s up until the introduction of the HTP can be conceptualised as 
‘policy drift’. Policy drift is defined as “changes in the operation or effect of 
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policies that occur without significant changes in those policies’ structure. 
The major cause of drift in the social welfare field is a shift in the social 
context of policies, such as the rise of new or newly intensified social risks 
with which existing programs are poorly equipped to grapple” (Hacker, 
2004, p.246). 
 
3.2.3.1. The Junta: Suppression of the left 
 
The Military coup on 12 September 1980 was a historic moment in 
Turkish politics and had a substantial impact on the country’s political and 
economic trajectory. The junta closed down all political parties, trade unions 
and civil society organisations. A new constitution for the country, once 
again, was prepared under the purview of the junta. The new Constitution, 
ratified in a referendum that took place in 1982, clearly instituted an 
authoritarian regime that introduced serious restrictions on the use of 
individual and collective rights and freedoms.  
One of the major changes that the junta introduced was the alteration 
of the development strategy from import-substitution industrialisation to 
export-oriented growth. The junta initiated the integration of Turkish 
economy into the global economy, which transformed Turkey’s economy into 
an open market economy in the 1990s (Yeldan, 2001, p.25). In line with the 
export-oriented growth strategy, the junta initiated the privatisation of 
public sector institutions and increased the role of the private sector in the 
economy. However, this top-down change in the development strategy of the 
country was not carried out at the expense of employers. On the contrary, 
Şenses notes that employer organisations succeeded in promoting their 
demands under the military rule. For instance, their pre-coup demands in 
the domains of labour legislation were implemented after the military coup 
(Şenses, 1993, p.105).  
The impact of the 1980 military coup on Turkish political life was deep 
and devastating. The military junta closed all active political organisations 
in the country; arrested activists, intellectuals, academics, journalists; and 
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silenced all forms of political opposition. This devastating impact was 
skewed towards the left end of the political spectrum. For instance, Heper 
argues, “The state’s intention was to de-activate, re-organise and then to 
exclude the present unions from the political sphere. Any gains that unions 
could make always remained precarious” (1991, p.17). As Buğra stated, the 
state did not welcome the development of organised capitalist interests as 
well. However, the state’s attitude towards the organisation of labour was 
much harsher: the state actively restricted, prohibited and even abolished 
labour organisations. This became much more evident after the 1980 
military coup d’état when “the activities of business organisations 
flourished, while labour organisations were totally silenced” (Buğra, 1997, 
p.59). Therefore, the political effect of the 1980 military coup d’état was 
partially the victory of business interests over labour’s demands.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 The military government’s stance towards the TTB was not much 
different from its stance towards trade unions. As mentioned before, the 
TTB had already transcended the boundaries of a classical professional 
body and began to voice a socialist perspective towards health care in the 
1970s. The military junta also closed down the General Council of the TTB 
and sent the head of the organisation to jail. Once the TTB was reopened, 
the military government attempted to make sure that compulsory 
membership of medical doctors working for public facilities to the TTB was 
lifted all together. The base of the General Council of the TTB was moved 
to Ankara, and the MoH was authorised to monitor the finances and 
administration of provincial medical chambers. All these changes were 
directed towards the re-consolidation of state control over the TTB.  
 
3.2.3.2. The Motherland Party period: Attempts to liberalise health 
care 
 
In the aftermath of the transfer of power from the military to the 
civilian government following the 1980 coup d’état, ANAP came to power 
with an agenda of economic liberalisation. By collaborating with the IMF 
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and the WB to initiate the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), ANAP 
took steps to increase the role of private entrepreneurs in the provision of 
health care. Private hospitals, according to the approach of ANAP, would 
help diminish the pressure on the SSK hospitals and the MoH hospitals. 
ANAP’s agenda for health care policy, however, was not limited to the 
fostering of private sector in health care provision. Its broader agenda 
included new public management policies, which manifested itself in the 
introduction of the Basic Law of Health Services that introduced market 
mechanisms to public health services (The Republic of Turkey, 1987).  
The main objectives of the Basic Law of Health Services were to 
transform public hospitals into individual health enterprises, to end the 
lifelong employment guarantee provided for medical doctors in the public 
sector, to introduce employment contracts and a performance-based 
payment model for health workers, and to establish a compulsory 
contribution-based general health insurance system by integrating all 
schemes under one institution (The Republic of Turkey, 1987). In response, 
the main centre-left political party of the time, the SHP, filed an appeal to 
the Constitutional Court with the request to annul particular articles of the 
law. The Constitutional Court annulled some articles of the law, rendering 
implementation of the law impossible (The Constitutional Court of Turkey, 
1988).  
Despite the success of the SHP in stopping the pro-market reform, in-
depth analysis of this case provides insight into the different health care 
service paradigms of the SHP and the majority of the Constitutional Court 
members. The SHP argued that the Law introduced exchange relationships 
between patients and public hospitals. The SHP found this unacceptable in 
a country where access to health care services was defined as a citizenship 
right. The SHP stated, “Health care, as a right of citizens and duty of the 
state, cannot become an issue of commercial undertaking” (The 
Constitutional Court of Turkey, 1988, p.4).  
While the Constitutional Court did not rule the proposed 
transformation of public hospitals into individual health enterprises 
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unconstitutional; it annulled articles that were on the transfer of power to 
the government in unification of social security institutions as well as the 
introduction of performance-based payment for health workers (The 
Constitutional Court of Turkey, 1988). The detailed ruling demonstrates 
that the majority of the members of the Constitutional Court seemed to 
adopt an economically liberal approach to health care. For instance, the 
Constitutional Court decided that the SHP’s claim that the social state has 
to provide health care services free at the point of service was invalid. 
Instead, it argued that public bodies could receive payments from citizens 
according to their income levels (The Constitutional Court of Turkey, 1988). 
Despite the fact that the ANAP government could not implement the 
Basic Law of Health Services, the ANAP legacy left its footprint on health 
care with the introduction of revolving funds into public hospitals in 1987 
(Buğra, 2008, p.213). The introduction of revolving funds into public 
hospitals symbolised the first step of the marketization of public health care 
services.  
In the meantime, due to the drastic decrease in formal employment 
opportunities and the outbreak of the armed conflict between the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party militias (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or PKK) and the 
Turkish army, the number of uninsured citizens began to substantially 
increase. In that context, while social risks associated with health care 
policies increased for citizens, no changes were made in the health system 
until the introduction of the Green Card scheme that will be discussed in 
the next section, which makes this situation to be best categorised as ‘policy 
drift’. 
The second footprint that ANAP had on health care was the promotion 
of private initiatives in health care delivery. Keyder suggests that private 
health provision initiatives started to gain visibility in the early 1990s due 
to the introduction of private sector incentives in the late 1980s (2007a, 
p.18). Consequently, inpatient bed capacity of private hospitals reached 
one-tenth of total inpatient bed capacity in Turkey in the middle of 2000s 
(Keyder, 2007a, p.19). In addition, Günal also notes that the number of 
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private inpatient institutions increased more than 1.5 times and the 
number of beds in these institutions almost doubled between 1980s and 
1990s (2008, pp.407-408). 
The majority of these private inpatient institutions were based in 
metropolitan cities of Turkey. Their services were mainly focused on 
specialties like ophthalmology, dental health, obstetrics, gynaecology, 
microchirurgia, and transplantation. The concentration of these private 
inpatient institutions in these areas of health care services, which were not 
advanced in public hospitals at the time, provided these institutions with a 
clear comparative advantage in the market (Günal, 2008, pp.407-408). 
However, the dominance of the public sector in most health care services 
remained intact. In 1990, it was reported that 78 per cent of all hospitals in 
Turkey were under the administration of the MoH, the SSK and public 
universities (PriceWaterhouse, 1990, p.66). While the dominance of the 
public sector in health care delivery persisted, the private sector started to 
increase its share in health care delivery during the 1990s.  
 
3.2.3.3 The introduction of the Green Card scheme 
 
In the 1987 general elections, SHP came second with almost one-
fourth of the national vote, followed by the DYP, centre-right party that 
represented a significant portion of the farmers, with roughly 20 per cent of 
all votes. After the significant fall in ANAP’s votes in the 1991 general 
elections, DYP and SHP formed a coalition government. 
SHP was against privatisation in health care services, while DYP 
generally had a populist take on social policy issues. A major health care 
policy development in the DYP-SHP coalition government period was the 
introduction of the Green Card scheme in 1992 (The Republic of Turkey, 
1992), which gave an end to the policy drift in health care policies 
throughout 1980s. The Green Card scheme was essentially a social 
assistance scheme that gave the very poor access to inpatient services in 
public hospitals. Buğra suggests that the introduction of the Green Card 
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scheme represented a step toward the idea of health care services for all 
(2008, pp.214-215). She argues that the Green Card model symbolises a 
procedural formalisation to grant the poor access to health care services, 
especially in comparison to the former model, which required the poor to 
convince either the local authorities or the chief physician that they were 
poor in order to access health care services for free (Buğra, 2008, pp.214-
215).  
 
3.2.3.4 The global health reform agenda arrives in Turkey 
 
In line with international trends, in the early 1990s the Turkish 
governments were engaged in drafting health care reforms and making 
attempts to legislate them. Four critical developments during this period 
contributed to the elevation of health care reform onto the political agenda.  
The first of these developments was the commencement of a 
partnership between Turkish governments and the WB on health care 
issues in 1990. Throughout the 1990s, the Turkish governments 
collaborated with the WB on health care issues, and the WB has been one 
of the key players in Turkey’s health care policy. The first WB project on 
health care started in 1990, and the second project was launched in 1996. A 
detailed history of the WB-Turkey health care partnership is discussed in 
the Chapter 5.  
 The impact of the WB’s pro-market discourse on reforms was visible 
in the criticisms that developed about the existing health care system, as 
well as how health care reforms were framed in national policy documents. 
For instance, in a ‘National Health Policy’ document, the Ministry 
questioned the centralised structure of health care delivery, the lack of 
managerial staff in public hospitals, the absence of awareness about costs 
amongst the staff, and the lack of motivation amongst medical doctors due 
to the inexistence of performance-based payment mechanisms (The 
Ministry of Health, 1993, p.51). In the same year, the Draft Law on Health 
projected the introduction of a basic benefit package for public health 
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insurance plans and out-of-pocket contributions for the insured (The 
Republic of Turkey, 1993). In 1997, a Ministry’s report titled ‘Health Sector 
Reforms in Turkey’ stated that purchaser and provider roles in Turkey’s 
health care system should separate, competition should be established 
among different service providers, and social insurance should cover the 
whole population (The Ministry of Health, 1997, p.29).  
The second critical development was the publication of a report titled 
the ‘Health Sector Master Plan’. The State Planning Organisation (Devlet 
Planlama Teşkilatı, or DPT) commissioned the preparation of this report to 
PriceWaterhouse. The report declared that the state was incapable of 
planning Turkey’s diverse health care system (PriceWaterhouse, 1990, 
pp.4-5). It also stated that the health care system failed to provide equitable 
access to health care services and to integrate preventive and curative 
health care services (PriceWaterhouse, 1990, p.34). This report raised 
awareness among different actors about the chronic problems of Turkey’s 
health care system. It also popularised the discourse of health economics in 
terms of defining these problems and proposing solutions, thus contributed 
to the emergence of a new ‘policy paradigm’. 
The third critical development was the revitalisation of the medical 
doctors’ movement under the umbrella of the TTB at the end of the 1980s. 
Between 1988 and 1992, thousands of medical doctors marched in the 
‘White Protests’ in order to call for the improvement of their working 
conditions and the realisation of a universal right to health (Soyer, 2005, 
pp.189-190). With these protests, the TTB called for the establishment of a 
public health care system and once again emerged as a significant political 
actor in the politics of health care.  
The fourth critical development that increased the politicians’ and 
bureaucrats’ attention to health care policy was the emerging income-
expenses imbalance of the social security institutions. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, governments started to make public transfers to these 
institutions in order to strike a balance between their incomes and 
expenses. The ES was the first institution to face a budget deficit in 1986, 
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followed by the BAĞ-KUR in 1989 and finally by the SSK in 1991 (Yılmaz, 
2012). Transfers from the public budget to social security institutions 
reached 1 per cent of GDP in 1994 and this share continued to increase until 
2000 (Yılmaz, 2012).  
While these deficits emerged partly as a result of governments’ use of 
social security funds for external debt payments and interest-free 
government borrowing from these funds, the same governments and the 
mainstream media started to conceptualise these deficits as a ‘black hole’ 
for the public budget. The portrayal of the fiscal deficit of social security 
institutions as ‘black hole’ can be conceptualised as part of the process of 
‘the social construction of the need to reform’ (Cox, 2001, pp.475-477) of 
Turkey’s health system. 
In contrast to the popular discourse that made social security 
institutions the scapegoat of the public budget imbalance, the Health 
Insurance Commission of Australia’s report on the Turkish health care 
system concluded that Turkey “as a whole spends less of its national 
product on health care than other countries of comparable development” 
(Health Insurance Commission of Australia, 1995, p.3) and the private 
insurance option “has no major role to play in addressing the fiscal problems 
in the health care system or dealing with the problems the uninsured have 
in accessing services (Health Insurance Commission of Australia, 1995, 
p.7). However, the deficits of the social security institutions were hardly 
handled within a conceptual framework that the Health Insurance 
Commission of Australia used at the time, which demonstrates the power 
imbalances between competing ideas in health care politics. 
The presence of these four factors led to a growing consensus that 
health care reform was needed. However, the introduction of reform did not 
follow automatically. A major reason for the failure of health care reform at 
the time was the fact that the country was run by weak coalition 
governments.  
However, the problem of social insurance coverage continued to 
worsen. As a result of the heightened armed conflict between the Turkish 
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army and the PKK, nearly a million people (mostly of Kurdish origin) from 
the South Eastern and Eastern small provinces and villages migrated to the 
metropolitan cities. Given the limited formal employment opportunities 
available in metropolitan cities, migrants remained outside of the formal 
social security system.   
In this context, the political Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, or 
RP) emerged as the new centre of attraction especially amongst the urban 
poor and in economically deprived regions of Eastern and South Eastern 
Anatolia. RP’s roots originated from the ‘National Outlook’ (Milli Görüş) 
movement that combined a modest Islamic critique of capitalism with third-
world nationalism. In contrast to the mainstream centre-right and centre-
left parties at the time, RP appeared as an ideological movement and was 
able to mobilise significant numbers of committed activists who voluntarily 
worked for the party’s success in elections.  
The first significant victory of the RP came in the 1994 municipal 
elections, when RP received almost 20 per cent of the votes and became the 
second-runner. In addition, now-President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
elected as the mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. RP’s wave 
of success continued in the 1995 general elections. In this election, RP got 
first place, marking the most significant victory of a Political Islamist party 
in the history of the Republic. However, the Turkish army, infamous for its 
military coup d’états, forced the RP-DYP coalition government to resign. 
This event is known as the 28 February 1997 ‘post-modern coup d’état’, 
which led to the closure of RP by the Constitutional Court.  
Following the military coup, the centre-left Ecevit’s Democratic Left 
Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, or DSP) came first in general elections in 1999 
and formed a broad coalition government with the Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, or MHP) and ANAP. The coalition government 
proved to be unsuccessful in dealing with two serious earthquakes, and its 
economic policies paved the way for the largest economic crisis in the history 
of the Republic in 2001. Unsurprisingly, these political parties lost most of 
their votes in the 2002 general elections and did not gain any seats in the 
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Parliament, due to the fact that they could not meet the 10 per cent national 
threshold.  
A group of politicians separated from the National Outlook movement 
and its Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, or FP) –which was founded as the heir 
to RP- and founded the AK Party in 2001. The AK Party’s general approach 
to social policies and health care policy in particular will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6. It was in this context that the AK Party came to power 
as a single party government in the 2002 general elections.  
Before the AK Party came to power, the problems in Turkey’s health 
care system had already been quite visible. A representative survey 
conducted in six cities in Turkey showed that roughly 42 per cent of 
respondents stated that they could not apply to health care services in the 
last 6 months due to financial difficulties (Ministry of Health, 1999). 
Parallel to this, the first comprehensive study on health expenditures found 
that Turkey was among the OECD countries making a large amount of out-
of-pocket expenditures for health care services. The share of out-of-pocket 
health expenditures in 2000 constituted roughly 28 per cent of total health 
expenditures (The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2004, p.36). In light of this 
historical and political background, the next section provides an overview 
of the main tenets of Turkey’s health care system before the reform and 
locates it within a comparative framework.  
 
3.3. Turkey’s health care system before the reform within a 
comparative perspective 
 
A health care system could be broadly defined as the whole set of 
regulations in a given country with respect to the financing, provision and 
regulation of health care services (Wendt et al., 2009, p.77). In the 
literature, the health care systems approach inspired health care system 
typologies. These typologies enable scholars to compare and contrast 
different national health care systems as well as evaluate whether the 
direction of changes in different national health care systems diverge or 
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converge (i.e. Blank and Burau, 2010; Wendt et al., 2009; Hassenteufel and 
Palier, 2007; Bambra, 2005a; Wall, 1996; Moran, 1992). 
While health care systems approach is useful in explaining the major 
characteristics of national health care policies, it has to be used with caution 
due to its tendency to underestimate the internal contradictions of national 
health care policies. Freeman argues that health care policies generally do 
not constitute a conflict-free system, as each country’s health care policies 
are based upon institutions that are superimposed on one another. These 
coexisting institutions might be complementary as well as in conflict 
(Freeman, 1999, p.89). In response, scholars call for an approach that pays 
enough attention to conflicts as well as tensions within the health care 
domain (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.224; Kasza, 2002). As discussed before 
in detail, Turkey’s health care system is also composed of different 
institutions and programmes not necessarily designed to fit into a single 
health care system. 
Bearing these words of caution about health care systems approach in 
mind, I would like to first situate Turkey’s health care system within a 
health care systems typology. Among various health care systems 
typologies (i.e Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007; Burau and Blank, 2006; 
Bambra, 2005a; Rothgang et al., 2005; Wall, 1996), I would like to use 
Wendt et al.’s typology (2009). As the most comprehensive and up-to-date 
typology, it has the power to explain the diversity of contemporary health 
care systems.  
For Wendt et al., there are three main ideal-types of health care 
systems: state health care systems, societal health care systems, and 
private health care systems (2009, p.81). The defining characteristic of the 
state health care systems is that the state undertakes financing, provision 
and regulation activities. In societal health care systems, societal actors, 
mostly in the form of independent autonomous social organisations (i.e. 
trade unions), are in charge of all three main pillars of the health care 
system. Lastly, in private health care systems, private actors control all the 
pillars of health care systems. On the basis of these three main ideal-types, 
 80 
 
they devised 27 combinations of health care systems with different forms of 
control over different pillars of the health care system. According to Wendt 
et al.’s typology, Turkey’s health care system before the introduction of the 
HTP most resembled the state health care systems, as the state had been 
the dominant power in the financing, provision and regulation of health 
care services.  
 
3.3.1. Health care finance 
 
The financing of health care services is one of the fundamental 
subsectors of health care systems. By financing, scholars refer to the 
mechanisms through which the total amount of financial resources 
allocated to health care services are collected, and how the conditions of 
access to health care services are determined (Blank and Burau, 2010, p. 
220).  
The four main sources of health care service funding identified in the 
literature are general taxation, social insurance, private insurance, and 
direct payments by the user (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.13; Normand, 1997, 
p.205). The health care systems of most countries rely on a combination of 
these sources. For instance, the health care system in the U.S. is primarily 
funded by private insurance schemes, but involves public funding to 
ascertain the access of special groups, such as children, the disabled, the 
poor and/or the elderly (via Medicaid and Medicare) to health care services.  
Nevertheless, one funding source is usually dominant in a health care 
system (Normand, 1997, p.205). This dominant funding source gives the 
system its general characteristic and has equity implications in terms of 
access to health care. The financing of health care services is also considered 
to be “a pointer to power” (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.63) in a given health 
care system. The main institutional funder of the system tends to have more 
power over the system as a whole. 
Similar to most developing countries (Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 
2000, p.417), Turkey’s health care system relied upon a social health 
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insurance model of financing. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Turkey’s 
welfare system resembled Rudra’s protective welfare system, social 
insurances in Turkey were first founded to provide protection for state 
officials and urban formal sector workers after the Second World War. 
Indeed, Turkey’s health care system before the reform had three public 
insurance schemes, which combined retirement pensions with health 
insurance and constituted the main source of health care finance. As listed 
before, these insurances were as follows: SSK, ES and BAĞ-KUR. 
The state in Turkey did not make financial contributions to these 
social insurance funds. In other words, these insurance funds were mainly 
financed out of employers’ and employees’ contributions. Despite the fact 
that employees and employers financed these insurance funds, the two 
groups were not in charge of the administration of these funds. Instead, as 
mentioned before, the majority of the members of these funds’ executive 
boards were government employees. In this setting, governments could 
even use these funds arbitrarily for purposes other than paying retirement 
pensions and/or health expenditures (i.e. paying the government’s debts to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). 
The size of the formal sector determines the scope for the development 
of social health insurance (Normand, 1997, p.216). Similar to other 
developing countries (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006, p.355; Barrientos and Lloyd-
Sherlock, 2000, p.417), the limited scope of the formal sector in Turkey 
decreased the ability of the social health insurance model to provide 
universal coverage. In line with the developmentalist aspirations of the 
period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the 1980s, the 
number of social insurance outsiders was expected to disappear as 
industrial development gained pace and created a high volume of formal 
jobs (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.17; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006, p.365). After 
these expectations proved to be wrong during the transformation of the 
global economy from the 1970s, the Turkish government developed a 
separate non-contributory scheme –the Green Card scheme- for the 
uninsured, financed out of the public budget (Buğra, 2008, p.215). Such a 
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move was in line with trends in other developing countries (Barrientos and 
Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000, p.417). 
In Turkey’s health care system before the reform, the number of 
citizens with private health insurance remained quite low. In 2000, 
approximately 0.4 per cent of the population had private health insurance 
coverage (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen's Association, 2005). 
Therefore, the private sector did not have any significant power in the 
health care finance. 
However, out-of-pocket payments constituted a significant share in 
health care finance before the introduction of the HTP. In 2000, out-of-
pocket payments constituted 27.7 per cent of total health expenditures in 
Turkey (The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2004, p.33). Out-of-pocket 
payments included both formal and informal payments. To exemplify, 
formal payments were made to purchase medications and to pay for 
compulsory “donations” to the SSK hospitals (Yeni Şafak, 2000). Another 
example of out-of-pocket payments was informal payments made during 
patients’ visits to the private clinic of a medical doctor, with the expectation 
of getting timely and quality health care services in public hospitals in 
return. Due to the coexistence of formal social security alongside high levels 
of informality, scholars identified Turkey’s previous social security system 
as an “eclectic system” (Buğra and Candaş, 2011, p.516).  
 
3.3.2. Health care delivery 
 
The provision of health care services is another significant subsector 
of health care systems, which refers to the rules and regulations with 
respect to the institutional means through which health care services are 
delivered in a given country context. Health care systems in countries rely 
on different forms of health care service delivery. With the exception of data 
on hospitals beds in public and private sectors, in-depth information on the 
role of the state in health care provision is still not available for different 
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countries (Rothgang et al., 2005, p.196) thus preventing international 
comparison. 
There are three different forms of ownership of health facilities. 13 
Health care services may be delivered through public facilities, private 
facilities, and/or non-profit facilities. There is a relationship between the 
dominant type of health care finance and the ownership of health care 
facilities. For instance, health care systems funded out of tax revenues rely 
heavily on public hospitals as the main providers of health care services, 
while social health insurance based systems depend both on public and 
private hospitals (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.82-83). In health care systems 
funded primarily by private health insurance, the private sector is generally 
the largest health care provider. In line with contemporary health reforms, 
midway solutions, which combine non-profit ownership with a level of state 
guarantee such as hospital trusts in the UK and health maintenance 
organisations in the US have developed.  
Turkey’s health care system before the introduction of the HTP relied 
upon public provision of health care services. However, the public sector 
was divided into different institutions, the largest number of which was 
owned by the MoH, the SSK and public universities respectively. The 
number of private sector hospitals including foreigners’ and minority 
foundations’ hospitals constituted a negligible portion of health care 
provision in the country (The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2004, p.7-8).  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, medical doctors in the public 
sector had the right to open up and operate private clinics with outpatient 
services without quitting their positions in the public sector. This made 
private clinics an important component of Turkey’s health care system.  
                                                        
13 Different rules and regulations may apply to the provision of primary and secondary 
health care services in a particular country. To exemplify, the NHS treats general 
practitioners as individual entrepreneurs and works with them on a contractual basis. GPs 
in the UK are involved in the delivery of primary care services and are permitted to 
establish private practices while remaining as employees of a health authority or hospital 
trust. See: ROTHGANG, H., CACACE, M., GRIMMEISEN, S. & WENDT, C. 2005. The 
Changing Role of the State in Healthcare Systems. European Review, 13, 187-212. 
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3.3.3. The regulation of health care finance and delivery 
 
The last important component of the health care system is the 
regulation of health care services. The regulation of health care services 
refers to the course of the governance of health care delivery and health 
care finance (Wendt et al., 2009, p.77). Wendt et al. argue that this 
dimension can only be analysed in qualitative terms, as it requires the 
examination of different actors’ engagement in regulatory practices with 
respect to diverse subsectors of health care systems. 
As the state was the dominant party in the financing and provision of 
health care services, the regulation mainly took place within the public 
administration. Indeed, neither professional organisations nor trade unions 
had any institutionalised regulatory power over health care services in 
Turkey’s health care system.  
Despite the fact that Turkey’s health care system closely resembled 
state health care systems as defined in Wendt et al.’s health care system 
typology, it also relied upon a significant amount of out-of-pocket payments 
in health care finance and private provision of health care services in the 
form of private practice of medical doctors. Given the importance of these 
components, it could be argued that the state’s regulatory capacity was 
limited, as it failed to control the informality enmeshed into the formal 
health care system.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the main parameters of the development of 
the health care system in Turkey with references to significant moments 
within the politics of health care. Starting from the late 19th century, 
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Turkey’s health care system was consolidated as a result of a collection of 
policy efforts in the domains of health care finance and delivery.  
The state integrated the members of the medical community into its 
nation-making endeavour as state officials with elite status. In this context, 
the medical community served as one of the ‘Westerniser’ political forces in 
the history of late Ottoman and early Republican periods and contributed 
to the nation-making endeavour.  
Parallel to welfare state developments in other parts of the world after 
the end of the Second World War, Turkey started to pursue more 
programmes to consolidate its health care system. In the domain of health 
care delivery, the geographical extension of primary health care services 
had been the major concern of governments until 1980s. In the domain of 
health care finance, governments initiated the establishment of 
occupational-status based social health insurance plans. Advances in health 
care finance increased the demand for and scope of secondary and tertiary 
health care services.  
However, it could be concluded that the historical development of 
Turkey’s health care system can hardly be explained with the power 
resources approach. In Keyder’s words, “neither farmers nor workers were 
politically strong and organised enough to influence directly the outcome of 
a political contestation” (Keyder, 2007b, p.3). Parallel to the pluralist 
approach, the major dynamic behind the birth of Turkey’s health care 
system in the 1950s was the transition to electoral democracy, as the ruling 
bloc was divided into two political parties. In order to secure their re-
election chances, a series of governments made advances in the domain of 
health care policies and cumulatively paved the way to the emergence of 
Turkey’s health care system as described in this chapter. However, as the 
analysis of Turkey’s political history suggests, the reduction of politics into 
electoral politics was not inartificial. In contrast, for the most part the 
political system left almost no possibilities for class politics. Electoral 
politics remained the only possibility for citizens to influence policy making. 
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The relatively liberal constitution of 1961 provided a restricted 
window of opportunity for different political actors to emerge as 
autonomous actors. Parallel to the rise of social movements worldwide 
around 1968, the DİSK and TTB emerged as powerful actors defending 
social rights of citizens, including the right to health care. Despite the fact 
that the main parameters of Turkey’s health care system resembled the 
corporatist welfare regimes in Western Europe, this corporatist character 
did not exist in the governance side. In other words, the political system of 
Turkey did not permit trade unions and professional organisations to take 
part in the administration of social security funds or health care delivery, 
which limited the impact of both DİSK and TTB on health care policy 
outcomes. However, here it is argued that the left might have had an 
influence on the development of social policies in general and health care 
system in particular, as a bundle of actors created a moral discursive 
vantage point for public discussions on social welfare issues.  
The concept of policy drift can best describe the situation of Turkey’s 
health care system throughout 1980s. The introduction of the Green Card 
scheme was the only change in health care policies throughout 1990s, which 
could not give an end to the failure of Turkey’s health care system to provide 
universal coverage. Meanwhile, the Political Islamist National Outlook 
movement benefited from the policy drift and recruited the outsiders to the 
formal social security system into its ranks. 
The WB’s engagement with Turkey’s health care system during 1990s 
seemed to have an immense impact on the framing of these problems and 
the solutions, which is discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 in detail. A number of 
governments in collaboration with the WB came up with similar health care 
reform proposals throughout the 1990s. Due to the short-lived weak 
coalition governments, none of these proposals could be realised.  
In case the governments attempted to introduce policy changes in 
health care, it met with opposition from the left. Even though the left did 
not enjoy any ‘veto power’ within the system, it used all possible political 
resources to stop these reform projects. While the SHP filed an appeal to 
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the Constitutional Court, the TTB mobilised medical doctors against the 
proposed reforms. As a result, it was only in 2003 that the single party 
government of the AK Party could initiate a comprehensive health care 
reform. The next chapter explains the main parameters of this reform while 
situating it within similar reform projects worldwide. 
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Chapter 4: The Health Transformation 
Programme in Turkey within the Context of 
Health Care Reforms in Other Developing 
Countries 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Reforming Turkey’s health care system had been on the agenda of 
governments since the 1990s in Turkey. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the changing character of Turkey’s health care reform projects 
coincided with the establishment of the partnership between the WB and 
Turkish government in 1990. Indeed, Turkey was not an exception to global 
wave of health care reform. The WB had been promoting pro-market health 
care reforms in the developing countries of Latin America and the transition 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia since the late 1980s. In 
addition to the WB, the IMF was also active in promoting pro-market health 
care reforms and enforcing the developing country governments to spend 
less on health care services as part of the Stabilisation Programmes. During 
this time, advanced capitalist countries were not immune to health care 
reforms either. Due to rising health care costs and changes in the power 
dynamics in favour of the pro-market political actors, many Western 
European countries also introduced pro-market health care reforms.  
Despite the fact that the post-1980s health care reforms generally 
shared a strong marketization dynamic, as discussed in Chapter 2, it would 
be erroneous to portray these reforms as carbon copies of one another. While 
the marketization tendency is evident in most reforms, health care reforms 
took unique shapes in different national settings due to diverse political 
dynamics. 
In this context, the major objective of this chapter is to describe the 
HTP and to situate it within the context of post-1980s health care reforms 
in developing countries. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates the 
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similarities as well as differences between the HTP in Turkey and other 
health care reforms.  
 This chapter has four main sections. After this introductory section, 
the second section describes the main parameters of the HTP. The third 
section provides an overview of the post-1980s health care reforms in 
developing country contexts with a special focus on Latin America, 
Southern Europe and East Asia. The concluding section discusses the 
similarities as well as differences between the HTP and reforms that were 
carried out in Latin American, Southern European and East Asian 
countries. 
 
4.2. The main parameters of the Health Transformation 
Programme in Turkey 
 
The AK Party government came to power in the 2002 general elections 
and launched the HTP in 2003. The reform paved the way for the 
restructuring of health care finance, health care provision, and regulation 
of health care services in Turkey.  
The MoH declared that the HTP had eight components: 1) transform 
the MoH into a planning and a monitoring body; 2) unify the public health 
insurance schemes under the umbrella of general health insurance; 3) 
facilitate access to health care services, which included the introduction of 
the family physicians model, the introduction of the referral chain, and the 
establishment of health enterprises; 4) increase the motivation of human 
resources in health care; 5) establish educational institutions to support the 
new model; 6) introduce quality measures for the health care sector; 7) 
support the rational use of medications; and 8) establish a health 
information system (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Turkey, 2003, 
pp.26-36). For the purpose of this study, I will discuss below the 
abovementioned components of the HTP in relation to the changes they 
made in the domains of health care finance and delivery.  
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4.2.1. Changes in health care finance 
 
The HTP aimed to establish a compulsory general health insurance 
model for all. Compulsory general health insurance was put into practice in 
2008 (The Republic of Turkey, 2006). With this change, three public health 
insurance schemes and the Green Card scheme were united under the 
umbrella of the general health insurance. The SGK was established to 
replace previous institutions that used to be in charge of health care finance 
for different occupational groups, namely the ES, BAĞ-KUR and SSK. In 
doing so, the reform also equalised the benefit packages of all three social 
insurance schemes and the Green Card scheme. 
The general health insurance model kept the social insurance based 
financing model of Turkey’s health care system intact. It did not change the 
residual tax-financed component that had financed the non-contributory 
scheme, namely the Green Card. Different from the previous model; all 
citizens are now obliged to contribute to the public health insurance fund 
regardless of their employment status. The only exception to this rule is the 
exemption given to those living under the official Green Card eligibility 
income threshold.14 Unlike the previous health care finance model, the state 
began to contribute an amount equal to 25 per cent of all premiums collected 
monthly to the public health insurance fund.  
The new financing model not only consolidated the social insurance 
based financing model of Turkey’s health care system, but also introduced 
additional sources of health care finance. These sources include 
contributory payments for all hospital visits and medications, additional 
payments for private hospital visits (which began to serve citizens with 
                                                        
14  Income eligibility criterion for a Green Card is below the officially defined poverty 
threshold. For the period between 1 June – 31 December 2012, income ranges and premium 
levels apply to these ranges of monthly incomes per person in a family: 1) No premium to 
be paid for people living under less than one third of minimum wage (313,50 TL=app. 135 
€), 2) 37,62 TL (app. 16 €) premium to be paid for people living on monthly incomes between 
one third of minimum wage (313,50 TL=app. 135 €) and minimum wage (940,50 TL=app. 
405 €), 3) 112,86 TL (app. 49 €) premium to be paid for people living on monthly incomes 
between minimum wage (940,50 TL=app. 405 €) and two minimum wages (1881 TL=app. 
810 €), 4) 225,72 TL (app. 97 €) premium to be paid for people living on monthly incomes 
above two minimum wages (1881 TL=app. 810 €). 
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public health insurance after the reform) and optional supplementary 
private health insurance.  
Patients are obliged to make contributory flat rate payments, named 
contributory payments, when accessing outpatient health care services and 
medications.15The amount of payment is calculated on the basis of the 
number of hospital visits and the number of prescribed medications. The 
rate of payment only differs according to the hospital type, i.e. a public 
university hospital, or a public education and research hospital. Patients 
are exempt from making contributory payments when they visit primary 
health care services. In addition, patients with defined health conditions 
(i.e. an emergency situation or metastatic cancer) are exempt from making 
contributory payments.  
In the early days of the reform, the government argued that 
contributory payments were introduced in order to promote rational use of 
hospitals and medications. Therefore, contributory payments are presented 
as part of economisation dynamic inherent in the HTP. Nevertheless, a 
study on the rate changes of contributory payments points to an increase 
throughout the reform process (Turkish Medical Association, 2011a). 
Indeed, these increases resulted in the tripling of the total revenue collected 
from contributory payments from 2009 to 2010 (Medimagazin, 2011a). 
Finally, I argued elsewhere that the increasing trend in the rate of 
contributory payments over time suggests that these payments might 
become an important source of health care finance, might go beyond the 
objectives of economisation and contribute to marketization of health care 
services (Yılmaz, 2013). 
The second new component of health care finance was the introduction 
of additional payments for private hospital visits. As discussed in the next 
subsection, the HTP integrated a significant number of private hospitals 
                                                        
15 Up-to-date rates of contributory payments at the time this article was drafted were as 
follows: 1) 5 TL (= app. 2,15 €) for each outpatient visit to a public hospital, 2) 12 TL (= 
app. 5,17 €) for each outpatient visit to a private hospital that offers services to the publicly 
insured, 3) 3 TL (= app. 1,29 €) for each prescription including up to three items of 
medication, 4) Additional 1 TL (=app. 0,43 €) for each item of medication over three. 
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into the system as service providers for the publicly insured. However, 
citizens can only get access to private hospital services if they are able and 
willing to make additional payments to top up their public health insurance 
plan. The SGK determines the maximum amount of additional payment 
that a private hospital can charge. Additional payments imply 
marketization of health care services. 
Similar to the level of contributory payments, the maximum rate of 
additional payments also demonstrates an increasing trend, which signifies 
increasing marketization of health care services over time. The maximum 
amount of additional payment in 2012 was 90 per cent of prices, as 
determined by the SGK for private hospital services (Habertürk, 2012), 
which then rose up to 200 per cent over a year (NTVMSNBC, 2013a). In 
addition, the rate of additional payments differs according to where a 
private hospital stands in the Ministry’s quality rankings. Since the reform, 
the rate of additional payments has become one of the main areas of 
controversy between the SGK (or the government in a Turkish context) and 
private hospitals, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.  
Lastly, the HTP introduced a basic benefit package for public health 
insurance. After the reform, the SGK became responsible for defining the 
basic benefit package of public health insurance. SGK annually issues the 
type, amount and duration of diagnostic services, medications and 
treatment services that are financed out of the public health insurance 
fund.  
These developments in the domain of health care finance seem to 
encourage the purchase of private health insurance plans. Indeed, the 
number of citizens with private health insurance increased from roughly 
850,000 in 2004 (Insurance Association of Turkey, 2012) to approximately 
2,800,000 in 2013 (Insurance Association of Turkey, 2014). Despite the fact 
that the total share of citizens with private health insurance has still not 
exceeded 2 per cent of the total population, the increase in private health 
insurance uptake is still noteworthy.  
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In addition, the HTP also introduced supplementary (private) health 
insurance. The main aim of this new private health insurance component is 
to top up the public health insurance by offering financial protection for 
additional payments in private hospitals that offer services to the publicly 
insured (Mapfre Genel Sigorta, 2012). Despite the slow pace of development 
in this area so far, one of the leading health insurance firms expects to reach 
five million consumers in five years time (Mapfre Genel Sigorta, 2012). 
 
4.2.2. Changes in health care delivery 
 
Before the reform, different types of public hospitals, such as the MoH 
hospitals, the SSK hospitals, and public university hospitals, dominated the 
health care delivery in Turkey’s health care system. Two major components 
of the HTP sought to restructure health care delivery in Turkey and create 
a quasi-market in health care provision. While the first of these components 
was the transformation of the MoH into a planning and monitoring body, 
the second one aimed to establish health enterprises.  
These individual health enterprises include both public and private 
hospitals. Public hospitals are transformed into health enterprises, named 
Public Hospital Unions (Kamu Hastane Birlikleri), that have both financial 
and administrative autonomy from the central state organisations 
(Ministry of Health of the Republic of Turkey, 2003, p.31). In the new health 
care delivery structure, all health care providers will be able to offer services 
to the publicly insured as long as they comply with the MoH quality 
requirements and sign a contract with the SGK (Ministry of Health of the 
Republic of Turkey, 2003, p.31). The new model will lead public hospitals to 
adopt private sector tools in hospital management and payment 
mechanisms for health workers (i.e. performance-based model of 
payments). In this new model, the MoH will cease to function as a health 
care provider. It will instead act as a monitoring body in the health care 
delivery market (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Turkey, 2003, p.27). 
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The first step that the government took in this direction was to 
transfer the SSK hospitals to the MoH (The Republic of Turkey, 2005). It 
then restructured the MoH to fit into its new overseer and monitoring role 
and granted administrative and partial financial autonomy to public 
hospitals (The Republic of Turkey, 2011a). In line with these legislative 
changes, Public Hospital Unions were established to bring together 
geographically close public hospitals and grant them financial and 
administrative autonomy.  
Finally, the government began to establish new public hospitals with 
a new financing mechanism, one that resembled the Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFI) in the UK (The Republic of Turkey, 2013). The 
establishment of Public Hospital Unions and the introduction of Private 
Finance Initiatives as the new resource for the construction of public 
hospitals can be understood with the concept of ‘institutional layering’, 
which refers to “the grafting of new elements onto an otherwise stable 
institutional framework. Such amendments . . . can alter the overall 
trajectory of an institution’s development” (Thelen, 2004, p.35). In other 
words, the injection of private sector management techniques into public 
health delivery institutions and the introduction of public-private 
partnership model in establishing new hospitals might transform the 
overall trajectory of public health delivery system in near future. 
Another major step that the government took was to allow the SGK to 
purchase services from private hospitals for its insurees, which implied the 
launch of the quasi-market model in health care delivery. Prior to the 
reform, public hospitals were free to purchase diagnostic and maintenance 
services from private providers. In addition, the ES also used to purchase 
services from private hospitals, though this was limited in scope. However, 
with the implementation of the HTP, the state began to purchase health 
care services on a much larger scale than in the earlier periods. As a result, 
both the share of private sector investments to the health care sector and 
the share of expenditures from the SGK to private hospitals increased 
drastically during the reform (Sönmez, 2011, pp.60-71). 
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As mentioned in the earlier chapter, private clinics used to function as 
an important component of the health care delivery structure in Turkey 
before the reform. With the launch of the HTP, the government’s insistence 
to introduce a full-time work requirement for medical doctors and to exclude 
private clinics from the public health insurance plan led to a decline in the 
number of private clinics (Kaban, 2010). 
Another significant development occurred in the provision of 
medications. Before the HTP, the SSK beneficiaries and Green Card holders 
could not easily access medications. While the SSK beneficiaries had been 
obliged to use the pharmacies owned by the SSK, Green Card beneficiaries 
did not have the right to free medications. The main problem for the SSK 
beneficiaries was the small number of the SSK pharmacies and consequent 
limitations to getting necessary medications on time. The only mechanism 
through which Green Card beneficiaries could access medications was to 
apply for a social assistance scheme, a laborious and lengthy application 
process. With the launch of the HTP, the beneficiaries of the SSK began to 
access medications through all privately owned pharmacies, which mostly 
solved the access problems of this group. As discussed in the earlier 
subsection, the reform granted equal benefit packages for Green Card users, 
including access to medications through privately owned pharmacies, which 
implied a clear improvement in Green Card beneficiaries’ access to health 
care.  
 
4.2.3. The results of the Health Transformation Programme so far 
 
One of the results of the HTP was an increase in public health 
expenditures and the share of public health expenditures in GDP. Graph 1 
shown below indicates this increase. 
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Graph 1. Public health expenditures/GDP 
 
Sources: Calculated by the author using data from the ES, BAĞKUR and SSK for 
the years between 1988 and 2004, the SGK for 2005, the General Directorate of 
Public Accounts for the years between 2006 and 2013. 
 
As the Graph 1 indicates, despite the policy drift –with the exception 
of the introduction of the Green Card scheme- between 1988 and 2002, the 
share of public health expenditures in GDP raised from 0.9 per cent in 1988 
to 3.6 per cent in 2002. After the introduction of the HTP in 2003, increase 
in the share of public health expenditures in GDP continued. The share of 
public health expenditures in GDP raised from 3.7 per cent in 2003 to 4.6 
per cent in 2013. 16  This increase might be explained with different 
components of the reform stated as follows: the equalisation of benefit 
packages for all public insurees including the beneficiaries of Green Card 
scheme, the increase in the number of Green Card beneficiaries and the 
introduction of public transfers for services of private hospitals to public 
insurees. 
A survey reveals that the general public perceives the short-term 
impact of the contemporary health reform as largely positive. The rate of 
highly and very highly satisfied citizens increased from 40 per cent in 2003 
to roughly 75 per cent in 2013 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2014, p.78). 
                                                        
16 Highest share of public health expenditures in GDP in 2008 is due to the shrinkage of 
the GDP by 4.8 per cent during the economic crisis. 
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This drastic increase in citizens’ satisfaction can be partly attributed to the 
increased ease of access: it was reported that per capita hospital visits rose 
from 2 in 2002 to 5.1 in 2012 (Ministry of Health of the Republic of Turkey, 
2013, p.91). In addition, the state began to pay the premiums of more 
people, as evidenced by the rising numbers of Green Card users. The 
number of people under the income eligibility threshold whose premiums 
were paid by the state increased from less than 7 million in the early 2000s 
(Social Security Institution of Turkey, 2010) to nearly 12.5 million by April 
2014 (Social Security Institution of Turkey, 2014). In addition, the 
equalisation of benefit packages might have contributed to an increase in 
the rate of public satisfaction with health care services. After the reform, 
the public expenditures for health care have become more fairly distributed 
among different occupational status groups (Teksöz et al., 2009). As a result 
of these developments, Alkan interpreted the AK Party’s consecutive 
victories in general elections as a result of the government’s success in 
reforming health care (2011). 
In the literature, scholars seem to disagree on the impact of the reform 
on three fronts: access to health care, the working conditions of health 
workers, and the future sustainability of health care system. Some scholars 
argue that the reform had a positive impact on citizens’ access to health 
care services by easing citizens’ access to health care services and abolishing 
the former occupational status-based inequalities in access to health care 
(i.e. Barış et al., 2011; Karadeniz, 2009; Teksöz et al., 2009; Ağartan, 2008; 
Ağartan, 2007; Keyder, 2007).  
In response, others suggest that the reform’s pro-market components 
pose significant obstacles against the consolidation of an egalitarian health 
care system (i.e. Yılmaz, 2013; Ağartan, 2012; Etiler and Urhan, 2011; 
Turkish Medical Association, 2011b; Yaşar, 2011; Yaşar and Uğurluoğlu, 
2011; Sönmez, 2011; Civaner, 2011; Uçku and Elçi, 2010; Üstündağ and 
Yoltar, 2007; Pala, 2007).  
In sum, it might be claimed that the short-term impact of the reform 
on citizens’ access to health care services was largely positive. However, 
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there is no consensus in the literature over the long-term impacts of the 
reform on the sustainability of Turkey’s health care system, its ability to 
provide free health care services for all, and the provision of health care 
services on the basis of equal citizenship status. 
 
4.3. The post-1980s health care reforms in Latin America, 
Southern Europe and East Asia 
 
The main aim of this section is to review the post-1980s health care 
reforms with a special emphasis on developing country contexts. This 
section will also analyse the similarities and differences between these 
reforms and the HTP. The first subsection provides an overview of the 
political, economic and demographic background of post-1980 health care 
reforms debates worldwide. The second subsection examines post-1980 
health care reforms in three regions, namely Latin America, Southern 
Europe, East Asia and South Asia. Countries from these three regions were 
selected primarily due to the similarities they share with Turkey in terms 
of welfare systems (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.212) and/or political 
economic context (i.e. Eder, 1993). 
 
4.3.1. Background 
 
Before the consolidation of the Washington Consensus, health care 
reforms in developing countries aimed to extend the scope of, and facilitate, 
access to health care services. A combination of anti-colonial sentiment, 
positive international political atmosphere crowned by the Alma Ata 
Declaration of 1978, and the ideals of socialism and social democracy, made 
“health for all” the common political developing country discourse on health 
care policies, even if governments did not always put “health for all” into 
practice.   
Unlike most advanced capitalist countries, developing countries could 
not provide universal coverage for all citizens before the early 1980s. The 
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majority of health care systems in high and middle-income developing 
countries traditionally rely on a social insurance system for civil servants 
and other formal sector employees (Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2000, 
p.417). In line with the developmentalist objectives of the post-WW2 period, 
it was expected that health insurance would gradually cover all citizens.  
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, health care reforms have become 
part of the political agenda both in developing countries and advanced 
capitalist countries. In advanced capitalist countries, several reasons 
accounted for the rise of health care reforms in the political agenda, 
including: ageing populations and chronic diseases which led to a rise in 
health care expenditures, an increase in demand for health care services, 
intensive use of health technologies such as computerised axial tomography 
(CAT) scanners, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and positron emission 
tomography (PET) (Wessen, 1999, p.386; Abel-Smith and Mossialos, 1994, 
p.90), and the need to contain increasing health care expenditures 
accordingly (Blank and Burau, 2010, pp.96-97). Indeed, scholars note that 
the increasing rate of health care costs exceeded the rate of economic growth 
in advanced capitalist countries (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.19).  
Regarding the factors that led to significant increases in health care 
expenditures, Moran suggests that Western European governments made 
a conscious political choice to prioritise protecting the global 
competitiveness of their health industries over the sustainability of the 
provision of free health service for all (1998: p.26). 
Going back to the discussion on cost-containment, it is important to 
ask the following question: Do pro-market health care reforms decrease 
health care spending? The evidence indicates the answer to the question if 
the proposed pro-market solutions serve the cost-containment objective is 
open to debate. State health care systems seem to better accommodate 
health care costs (Abel-Smith and Mossialos, 1994, p.125). Societal health 
care systems seem to be weaker than state health care systems in 
containing costs, yet they fared better than private health care systems 
(Blank and Burau, 2010, p.76). As the case of the U.S. demonstrates, greater 
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private sector involvement in health care services tends to result in reduced 
government ability to control health costs (Blank and Burau, 2010, p.107).  
How has the US private health care system emerged as the vantage 
point for health care reforms in Western Europe and elsewhere? While the 
US health care system has been a laggard in terms of its failure to both 
provide universal coverage and contain health care expenditures, it 
nevertheless become a vantage point for health care reforms. The strength 
of the US position within the global health care market makes it a reference 
point for health care reforms, even though the UK has one of the best 
performing health care systems in terms of cost containment and universal 
coverage (Moran, 1999, p.18). 
If pro-market health care reforms do not support cost-containment, 
what makes them acceptable for democratic societies? Some sectors of 
Western European societies find pro-market health care reforms appealing 
due to various reasons. Scholars suggest that upper and upper middle 
classes in particular have been unsatisfied by the restricted choice and 
relatively low quality of health care services of state health care systems. 
This discontent has not been unfounded, as rationing mechanisms led to 
problems such as long waiting times and delays, especially in access to 
specialty health care services (Leys, 2010, p.19; Moran, 2000, p.150; 
Ranade, 1994, p.43). Moran emphasises that even though state health care 
systems perform well in controlling the system and providing access to all 
free at the point of service, they are more likely to be insensitive to 
consumer demand and inefficiencies (1998, p.19). As a result, neoliberal 
discourse of health care reforms has become a voice for high-income groups’ 
demands for better health care in these countries (Moran, 1998, p.30). 
Finally, in line with the expectations of ideational institutionalism, it could 
be suggested that the fact that pro-market health care reforms lack 
evidence does not seem to weaken their popularity. The power of 
neoliberalism manifested itself in the recognition of the basic premises of 
health economics among policy makers, which empowered the pro-market 
policy frame in health care policies. 
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In the aftermath of the fall of Keynesianism and the consolidation of 
the Washington Consensus, the political atmosphere that favoured the 
establishment of state health care systems in the developing world started 
to disappear. The WB emerged as the key institution in global health care 
policy, and its role is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The WB’s first report 
on financing health services in developing countries was published in 1987 
(World Bank, 1987). The report promoted pro-market health care reforms 
and contributed substantially to the increasing political urgency attached 
to health care reform in developing countries. The WB’s approach was 
clearly pro-market in health care delivery but pushed the state’s financier 
role to remain intact (World Bank, 1993, p.65). In this period, managers and 
economists became part of health care policy debates, challenging the 
dominance of the medical profession in the political realm in developing 
countries (Walt and Gilson, 1994, p.357).  
Therefore, the post-1980s health care reforms in developing countries 
emerged as products of both a pro-market dominant discourse and a new 
set of actors in the health care domain. Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) and Stabilisation Programmes that laid the basic tenets of the 
economies of developing countries and public sector transformation in these 
countries became part of the political context within which health care 
reforms gained primacy. In this context, pro-market health care reforms 
sometimes were introduced as part of the conditionalities attached to loans 
provided by international donor organisations at the time of economic crises 
hall (Hall, 2003, p.87). 
However, it would be erroneous to conclude that health care systems 
are simply converging to private health care systems. In contrast, Rothgang 
et al. suggests that there is a relative retreat of the state from health care 
financing, while the differences between health care system types remains 
relatively stable over time (2005, pp.194-196). 
Research on some country cases point to a reverse dynamic in private 
health care systems. For instance, the U.S. government recently managed 
to introduce a health care reform to increase the regulatory power of the 
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state over the health insurance market with the objective of ensuring access 
to health care services especially for seniors, the sick and middle-class 
Americans (Jacobs and Skocpol, 2010, p.122). Therefore, evidence supports 
the claim made in Chapter 2 that health care reforms all around the world 
are ongoing political processes, the pace and scope of which vary according 
to the political and economic dynamics in different national contexts. The 
study of individual cases of health care reforms shows that all these 
processes are political processes that are open to unprecedented outcomes. 
One should note that stark differences exist between advanced 
capitalist countries and developing countries with respect to the political 
economic context within which the post-1980 health care reforms arrive. 
Developing countries differ from advanced capitalist countries in terms of 
financial resources they can allocate to health care services. Schieber and 
Maeda looked at the WB statistics on health care to show that developing 
countries—home to 84 per cent of the world population—account for only 
11 per cent of all health care spending in the world (1999, p.194). Even 
though more money poured into health care does not necessarily translate 
into better health outcomes, the considerable disparity between health care 
expenditures of developing countries and advanced capitalist countries 
might well indicate the inequality of health care infrastructures and health 
outcomes between these two groups of countries.  
Against this background, the selected country cases below indicate 
that the political trajectories of post-1980 health care reforms in the 
developing world have been diverse with respect to the content of these 
reforms as well as the changes they brought on.  
 
4.3.2. Health care reforms in Latin America 
 
Most post-1980 health care reforms in Latin America were introduced 
as part of the SAPs during economic crises. Apart from a small number of 
exceptions, such as the Venezuelan health care reform in 1999 (Muntaner 
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et al., 2006, p.804), the majority of Latin American health care reforms had 
strong pro-market components. 
Most Latin American countries and Turkey shared social insurance-
based health care systems that failed to provide coverage for those outside 
the formal labour market. While Turkey’s health care reform did not start 
during an economic crisis, as was the case in most Latin American reforms, 
it still shares a pro-market approach with Latin American reforms. 
Therefore, an analysis of three Latin American experiences of post 1980 
health care reforms might shed light to the discussions on Turkish health 
care reform. With this objective, we examine three reform experiences: in 
El Salvador, Chile and Argentina.  
 
4.3.2.1. Health care reform in El Salvador 
 
El Salvador witnessed health care reform during its public sector 
restructuring after the 1980 economic crisis and 1992 peace agreement. The 
WB was seen as the most critical international partner of the El 
Salvadorian government during the reform process (Homedes et al., 2000, 
pp.66-67). The government established the Health Reform Group, which led 
the reform process without consultation with trade unions, peasants’ 
organisations, professional organisations and the MoH (Homedes et al., 
2000, p.75). The reform resulted in decentralised health care services, a 
limited role for the public sector in health care, new user fees for health care 
services, and a basic benefit package that merely included primary health 
care services (Homedes et al., 2000, pp.71-73). 
 
4.3.2.2. Health care reform in Chile 
 
Chilean health care traditionally relied on a centralised public health 
care system funded by a set of social health insurance schemes (Barrientos, 
2000, pp.95-96). Similar to the El Salvadorian experience, the first set of 
post-1980 health care reforms in Chile came into place as part of the SAP. 
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In addition, the country was also under the rule of the military dictatorship 
that overthrew Salvador Allende’s government in Chile. The dictatorship 
introduced private health insurance and extended its coverage to blue-collar 
workers in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Barrientos, 2000, p.96). 
However, until the end of the 1990s, private health insurance covered just 
over a quarter of the citizenry, which included mostly low-risk individuals 
and high-income earners (Barrientos, 2000, p.94). In addition, the military 
dictatorship separated health care finance and provision from each another 
(Barrientos, 2000, p.96). 
 Chile’s transition to electoral democracy after 1989 brought the 
centre-left to power and strengthened the public component of its health 
care system. A second set of Chilean health care reforms, titled The Plan 
AUGE, attempted to reverse the marketization process initiated by the 
Pinochet dictatorship and established a universal health insurance for all, 
one which would eliminate differences in benefit packages among different 
sectors of society. However, this reform did not ensure equal access to 
health care for the majority of women. The reform also failed to eradicate 
income-based inequalities in access to health care services (Dannreuther 
and Gideon, 2008). After the reform, the public component of the Chilean 
health care system functioned as a ‘provider of last resort’ (Barrientos, 2000, 
p.94). The resulting health care system rendered a strong stratification both 
in citizens’ access to health care services and their affiliation to health 
insurances (Barrientos, 2000, p.111). 
 
4.3.2.3. Health care reform in Argentina 
 
During the 1990s, the government carried out a comprehensive health 
care reform in collaboration with the WB. Before the reform, the 
Argentinian health care system had been built upon a tripartite structure: 
the publicly funded sector, social insurance funds, and private health care 
(Lloyd-Sherlock, 2005, p.1895). The publicly funded sector suffered from 
underfunding, while small-sized social insurance funds were weak vis-à-vis 
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health care providers due to the lack of state regulation (Lloyd-Sherlock, 
2005, p.1895). Throughout the 1990s, the private sector component grew 
(Lloyd-Sherlock, 2005, p.1895).  
Similar to the experience of most other Latin American countries, 
health care reform was initiated at a time when the Argentinean economy 
was under the impact of the SAP in the 1990s. One of the key components 
of the Argentinean health care reform was the introduction of a competitive 
market in health insurance, which gave citizens the option to exit from the 
social health insurance scheme and switch to the private health insurance 
(Lloyd-Sherlock, 2005, p.1897). Secondly, the reform transformed public 
hospitals into health enterprises with their own management authorities, 
with the exception of keeping the provincial administrations’ authority over 
the hospital staff (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2005, p.1898). 
 
4.3.3. Health Care Reforms in Southern Europe 
 
Southern European countries, namely Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, historically share similar traits with Turkey in terms of their 
political economic structures, social insurance based financing of health 
care, and the legacy of authoritarian rule. Scholars generally classify 
Turkey’s welfare system as reminiscent of the Southern European welfare 
regime type (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.212). However, it is important to 
note that Günal rightly suggested that Southern European countries took 
a different route in terms of their health care systems after the end of the 
1970s. While Turkey mostly chose to consolidate its social insurance based 
financing model, Southern European countries switched to a national 
health services model (Günal, 2008, pp.13-14). 
Although Southern European countries and Turkey took different 
historical paths toward health care reform, it might still be useful to 
examine the reforms to see if different political dynamics in Southern 
Europe resulted in a switch to a national health services model.  
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Before discussing individual cases, I would like to note the difference 
between the political economic context within which national health care 
systems are embedded in Southern European countries and Britain and 
Scandinavian countries. First of all, Southern European countries had 
societal health care systems before the reforms, and these systems were 
then transformed into state health care systems. In contrast, Britain and 
Scandinavian countries established their health care systems as state 
health care systems from the very start (Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008, 
p.107). Second, Britain and Scandinavian countries set up their national 
health care services at times of steady economic growth and prosperity, 
while Southern European countries established national health care 
services during periods of economic austerity (Petmesidou and Guillén, 
2008, p.107). Similar to Latin American countries that were obliged to 
undertake SAPs under the influence of the WB and the IMF, Southern 
European countries were required to meet the Maastricht criteria in order 
to join the preparations of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
(Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008, p.107). 
As a result, and in line with historical institutionalist predictions, 
Moran suggests that national health care services in Southern European 
countries do not function like the systems of Northern European countries 
(2000, p.154). Co-payments increasingly became the biggest source of 
health care finance, while universal coverage remained more as an ideal 
than reality (Moran, 2000, p.154). According to Moran, the partial failure of 
the national health care service model in Southern Europe was due to the 
fact that Southern European health care reforms were undertaken at a time 
of fiscal austerity. Lastly, Moran draws attention to the role of the political 
culture in these countries, which resulted in corruption and the prevalence 
of private practice of medical doctors (Moran, 2000, p.155). Against this 
background, health care reforms in Greece and Italy are discussed in detail 
below. 
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4.3.3.1. Health Care Reform in Greece 
 
After the fall of the military junta in the middle of the 1970s, the New 
Democracy Party of Karamanlis won the general elections in Greece. 
However, it was not until 1981 that the Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) initiated health care reform and established a national health 
service in Greece (Kondilis et al., 2011, pp.32-33). As part of the reform, the 
establishment of new private health facilities was banned. This reform led 
to an increase in public health facilities for health care delivery (Kondilis et 
al., 2011, p.33).  
However, reformers could not unite social security funds due to strong 
opposition by trade unions (Kondilis et al., 2011, p.33). As a result, while 
almost two-thirds of total health expenditures were funded through general 
taxation in Spain and Italy, only around 20 per cent of total health 
expenditures was financed through general taxation in Greece in 2004 
(Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008, p.111). Petmesidou and Guillen suggest 
that the main reason for Greece’s failure to unite separate social security 
funds was the ‘statist-clientelistic’ political culture and consequent 
polarised political structure (2008, p.110).  
After the fall of the Social Democrats, the Conservative government 
lifted the ban on the establishment of private health facilities, introduced 
co-payment and user charges, subsidised private health insurances, 
abolished the employment security for medical doctors (Kondilis et al., 
2011, p.34), and permitted medical doctors working for public hospitals to 
engage in private practice (Petmesidou and Guillén, 2008, p.110). 
As mentioned earlier, the European Union’s (EU) Maastricht criteria, 
coupled with preparations for the transition to a monetary union in Europe, 
undermined the power of the Greek government over the public budget 
during the reform process (Kondilis et al., 2011, p.34). As a result, the 
consolidation of national health care services model could not be a policy 
priority. Alternatively, the government became concerned with cost-
containment in health care services, which then resulted in the further 
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marketization of health care services (Kondilis et al., 2011, pp.34-35). 
Therefore, despite the introduction of the NHS model, Tountas et al. 
suggest that the role of the private sector increased over time (2005, p.168). 
They argue that the main reason for the increased private sector presence 
in health care was due to the public sector’s failure to provide quality 
services while citizens’ disposable income increased, thereby fostering 
‘passive privatisation’ (Tountas et al., 2005, p.169).  
The private hospitals sector witnessed mergers and acquisitions 
between the late 1990s and early 2000s. This process led to the 
establishment of an oligopolistic market in private health care provision 
dominated by three multinationals (Kondilis et al., 2011, p.37). In his study 
of the concentration of private hospitals sector, Boutsioli also reports that 
the private hospitals sector has become an oligopolistic market, as it became 
increasingly concentrated over time and only a few companies today control 
the market (2007, p.223). The current Greek health care system, which has 
low satisfaction rates among the public, resembles a mixed health care 
system that is composed of different forms of financing and delivery 
structures (Kondilis et al., 2011, pp.40-41). 
 
4.3.3.1. Health Care Reform in Italy 
 
The Italian government introduced health care reform to transform 
the country’s health care system into a national health service in 1978. The 
major aim of this reform was to establish tax-based financing, free access to 
services for all, and public provision of services (Donatini et al., 2001, p.91). 
However, the reform could not be fully implemented, and private health 
care providers flourished due to limited public capacity for delivering health 
care services. In addition, costly co-payments created an obstacle for 
patients wishing to access health care services during the 1980s and early 
1990s (Donatini et al., 2001, p.92).  
In response, the Italian government initiated a new reform project in 
the early 1990s. In line with the British NHS reform, the main objectives of 
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this reform were to create an internal market for health care delivery and 
to decentralise health care services (Donatini et al., 2001, p.92). 
Nevertheless, these changes did not work in tandem with one other due to 
the lack of regulatory capacity in regional authorities.  
In 1999, the Italian health care system once again witnessed health 
care reform. This time, the reform strengthened the regulatory role of the 
state but left the administration of health care delivery to the autonomous 
regions (Donatini et al., 2001, p.93). The reform authorised autonomous 
regions to permit the establishment of new health care facilities, which 
increased state power over the private providers (Donatini et al., 2001, 
p.99).  
In the Italian case, the reform ended the dual practice of medical 
doctors until 1998 (Donatini et al., 2001, p.100). Alternatively, public 
hospitals reserved 6 to 12 per cent of beds for private patients of medical 
doctors, provided that these doctors pay a specific amount of their extra 
income to the hospital (Donatini et al., 2001, p.100). 
 
4.3.4 Health Care Reforms in East Asia and South East Asia 
 
The social policies of East Asian and South East Asian countries have 
been traditionally enmeshed with outward-oriented developmentalist 
aspirations, which are categorised as ‘productive welfare systems’ (Rudra, 
2007). East Asian and South East Asian countries also witnessed a welfare 
system transformation after the 1980s. Since the literature on political 
economy has compared Malaysia and South Korea with Turkey (i.e. Eder, 
1993) health care reforms in both countries are briefly discussed below. 
 
4.3.4.1. Health Care Reform in Malaysia 
 
The Malaysian health care system was traditionally a state health 
care system (Ramesh, 2009, p.73). While the Malaysian government 
included health care in its privatisation plan in 1983 (Ramesh, 2009, p.75), 
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the government did not put this objective into practice for fear that it might 
hamper its re-election chances (Ramesh, 2009, p.75).  
Alternatively, the Malaysian government pursued an alternative 
strategy that encouraged the private health sector to develop without 
undertaking direct privatisation (Leng and Barraclough, 2007, p.21). As the 
national income of Malaysia rose dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s, 
private hospitals flourished, proving the success of the government’s 
‘passive privatisation’ strategy (Leng and Barraclough, 2007, p.24). For 
example, the share of private hospital beds in total hospital beds increased 
from 5 per cent in 1980 to 25 per cent in 2002 (Leng and Barraclough, 2007, 
p.9). In this new setting, roughly less than half of the medical doctors work 
for the private sector, while more than half are hired by the public sector 
(Ramesh, 2009, p.75). In accordance with the concept of ‘policy drift’, the 
Malaysian case indicates that unimplemented reform or a passive attitude 
by the government does not merely mean stability in health care system. 
On the contrary, this inactivity can permit active change by other actors on 
the ground. 
Malaysia relies upon various forms of health care finance tools, 
including government transfers, user charges, out-of-pocket payments, and 
a tiny proportion of social security funds and private health insurance funds 
(Ramesh, 2009, p.76). Government transfers to health care accounted for 
little more than half of total health care expenditures in 1998 and in 2002 
(Ramesh, 2009, p.77).  
Ramesh reports that the Malaysian government has been concerned 
with the containment of health care costs since the mid 1980s (2009, p.79). 
The government plans to transform the country’s health care finance model 
from a tax-based model to a social insurance-based. However, Ramesh 
suggests that the government has still been unsuccessful in reaching these 
objectives due to possible electoral backlash (2009, p.79). 
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4.3.4.2. Health Care Reform in South Korea 
 
South Korea, similar to Turkey, has one of the lowest levels of social 
expenditures among other members of the OECD. In his book on the South 
Korean social policy, Woo argues that the main reason for low social 
expenditures was due to the state’s primary political objectives, which were 
commitment to economic development and national competitiveness in the 
international economy. These objectives left social policy development off 
the political agenda. In order to strengthen its developmentalist strategy, 
Woo suggests that the South Korean state worked with the owners of large 
companies and created a cooperative labour force using company-level trade 
unions (2004, p.135). In fact, the Korean Tripartite Commission, which is 
composed of government, business and labour representatives, functioned 
as a corporatist governance body in South Korea. In this setting, company-
level welfare provision increased in scope, yet the development of a 
universalistic welfare state remained limited (Woo, 2004, p.135). 
Woo explains that the South Korean health care system began to 
develop during the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s under the 
authoritarian regime. This system provided health care coverage mainly for 
those working in the largest companies. However, the Medical Aid 
Programme, similar to the Green Card scheme in Turkey, was introduced 
in 1977 as a tax-financed welfare programme to provide free health care 
services for those living under the officially determined poverty threshold 
(Chun et al., 2009, p.26).  
According to Woo, health insurances for the general population 
appeared only after the relative democratisation of the country in the late 
1980s (2004, p.130). For instance, in the late 1980s, health insurance 
schemes for the self-employed became available (Chun et al., 2009, p.141). 
According to Woo, the largest increase in health insurance coverage came 
about after the financial crises of 1997 and 1998 in order to reinstitute 
legitimacy of the state at the time (2004, p.130). Kwon also suggests that 
the democratisation of Korean politics and the financial crises of 1997 and 
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1998 made the developmentalist Korean state a more inclusive one in the 
domain of health care (2005, p.494). 
In 1998, the South Korean government, a single party government of 
the now centre-left Democratic United Party, launched its plan to unite 
health insurances. As trade unionism was confined to the company-level, 
the largest trade union of the country, the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions, opposed any proposal to unify social insurances and establish a 
national health service (Woo, 2004, p.134). The largest business 
organisation also opposed the unification proposal and suggested instead 
the extensive use of private health insurance (Woo, 2004, p.109).  
Despite strong opposition to the proposed reform, the Democratic 
United Party’s centre-left government legislated the reform, and the 
Constitutional Court ruled the unification of health insurance funds as 
constitutional (Woo, 2004, p.109). As a result, the National Medical 
Insurance Corporation was established in 1998 to merge 227 social 
insurance funds under the umbrella of one corporation (Chun et al., 2009, 
p.142).  
Despite the ruling, the Grand National Party, the major conservative 
party of South Korea, and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions continued 
to work against the actual unification of social insurance funds. Indeed, Woo 
suggests that the fate of the financial unification of health insurance funds 
was still unclear in 2002. The anti-unification camp managed to convince 
the government to delay the financial merger until the end of the 2002 
general elections (Chun et al., 2009, p.144). Woo argues that the political 
division between the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, who were against 
the unification, and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, who were 
for the unification, decreased the chance of full-fledged unification of health 
insurance being realised (2004, p.120). Finally, after the electoral victory of 
the centre-left Democratic United Party in the 2002 presidential elections, 
the financial merger could be implemented in 2003 (Chun et al., 2009, 
pp.144-145). 
 113 
 
After the mid 2000s, the Medical Aid Programme began to be perceived 
as a significant burden on the public budget (Kwon, 2007). As a result, the 
South Korean government introduced cost-sharing for outpatient care 
services with a ceiling on user chargers and limited access of the 
beneficiaries of Medical Aid Programme to certain health care providers 
(Kwon, 2007). Kwon reports that progressive civic groups opposed these 
changes to the Medical Aid Programme yet failed to stop the reform (2007). 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
This concluding section explores the similarities and differences 
between the HTP in Turkey and reforms in Latin American, Southern 
European and East Asian countries. In doing so, the section offers insight 
into the specificities of the HTP in Turkey within a comparative perspective. 
Last but not the least, the section shows that significant actors have to be 
taken into account when examining the politics of health care in developing 
countries. 
The first conclusion that might be drawn from this discussion is that 
while there seems to be a general trend for marketization in different health 
care reforms, there is no single route for developing countries to restructure 
their health care systems. Even if two countries seem to take a similar path 
(i.e. providing more room for private health insurance schemes), if and how 
this path is implemented on the ground depends on various political factors.  
However, it can be safely argued that the dominant global ‘policy 
paradigm’ of pro-market health care reforms for developing country 
governments has been by and large the same. International organisations, 
especially the WB, have been at the forefront of promoting this discourse 
through various means, which will be discussed in detail in next chapter. 
The HTP has both similarities and differences with health care 
reforms in the selected countries of Latin America, Southern Europe and 
East Asia. The main tenets of the reform in Turkey, including the 
purchaser-provider split, the social insurance funds merger, user chargers 
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to outpatient services, and a greater role for the private sector in health 
care delivery, are common in most of the health care reforms discussed 
above. Similar to the Latin American health care reforms carried out in 
collaboration with the WB, Turkey’s health care reform has been an almost 
secretive political process that included government officials and the WB 
experts but excluded other actors such as trade union and the TTB 
representatives, the point that is elaborated in the next chapter. 
As far as the outcomes of the abovementioned reforms are concerned, 
passive privatisation seems to be a general trend rather than sale of public 
health care institutions to the private sector. Turkey is not an exception to 
this trend. As is the case of Greece, changes in health care delivery market 
have been leading to a greater concentration in the health care delivery 
market in Turkey. Similar to the Malaysian experience, a rise in national 
income seems to strengthen the use of private health care facilities in the 
Turkish case. During the post-1980 health care reforms, hardly any of the 
developing country cases were investing in public health care facilities. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the rise of private actors in health care 
delivery emerged as common trend in the aftermath of post-1980 health 
care reforms in developing countries. 
A major difference between the HTP and reforms in other selected 
developing countries is the continued dominant role of the Turkish state in 
health care finance. For instance, unlike the reform in Argentina, the 
Turkish health care reform did not include an exit option from compulsory 
social health insurance. This might be partly explained on the basis of the 
contextual differences within which reforms were introduced in these two 
countries. While health care reform in Argentina was introduced at times 
of austerity, Turkish health care reform came into place during steady 
economic growth. The second difference might be the limited power of 
political actors beyond the government in Turkey. Unlike South Korea, 
consultative bodies like the Tripartite Commission do not exist in Turkey’s 
political system. For instance, while the power of trade unions and other 
actors delayed the implementation of health care reform in South Korea 
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and blocked reform in Greece, no political actors have succeeded in delaying 
or blocking the reform of a single-party government in Turkey.  
The selected case studies suggest that there are important political 
factors that have to be taken into account when understanding the politics 
of health care during health care reform processes. These actors include the 
role of international organisations, governments and their power within the 
country’s political system, and the role of trade unions and business 
organisations. The subsequent chapters examine the role of these actors in 
the politics of health care in Turkey. 
There are also general lessons to be learnt from these case studies. For 
instance, if a country is under the rule of a working electoral democracy, 
governments seem to care about their electoral prospects while carrying out 
health care reforms, which hamper any governmental attempts to pursue 
direct privatisation. Therefore, when governing parties have competitors, 
they might choose not to pursue direct privatisation but rather undertake 
passive privatisation. In addition, trade unions in developing countries can 
act either to protect their members’ relatively privileged positions within 
health care systems or to establish broader alliances to push for the 
establishment of universalist health care system for all.  
Last but not the least, these cases suggest that significant political 
clashes might well occur after the reform is enacted. These clashes might 
even block the implementation of the reform, give it a new shape, or make 
a significant amendment to it. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2, a 
general tendency in the literature to examine the political processes that 
result in the enactment of reforms, but neglect the political processes after 
the primary legislative victory of the proponents of the reform, might not be 
well grounded. Political negotiations and conflicts over the reform do not 
come to an end once the primary reform decision is made. In line with this 
insight, the remaining chapters focus on post-legislative politics in Turkey’s 
health care system as well. 
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Chapter 5: The Impact of the World Bank on 
Health Care Reform in Turkey 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Domestic political dynamics (within the limits of global economic 
dynamics) are often used to contextualise the emergence of health care 
reforms in Western European and North American advanced capitalist 
countries (Jacobs and Skocpol; 2010; and Klein, 2010; Ewert, 2009; Ham, 
2009; Harrison and McDonald, 2008; Giaimo, 2005; Lister, 2005; Salter, 
2004; Moran, 1999; Freeman, 1999; Freeman, 1998; Moran, 1998; Abel-
Smith and Mossialos, 1994; Walt, 1994; Navarro, 1994; Ranade, 1994; 
Immergut, 1992; Moran, 1992). In contrast, the role of international 
organisations is particularly emphasised when looking at health care 
reforms in developing countries (Sen and Koivusalo, 1998; Berman and 
Bossert, 2000; Armada et al., 2001; Homedes and Ugalde, 2005; Lloyd-
Sherlock, 2006; Ağartan, 2007; Ağartan, 2008).  
Before the establishment of the Washington Consensus, the WHO was 
the most important international actor driving the global health care policy 
agenda. In the late 1970s, the WB replaced the WHO as the new key global 
development actor and began directing considerable amounts of financial 
resources to the reform of health care systems in developing countries. 
The World Bank Group (WBG) institutions, which were primarily 
established during the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 to assist the 
reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, changed shape as the 
neoliberal political agenda took off first in the U.S. and the U.K. and then 
spread to other countries. As the voting structure of the WB allowed 
advanced capitalist states to dominate over the Bank’s policy choices 
(Armada et al., 2001, p.732), political changes especially in the U.S. and the 
U.K. proved to be influential in reshaping the policy priorities of the WB 
alongside the Washington Consensus. In this process, the WB emerged as 
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one of the largest global development actors and pioneers of pro-market 
health care reforms in developing countries.  
Starting in the late 1970s, the WB increased the scope of its funds in 
the domain of health care services, which exceeded the total budget of all 
health-related UN organisations by the 1990s. In addition to its financial 
resources, the WB also established an international ‘epistemic community’, 
as Freeman suggests (Freeman, 1998, p.398) that began to claim expertise 
in reforming health care systems especially in developing countries.  
With these changes, the WB started to get involved in the domestic 
policies of its aid recipient countries, including in the restructuring of public 
administration, and in the domains of social policy and health care policy 
(Laurell and Arellano, 1996, p.2). The WB began to act as a vantage point 
for health care reforms in developing countries (Walt, 1994, p.127; Walt, 
1998, p.434; Buse and Gwin, 1998; Homedes and Ugalde, 2005, p.94).  
The WB, a member of the WBG, is comprised of two institutions: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA). In addition to the WB, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is also a member 
organisation of the WBG alongside the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) and International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), has also been quite influential in the health care domain 
in developing countries. The IFC is “the world’s largest multilateral 
investor in the private health sector in emerging markets” (International 
Finance Corporation, 2012b) that works to support the growth of the private 
sector in health care.  
After the release of two WB reports titled ‘Financing Health Services 
in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform’ (World Bank, 1987) and 
‘Investing in Health’ (World Bank, 1993), the mandate of the WB over the 
global health care policy agenda and the discourse of health care reform was 
consolidated. In this period, Turkey became one of the WB’s target 
countries. The Turkish governments started to collaborate with the World 
Bank both in order to determine the shortcomings of Turkey’s health care 
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system and to formulate possible solutions to help to overcome these 
shortcomings. 
Against this background, this chapter addresses the question of how 
and to what extent the WB has been influential in the health care reform 
process in Turkey. With the objective of providing an answer to this 
question, this chapter examines the interaction between the WB and the 
AK Party governments in the domain of health care policy, and the 
historical as well as on-going institutional ties established between the WB 
and Turkish governments that feed into the contemporary partnership 
between these two actors. In doing so, this chapter draws on the content 
analysis of WB documents, as well as interviews conducted with WB experts 
who took part in the partnership with the Turkish government in the HTP 
and the members of the government’s reform team. 
This chapter is organised into nine sections. After this introduction 
section, the second section discusses the WB’s approach to health care 
policies and health care reforms in developing countries. This section 
explores whether the WB has a blueprint in health care reforms or not, and 
if it does, what are the main components. The third section provides an 
overview of the history of the partnership between the WB and Turkey in 
health care. The fourth section describes the partnership between the WB 
and the AK Party government during the preparation and implementation 
of the HTP. The fifth section examines the effectiveness of the WB loans in 
providing the WB with political leverage to further its policy advices in the 
Turkish case. The sixth section investigates the influence of the WB’s know-
how and policy advices on the reform under consideration. The seventh 
section analyses the WB experts’ insights about the design of the reform 
process. The eighth section examines the conflicts between the WB and 
Turkish government throughout the reform process and discusses if and 
how these conflicts have been solved. The ninth and last section 
summarises the impact of the WB on Turkey’s health care reform. 
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5.2. The World Bank’s approach to health care reform in 
developing countries 
 
This section explores the following questions: Does the WB have a 
blueprint in health care reforms? If it does, what are the main parameters 
of its blueprint? 
One way of exploring these questions is to examine the WB’s official 
documents on health care reforms. The World Development Report titled 
‘Investing in Health’ can be considered the foundation of the WB’s approach 
to health care reform in developing countries. In this report, as Laurell and 
Arellano succinctly state, the WB presented health care both “as an end in 
itself and as a means to foster development” (1996, p.2). This dual portrayal 
of health care can be argued to echo the contemporary nature of the health 
care domain both as a matter of human rights and as a global and national 
market commodity, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
Despite the fact that the WB describes health care both as a public 
good and as a profitable sector, scholars argue that the WB’s health care 
reform proposals in practice aim to foster health care as a profitable sector 
only to disregard its public good character. Laurell and López Arellano 
argue that the WB report gives priority to health care as a means to foster 
development (1996, p.2) rather than as a human right to be instituted. As 
the WB’s proposals are centred upon the idea of health care as a means to 
development (implying economic development only), scholars identify the 
WB’s approach to health care with neoliberalism (Laurell and Arellano, 
1996, p.11; Armada et al., 2001, p.735), which here implies a political project 
that aims to increase the commodification of goods and services formerly 
out of the market relations.  
It could be argued that the WB backs up its contemporary health care 
reform blueprint with three arguments. These are: 1) the state does not 
have enough money for universal health care; 2) the public financing and 
provision of health care services are bound to be inefficient; and 3) 
instituting equity in access to health care services is not possible.  
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Inspired by the NPM approach, the WB comes up with a set of policy 
tools that it promotes as a panacea to the ills of health care systems in 
developing countries. This set of policy tools includes the consolidation of 
individual based forms of health care finance (i.e. user charges, compulsory 
public health insurance and private health insurance) at the expense of tax-
based financing models. It also includes the introduction of purchaser-
provider split in the domain of health care and the promotion of the private 
sector involvement in health care finance and delivery (Collins et al., 1999, 
pp.69-70).  
Nevertheless, the WB experts do not agree with the claim that the WB 
has an ideological health care reform blueprint. One of my informants, 
holding an important position in the WB headquarters, argued:  
 
“We do not have a reform blueprint for countries. … It is better to think 
of it as a loose jacket. It is shaped according to the political economy of 
each country.” (Interview no. 25) 
 
As the informant stated above, the WB offers ‘loose jacket’ guidelines 
to developing country governments rather than a reform blueprint. In his 
understanding, the WB does not impose the specifics of health care reform 
but rather provides governments with a general perspective on health 
policy issues and equips them with up-to-date evidence.  
However, not all WB experts agree with this statement. Another 
informant working for the WB office based in Ankara took one step forward 
to criticise the WB’s blueprint tendency in its health care reform proposals 
for developing countries:  
 
“We tend to be blueprint. We go to every country and say the same 
things. Hospital autonomy, purchaser-provider split… Reality is that 
every country has to contextualize these reforms” (Interview no. 22).  
 
As the interviewee suggests above, the ‘loose jacket’ of the WB has a 
specific colour. This colour has been already identified in this chapter before 
through an analysis of the WB discourse on health care systems and its 
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proposals for developing countries. The WB, according to this informant, 
has to be more responsive towards varied political and economic factors at 
play in different countries. However, she does not question the portrayal of 
the WB’s health care reform blueprint as beyond politics. For her, the 
problem is not about the jacket itself, but the way the WB wants developing 
countries to wear it.  
Where does this ‘loose jacket’ of health care reform come from? When 
I asked this question to my informants affiliated with the WB, they all 
unequivocally referred to scientific evidence. For instance, one suggested,  
 
“There are some principles that science proved to us such as the 
provider-purchaser split. Science teaches us so. We use evidence-based 
policy approach” (Interview no. 25). 
 
Another informant from the WB office in Turkey argued:  
 
“Co-payments, everybody has recognised that even in health insurance 
systems, basic economics which tells you if you don’t ask people to pay 
something, there is the moral hazard issue” (Interview no. 21).  
 
For WB experts, it therefore seems that the main parameters of the 
‘loose jacket’ approach to health care reform originate from scientific 
evidence. By scientific evidence, they mainly refer to the discipline of health 
economics. Having expertise on different health care reforms, therefore, 
may bestow a sense of authority on the WB experts to present their 
knowledge as universal truth. In this sense, the WB’s policy proposals 
appear as the manifestation of this universal truth. Different alternatives 
are deemed political or ideologically driven and therefore lack empirical 
support. 
The validity of the WB’s general claims is contested in the literature. 
With respect to the first claim about the lack of public resources for 
universal health care, scholars argue that the WB fails to analyse the 
distribution of expenditures, including health expenditures in government 
budgets, and does not consider alternative solutions that may increase 
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public social and health expenditures (Laurell and Arellano, 1996, p.9). In 
regards to the second claim on the inefficiency of public health care service 
provision; scholars argue that the WB disregards the negative impacts of 
the SAPs on the efficiency and effectiveness of public financing and delivery 
of health care services (Laurell and Arellano, 1996, p.10). With respect to 
the WB’s last claim on the inequitable nature of public financing and 
delivery of health care, scholars emphasise that this problem might well be 
eliminated by introducing universal public health insurance to replace the 
formerly inequitable access requirements, rather than allowing more 
private sector involvement in financing and provision (Laurell and 
Arellano, 1996, p.10). Nevertheless, the WB disregards the aforementioned 
alternatives. Therefore, scholars argue that the all-encompassing discourse 
of the WB on health care actually leaves out any alternative solutions 
without a valid scientific base (Laurell, 2001; Laurell and Arellano, 1996). 
While the pro-market character of the WB’s health care reform 
blueprint has not changed, its approach to role of the state in the health 
care sector has not remained constant over time. In the early days of the 
Washington Consensus, the WB called for a ‘minimal’ state. Later the WB 
replaced the ‘minimal’ state ideal with the ideal of the ‘effective’ state 
(Archer, 1994, p.13). This discursive change, consolidated in 1990s, became 
known as ‘the governance agenda’.  
Some scholars viewed this change in the WB’s approach as a sign of a 
movement to give a larger role to the state in public policies (Archer, 1994, 
p.13). Nevertheless, not all scholars have attributed a similar significance 
to this change. In response to Archer, Crawford argued that the WB 
approach in its revised form continues to subordinate the role of the state 
to the market (Crawford, 2006, p.115). In the WB’s approach, good 
governance is nothing but pro-market governance (Crawford, 2006, p.120). 
On the one hand, Crawford rightly emphasises the continuity in the WB’s 
approach to favour the private sector over the public sector in the provision 
of public services. On the other hand, it could be argued that Archer’s 
emphasis on the difference between the two discourses of the WB signifies 
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a noteworthy alteration of the WB’s policy tools. Therefore, this change in 
the WB’s paradigm might imply that the WB may continue favouring the 
marketization of health care services, while ensuring that the state 
monitors and regulates this marketization process. 
But why did the WB feel the need to give the state a larger role in 
existing health care markets? Laurell and López Arellano provide us with 
an elaborate understanding of the reasons why the WB has made this 
discursive change. For them, the WB approach to health care reform faces 
a dilemma. The WB’s dilemma resembles the foundational contradiction of 
the modern capitalist state: promoting capital accumulation while 
regulating class conflict (Laurell and Arellano, 1996, p.3). While the 
scholars’ analogy is insightful, it also needs further elaboration. In fact, the 
WB differs from the modern capitalist state in its institutional setup, 
accountability structures, and ideological makeup.  
One of the most striking differences between the WB and democratic 
capitalist states is that the WB’s activities have no popular democratic 
control. Therefore, unlike democratic capitalist welfare states, it could be 
argued that the WB’s solution to the dilemma between the promotion of 
capital accumulation and the regulation of class conflict (or soothing the 
masses through the provision of social policies) is prone to favour the former 
objective than the latter one. Nevertheless, the lack of popular democratic 
control in the WB does not necessarily imply that it is totally exempt from 
the need to establish legitimacy for its pro-market reforms; it has to work 
with democratically elected governments in most developing countries in 
order to introduce pro-market health care reforms. 
Another difference between the WB and a modern capitalist state 
might be the level of responsiveness to capitalist interest groups. While the 
former is expected to think primarily in terms of global markets and serve 
the global capitalist interests (i.e. multinational companies), the latter is 
expected to consider the needs of the national market and at least take more 
into account the interests of the national (or smaller) capitalist interests. 
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The WB’s health care reform proposals in developing countries seem 
to support the abovementioned analysis. The WB encourages developing 
country governments to promote a larger role for the private sector in the 
financing and delivery of healthcare services. The WB also targets public 
expenditures to provide low-cost services to the bottom income quintiles 
(Laurell and Arellano, 1996, p.3). While the former proposal might be 
regarded as the WB’s primary objective to foster more private sector 
participation in the provision of public services, the second proposal might 
be considered the WB’s quest for public legitimacy in its pro-market health 
care reforms.  
It is argued here that the WB’s approach to health care reforms in 
developing countries forms a coherent paradigm that might well be 
considered a blueprint. In fact, this blueprint suits well with the WB’s 
general pro-market approach to reforms in other public policy domains. The 
WB’s blueprint is established on the following ideals: to encourage more 
private sector participation in financing and service delivery, to promote 
efficiency through market or market-like structures in health care, and to 
restrict the role of the state to the establishment and regulation of these 
markets or market-like structures.  
As the WB informants suggested, the WB tries to be responsive to the 
political economic differences between countries. However, this 
responsiveness is quite limited, as it only implies ‘contextualising’ the WB’s 
blueprint in different institutional environments in order to create 
legitimacy, rather than considering other alternatives. 
Finally, it could be argued that the WB’s approach to health care 
reforms has been fine-tuned over time. In its current form, the WB calls for 
the strong presence of the state with a stewardship role in the health care 
market. The WB has adopted a more responsive and flexible approach to 
national political economic differences while working with developing 
country governments and recommends public guarantee for the very poor’s 
access to basic health care services. 
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5.3. The History of the partnership between the World Bank 
and Turkey in health care and its impact on the Health 
Transformation Programme 
 
This section presents a brief history of the partnership between the 
WB and the Turkish governments in the realm of health care policies. The 
WB’s relationship with Turkish governments tightened in the aftermath of 
the coup d’état in 1980. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1980 coup d’état 
was not only important because it suspended democratic rule in the 
country, but it also paved the way for liberalisation of the Turkish economy 
and alteration of the country’s main development strategy from import 
substitution industrialisation to export oriented growth. As Turkey’s 
economy transformed, the WB and the IMF began to get directly involved 
in economic policy making processes (Yalman, 2009; p.251).  
The WB has been involved in various policy domains in Turkey. For 
instance, the WB had 27 on-going projects in Turkey in 2012. The sectoral 
distribution of these projects ranged from secondary education to renewable 
energy and energy efficiency (World Bank, 2012c). The WB’s multi-sector 
engagement with Turkey may have provided the WB with higher leverage 
vis-à-vis Turkish governments, equipping it with the necessary know-how 
about the modus operandi of Turkey’s public administration.   
As of the late 2000s, WB loans to Turkey constituted an important 
amount of all WB loans. According to the WB data, Turkey is the largest 
borrower country in Europe and the Central Asia region, and ranks third 
among all borrower countries in terms of the size of loan agreements that 
exceeded 1.5$ billion during the last three years (World Bank, 2008, p.20). 
Turkey has also been a member of another important member institution 
of the WBG, the IFC, since 1956. As of 2010, Turkey ranks fifth among all 
countries benefiting from the IFC operations (International Finance 
Corporation, 2012a).  
The engagement of the WB with Turkey’s health care system dates 
back to the late 1980s. The WB’s primary engagement started with the 
launch of the First Health Project in 1990, which provided the Turkish 
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government with $75 million funds. As part of this project, the government 
was expected to extend the geographical access to healthcare services 
especially in eight underserved provinces, to enhance the efficiency of 
health care delivery, to improve the financial sustainability of the health 
care system, and to support the management capacity in the MoH (World 
Bank, 2004, p.27).  
The Second Health Project came in 1994. As part of the second project, 
$130 million loan was released in 1995. Similar to the objectives of the first 
project, the second project aimed to extend access to essential health care 
services, this time in 23 Eastern underserved provinces, and to strengthen 
the management capacity of the MoH (World Bank, 2004, p.27).  
Following the second project, the WB and the Turkish government 
initiated The Primary Health Care Services Project in 1997. This project 
included a  $14 million loan to the government with the aim of developing 
a family physician model for Turkey, applying this model nationwide, 
establishing an effective referral system, and developing the economic 
analysis capacity in the MoH (World Bank, 2004, p.27). This project, 
however, was not implemented due to the inability of the unstable coalition 
governments to make necessary legislative amendments in the Turkish 
Parliament.  
Finally, the last and fourth collaboration between the WB and the 
Turkish government, which will be discussed in detail in the next section, 
came in the early 2000s. Although none of the former three partnerships 
between the WB and Turkish governments produced satisfactory outcomes, 
the experience provided the WB with strong know-how in working with 
Turkish governments and bureaucracy. Second, these partnerships helped 
the WB to promote its approach to health care within the MoH. For 
instance, Ministry officials who attended the WB’s trainings on health care 
policy learned how to approach these issues from the health economics 
perspective and became part of the WB’s epistemic communities on health 
care policy issues. Moreover, the WB succeeded in institutionalising its 
discourse within the Ministry in the form of a directorate, namely the 
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General Directorate of Health Project (Sağlık Projesi Genel 
Koordinatörlüğü, or SPGK). Indeed, some Directorate officials served in key 
posts during the introduction of the HTP of the AK Party government. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the partnerships between the WB 
and Turkish governments throughout the 1990s laid the foundation for the 
introduction of pro-market health care reform in Turkey. This argument is 
elaborated in 6th section of this chapter by demonstrating the adoption of 
the WB’s ‘policy paradigm’ on health care policies in policy documents of 
Turkish public administration. 
 
5.4. The partnership of the World Bank and the AK Party 
government on health care reform 
 
In 2003, the WB released a policy note identifying the main public 
policy areas that needed to be reformed in Turkey. The note clearly 
prioritised health care policy as it called for “fundamental and systemic 
changes” in Turkey’s health care system that would include separating 
financing and provision of healthcare, improving resource mobilisation and 
allocation, enhancing access to health care services, increasing the 
utilisation of health care services in accordance with the needs of the 
population, improving efficiency in production and delivery of health care 
services, and enhancing clinical effectiveness of the health care services 
(World Bank, 2003a, pp.31-32). In the same policy note, the WB also 
declared its readiness and enthusiasm to support a new health reform 
project in Turkey and expressed its willingness to provide both policy advice 
and loan to the government and bureaucracy (World Bank, 2003a, p.33).  
The AK Party government launched its Urgent Action Plan to initiate 
a comprehensive health care reform. This Plan declared that the 
government would take policy actions, including: the restructuring of the 
MoH, granting administrative and financial autonomy to public hospitals, 
unifying all hospitals under the umbrella of the MoH, splitting purchaser 
and provider function in health care, the introduction of universal 
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compulsory social health insurance, and provision of incentives to private 
sector initiatives in health care (The Republic of Turkey, 2003, pp.99-101). 
Given the similarities between the components of the government’s reform 
plan and the WB’s proposals, it could be argued that the AK Party and the 
WB were in consensus over the main parameters of the forthcoming health 
care reform. 
The actual collaboration between the AK Party government and the 
WB started with the launch of the Health Transition Project in 2004. The 
government and the WB designed the Health Transition Project to support 
the implementation of the government’s HTP. The Health Transition 
Project had two phases. In the first phase, initiated in 2004, the WB’s 
objective was the following: 
 
“to assist the government to strengthen the institutional environment 
for the implementation of the Health Transformation Programme that 
will improve system stewardship, streamline financing and service 
delivery, and build the institutional capacity to extend health 
insurance coverage to the whole population in a fiscally sustainable 
manner” (World Bank, 2004, pp.ii).  
 
Completed by 2007, the first phase of the project included the release 
of a roughly $61 million loan (World Bank, 2003b, p.11). While previous WB 
projects in health care in Turkey invested the majority of loans into building 
infrastructure and purchasing equipment (World Bank, 2004, p.6), most of 
this project’s budget was allocated to training and consultancy services 
(World Bank, 2003b, pp.10-11).  
The second phase of the project, called the Health Transformation and 
Social Security Reform Project, came into effect in 2009 and was completed 
by 2013. The main objectives of this project was to improve the effectiveness 
of the SGK and the MoH in developing and implementing reforms on 
provider payments and health care systems performance, and piloting 
output-based financing for non-communicable diseases prevention and 
control (World Bank, 2009, p.iv). With this project, the WB supplied 
approximately $75 million (World Bank, 2009: iv). Most of the project 
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budget was dedicated to capacity building in the MoH to claim a 
stewardship role and retreat from its dominant role in the health care 
delivery (World Bank, 2009, p.v). 
In addition to the Health Transition Project and the Health 
Transformation and Social Security Reform Project, the WB financially 
supported the government through the First and Second Programmatic 
Public Sector Development Policy Loans and First and Second Restoring 
Equitable Growth and Employment Development Policy Loans. 
Implemented between 2004 and 2011, these four projects did not exclusively 
address health care policies, but each had strong health components. 
Indeed, one of the four programme development objectives specifically 
addressed health care reform. This objective is stated as follows: 
 
“Reforming substantially the country’s social protection system, which 
covers social security, universal health insurance and social assistance 
to address growing deficits in the social security system, to make 
structural and administrative improvements in the provision of social 
security benefits and social assistance, and to support universal access 
to health services while increasing the efficiency of their provision” 
(World Bank, 2012, p.viii).  
 
The WB loans for these four consecutive projects ranged from $400 
million to $1.3 billion (World Bank, 2012, p.i). The share of loans directed 
to health care reforms ranged from 11 per cent to 25 per cent (World Bank, 
2012, pp.v-vi).  
The WB published the three-year country partnership strategy 
document for Turkey between 2008 and 2011, which set the priorities of 
partnership for the WB. The Bank presented its main domains of interest 
in Turkey as 1) improved competitiveness and employment; 2) equitable 
human and social development; and 3) efficient provision of high-quality 
public services (World Bank, 2008, p.i). Under the pillar of equitable human 
and social development, the WB once again affirmed that its priority to 
make the health care system more effective (World Bank, 2008, p.ii). 
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In the three-year country partnership strategy document, the main 
objectives of the WB in health care were presented as improving the cost-
effectiveness of healthcare services and increasing the responsiveness of 
these services to the needs of the population (World Bank, 2008, p.32). In 
order to achieve these general objectives, the WB declared that it would 
continue providing financial support in the form of lending, technical 
assistance, just-in-time policy notes, monitoring and evaluation of the 
impacts of on-going healthcare reform, and training in the form of health 
care reform flagship programmes for policy makers and practitioners 
(World Bank, 2008, p.32).  
In addition to the WB’s engagement through the partnerships with the 
government, the WBG was engaged with Turkey’s health sector through the 
IFC. Unlike the WB, which primarily collaborates with governments, the 
IFC works directly with the private sector. Following the release of the HTP 
in 2003, the IFC identified Turkey as a “high priority country in the health 
sector” (Albawaba Business, 2003).  
In line with the prioritisation of Turkey in the investments in the 
health sector, the IFC released an 11$ million loan for the MESA group with 
the objective of supporting the construction and launch of a private hospital 
in the capital city of Ankara (Albawaba Business, 2003). Another notable 
project of the IFC was its support for Acıbadem Healthcare Group with a  
$20 million loan (International Finance Corporation, 2007) that was then 
followed by another corporate loan of up to 40$ million in 2006 (Joseph, 
2006). Lastly, the IFC provided Yapı Kredi Leasing with 25$ million in 2010 
which has been used to provide financial support for small and medium 
enterprises (SME) in the health sector to access higher levels of health 
technology (International Finance Corporation, 2011). The total amount of 
IFC loans to private sector institutions in health care exceeded the total 
amount of the WB loans to the government in the Health Transition Project. 
The WBG declared the IFC’s commitment to support higher levels of 
private sector provision in health care services. As stated in the WB’s 
Country Partnership Strategy for Turkey, the IFC, in collaboration with 
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domestic banks, would lend its support specifically to companies that aim 
to become national health care service providers; expand their domestic or 
foreign operations; establish specialised centres of excellence, and/or have 
smaller hospitals and clinics (World Bank, 2008, p.32). 
First of all, the continuous support of the WB to the HTP suggests that 
the WB and the government had been in agreement on the main parameters 
of the reform project. Second, the main objectives of the WB are in 
accordance with the WB’s health care reform blueprint for developing 
countries, which was described earlier in this chapter. Third, the WB 
focuses its endeavours on the institutional establishment of a pro-market 
health care system. The WB uses two major tools to influence the 
preparation and implementation of health care reform in its partnership 
with the AKParty government. These tools are loans and evidence-based 
policy advice.  
 
5.5. The importance of World Bank loans for health care 
reform in Turkey: Is it overrated? 
 
As discussed above, the WB uses different instruments to initiate, 
support or influence reforms in developing countries, including Turkey. 
Loan agreements are one of the most commonly used instruments of the 
WB.  
For some scholars, continuous WB loans directed to the restructuring 
of health care services in Turkey provide sufficient empirical data to argue 
that the HTP has been a top-down WB project (i.e. Savaş, 2012, pp.18-37). 
Indeed, similar arguments were made for health care reforms supported by 
the WB in other developing countries (i.e. Armada et al., 2001, p.731). 
Nevertheless, both the reform team and the WB team members argue 
against the claim that the WB has been decisive throughout the reform 
process as a result of its partial financier role. For instance, one of the 
informants, who worked as a member of the health care reform team in 
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Turkey, pointed out the limitations of the WB’s power due to the scope of 
financial resources it provided during the reform process. He said, 
 
“If you especially look at the World Bank’s loan agreements in social 
sectors, these are not huge amounts of money. Indeed, these are quite 
symbolic amounts of money within overall budgets of countries. This 
is at least valid for Turkey. Maybe this is not so in Uganda. From this 
angle, the World Bank’s impositions in social sectors cannot be 
effective in countries like Turkey.” (Interview no. 22) 
 
As this quotation suggests, members of the reform team trusted the 
financial resources of Turkish state, explaining their financial and 
intellectual autonomy from the WB on the basis of the economic strength of 
the country. The WB report on the politics of health care reform in Turkey 
also supports this informant’s claim. The report suggests that the WB loan 
for healthcare reform could not sufficiently provide the Bank with 
significant leverage, since its amount was small compared to other loans 
that the government was managing at the time (Rossetti, 2004, p.24).  
Similarly, an informant who worked as a team leader on one of the WB 
health projects argued, 
 
“The AK Party did not come to the World Bank for money. Indeed, total 
amount of loan lent was around 0,5 per cent of total health budget. The 
AK Party wanted to benefit from the World Bank know-how. It wanted 
to use the World Bank for legitimacy. If the reform would go well, than 
it would be the AK Party’s reform. If it would not, then it would be the 
World Bank’s. In addition, it was useful to have a small yet a flexible 
budget. Therefore, we might list three reasons: technical advice, 
legitimacy and flexible money” (Interview no. 25) 
 
As the informant suggested, acquiring loans was not the main motive 
of the AK Party government when approaching the WB to collaborate on 
the health care reform. Apart from the critiques of the reform, neither the 
WB experts nor the members of the reform team suggested that the WB 
loans provided the WB with a strong decision making capacity with respect 
to the content of the reform. 
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In fact, the relative autonomy of the AK Party government from the 
WB and the low level of importance attributed to the loan components of 
the WB partnership throughout the reform process might be due to 
contextual economic factors. With respect to the economic situation of the 
recipient country, an economic crisis seems to be an important contextual 
factor that has serious implications in determining the terms of the 
relationship between the recipient country and the WB. As country cases 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, scholars suggested that developing country 
governments had the lowest capacity to negotiate with the WB in adverse 
macroeconomic contexts and complied with the WB’s policy proposals in 
order to access loans and international aid (Laurell and Arellano, 1996, 
p.13; Batley, 2004, pp.54-55). In contrast to Latin American reform 
experiences, the latest WB and Turkish government health care reform 
partnership was established at a time of steady economic growth of the 
Turkish economy. According to the WB data, Turkey’s economy has been 
booming with over 5 per cent economic growth especially between 2003 and 
2007, which might have increased the control of the Turkish government 
vis-à-vis the World Bank over the specifics of the reform project. 
 
5.6. The influence of the World Bank’s know-how and policy 
advice on the reform 
 
Despite the emphasis given to WB loans when explaining the impact 
of the WB on health care reform in Turkey, the effectiveness of other WB 
tools, such as know-how support and policy advice, have been generally 
overlooked. In fact, in the case of Turkey, the WB has been active in 
researching the health care sector, promoting health care reform ideas, and 
providing strategic political advice to the government in order to make the 
reform politically feasible in Turkey.  
The WB was the pioneering institution producing knowledge on the 
problems of the health care system of Turkey before the reform. In fact, one 
of the informants, who formerly worked for the SPGK and then became part 
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of the reform team during the preparation and implementation of the HTP, 
argued that there was a consensus over the general parameters of the 
health care reform even before the AK Party came to power. He said, 
 
“In the beginning of 2000s, a programme called Health 
Transformation Programme came to the agenda. In fact, this was a 
new version of health care reforms. … In that period (before 2003), 
technical preparations of related ministries had been already there. 
Undersecretaries of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security, State Planning Organisation, Treasury and Ministry 
of Health already prepared letters of agreement. As of 2003, general 
philosophy of these prior agreements was kept intact and took the 
name of Health Transformation Programme (Interview no. 32).  
 
As a member of the reform team and a former official of the General 
Directorate of Health Project, this informant’s perception of continuity 
between former reform projects and the current one has to be taken into 
consideration in order to understand the extent to which the earlier 
partnership between the WB and government shaped the major parameters 
of the reform. Earlier input of the WB into this consensus is explored later. 
This statement, however, might also imply that the AK Party’s input, 
coupled with contestations between the AK Party and the WB throughout 
the preparation and implementation of the HTP, did not make a significant 
change in the content of the reform. The validity of this claim is discussed 
in detail in the next chapter on the AK Party’s impact on the HTP.  
One of the moments when the World Bank contributed to ‘the social 
construction of the need to reform’, in Cox’s terms (2001, pp.475-477), was 
the release of its report on Turkey’s health care system in 2003 (World 
Bank, 2003b). This study has been quite influential in setting the main 
parameters of the political debates on Turkey’s health care system and then 
constituted a vantage point for the AK Party government’s HTP (World 
Bank, 2010, p.ix).  
In this study, the WB called for “fundamental and systemic changes” 
in Turkey’s health care system (World Bank, 2003b, p.iii). Additionally, the 
WB listed the fundamental and systemic changes to be made, which 
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included the introduction of compulsory universal social health insurance 
with optional supplementary private health insurance; the development of 
an essential health care services package; better targeted public spending; 
the reorganisation of public hospitals by granting them financial and 
administrative autonomy; the transformation of the role of the MoH from a 
health care service provider to a stewardship body that oversees and guides 
the provision of health care services; and the transformation of the role of 
the SSK from being both financier as well as the provider of health care 
services to a purely social insurance body (World Bank, 2003b, pp.iv-vi). In 
fact, as discussed in the earlier chapter, the HTP covers almost all of the 
abovementioned WB proposals. 
Some political actors interpreted the similarity of the WB proposals 
and the government’s health care reform as evidence of the fact that the 
reform is the replication of a WB blueprint. One of the informants, who was 
the head of the TTB, suggested, 
 
“Before I compared two documents, I thought this claim (the claim that 
the reform is a replication of the World Bank blueprint) was quite 
inspired by our standard left perspectives. … Despite the fact that this 
might sound like a slogan, I think the discourse that suggests this 
reform is a World Bank project is the manifestation of reality” 
(Interview no. 14). 
 
Another informant, who is the head of one of the leading trade unions 
in the health sector, also made a similar comment on the reform. She 
argued, “This programme in health care is totally a World Bank 
programme. In fact, it is a word-for-word translation. The AKP is the direct 
subcontractor of the World Bank” (Interview no. 31). Both the TTB and this 
trade union in health sector opposed the HTP. Therefore, proving that the 
reform is a replication of the WB is important to them, as they think this 
would undermine the legitimacy of the reform in the eyes of the general 
public. For these actors, the WB symbolises the interests of the 
transnational capitalist class and the advanced capitalist countries, 
especially the United States. They argue that this blueprint reform, 
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implemented by the AK Party, furthers the interests of these actors rather 
than the interests of the citizens of Turkey. 
In response, one member of the reform team contests this perception 
that HTP is merely a replication of the WB blueprint. He stated, 
 
“I would really want that (directly implementing an available World 
Bank model in Turkey). If only somebody could bring in an already 
implemented experience and we could be inspired by it and come up 
with a health care system by adopting it to Turkey. I would really want 
that, as a person involved in this process. But we did not have that 
chance. … In the last instance, we know the sector, we know the 
country, and we know the world. We started with needs, the needs of 
the citizens and the needs of the sector. … I can safely argue that this 
model is authentic to Turkey” (Interview no. 8).  
 
In contrast to the anti-reform camp’s critic of the blueprint reform, as 
seen above, this informant stressed the fact that the government’s reform 
team has been decisive in preparing Turkey’s health care reform and the 
resulting reform has been unique to Turkey. He emphasised both the 
competency of the reform team and their responsiveness to both citizenry 
and sector interests. Another informant, who was also a member of the 
government’s reform team, also argued against the claim that the HTP was 
the carbon copy of the WB’s blueprint.  
 
“This is a perception that I always contest, a perception that the WB 
and the IMF imposed this. Indeed, the advances in health care finance 
in the world had reflections in Turkey. But other than perceiving this 
as an imposition of the World Bank and IMF, because it is not true, I 
think it is possible to perceive this as the accumulation of experiences 
and institutional memory in Turkey that was enriched by the WB’s 
consultancy support” (Interview no. 32).  
 
This informant agreed with the previous one, who was also a member 
of the reform team, that the WB and the IMF did not impose the reform on 
Turkey. However, he acknowledged that the history of health care reform 
attempts and the preparations made throughout the 1990s provided 
significant inputs for the HTP. Unlike the informant who presented the 
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reform as a fully authentic reform of Turkey, this informant acknowledged 
the importance of international input. For instance, he suggested that the 
international policy trends in health care finance, which he conceptualised 
as “advances”, also resonated in this reform. Similar to the way WB experts 
presented policy trends as up-to-date scientific evidence, this informant also 
portrayed international policy trends in health care beyond politics and 
scientific.  
The WB experts also claimed that while the main parameters of the 
HTP included the WB proposals for health care reform in Turkey, it does 
not necessarily imply that the reform is a WB imposed one. Indeed, one of 
my informants who worked in the WB as a policy expert stated in his public 
speech: 
 
“The starting point of all partnerships (between the World Bank and 
governments) is, as I said, the development program of the countries. 
The World Bank does not come and tell the governments to do 
something for them. It does not work like this. Here the public sector 
is decisive.” (Public Speech no. 4) 
 
Indeed, the Five Year Development Plans, prepared mainly by 
bureaucrats with the input of a selected group of academics, before the 
introduction of HTP included policy priorities as follows: 
 
 Five Year Development Plan for 1985-1989: The establishment of a 
universal health insurance (The State Planning Organisation of 
Turkey, 1984: p.2), increasing service efficiency in health facilities, 
supporting the establishment of new private health facilities, 
allowing private health facilities to freely determine prices for their 
services, the prevention of Social Insurance Institution’s 
establishment of new health facilities (The State Planning 
Organisation of Turkey, 1984, p.152) 
 
 Five Year Development Plan for 1990-1995: Provision of incentives 
to integrate private health providers into the public health care 
delivery system (The State Planning Organisation of Turkey, 1989, 
p.291), diversification of sources of health care finance, the 
introduction of universal health insurance (The State Planning 
Organisation of Turkey, 1989, p.357). 
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 Five Year Development Plan for 1996-2000: Establishing a 
purchaser-provider split in health care, transformation of the MoH 
into a stewardship body and limiting its role in health care provision, 
granting administrative and financial autonomy to public hospitals, 
(The State Planning Organisation of Turkey, 1995, p.46) and 
provision of incentives to the private sector in order to increase its 
presence in health care domain (The State Planning Organisation of 
Turkey, 1995, p.48). 
 
 Five Year Development Plan for 2001-2005: Provision of incentives 
to private health insurance companies (The State Planning 
Organisation of Turkey, 2000, p.225), establishing a purchaser-
provider split in health care, increasing the efficiency of management 
of public hospitals (The State Planning Organisation of Turkey, 2000, 
p.223) 
 
One should not disregard the historical origins of these ideas in 
Turkish policy circles and the role of the WB in generating these ideas. The 
WB promoted a new pro-market discourse in health care since the late 
1970s. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the WB had a significant role in 
the restructuring of the Turkish economy after the 1980 military coup d’état 
alongside with the policy trends of the Washington Consensus. Therefore, 
it could be argued that the WB historically contributed to the emergence of 
pro-market ideas in health care and contributed to the birth of its local allies 
since 1980s. In other words, the WB set the ‘policy paradigm’, within which 
policymakers operated in Turkey in the domain of health care since 1980s.  
Against this background, during the preparation and implementation 
of the HTP, WB experts and the government’s reform team were in general 
agreement on the main parameters of the reform and worked together as a 
large team. One of the informants, who worked as the project leader of the 
WB, stated the uniqueness of the Turkish case compared to health care 
reform experiences in other countries, 
 
“Every single person in the MoH knows what the programme is about. 
In some other countries, … people know when it happens. … Wealth 
of our discussion with MoH here, level of discussion is impressive. It is 
actually technical. You cannot underestimate the power of that. 
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Everything is understood, taken and thought through.” (Interview no. 
21) 
 
While this quotation reveals that the WB carried out top-down reform 
projects in countries where even state officials did not “know what the 
programme was about” before it was implemented, it also demonstrates 
state officials in Turkey were more competent in the eyes of the WB experts 
than most other countries about the general philosophy as well as the 
details of the reform project. This competency might well be attributed to 
the earlier partnership between the WB and the governments that made 
health care bureaucrats part of the WB’s epistemic community.  
One of my informants, a former member of the government’s reform 
team, supported the WB team leader’s suggestion that the government’s 
reform team was comfortable about their competencies: 
 
“We should not overestimate the WB. I attended the WB’s trainings. 
But please do not understand this like this. We do listen. But why 
should we look down on our people? Why should we look down on our 
politicians? We do listen. We can listen to anyone. Am I a wally? Can’t 
I analyse what has been said there? Am I not aware of my country’s 
reality?” (Public speech no. 5) 
 
As the quotation suggests, the members of the reform team do not feel 
challenged by the WB’s role in the preparation and implementation of the 
reform. For this informant, the power lay in the hands of the government’s 
reform team and the government rather than the WB experts. Therefore, 
they were free to attend the WB trainings and assess the applicability of 
this information on the Turkish case. However, he seemed to underestimate 
how his approach to health care reform came into being as a result of a 
historical process. 
In sum, the WB was decisive in setting the terms of the health care 
reform, as a result of its historical role. During the introduction and 
implementation of the HTP, the influential role of the WB was policy 
consultancy. In the end, the government’s confident reform team 
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contextualised the WB’s health care reform blueprint. In other words, the 
major impact of the WB in the HTP was its constitutive role in the 
emergence of the ‘policy paradigm’ within policymakers operated 
throughout the preparation and implementation of the HTP. 
 
5.7. The reform as a closed process 
 
During the introduction and implementation of the HTP, the 
government did not allow any other domestic actors to influence the 
preparation and implementation of the reform. An informant, who also 
worked as the project leader of the WB, acknowledged this fact as follows: 
 
“The way you do business here is very different. You would never go to 
a big public meeting and talk about such things. You would do that 
through your one-to-one relationship” (Interview no. 22). 
 
As the informant stated above, she had to adapt to the local modus 
operandi. This modus operandi in Turkey consists of the acknowledged 
power of the executive over legislative, respect for the government’s ability 
to exclude all political actors from the reform process, and the exercise of 
caution about the AK Party government’s tendency to stop working with 
international organisations in case they publicly announce the problems 
they see in the reform projects. Therefore, the informant adopted the 
accepted way of “doing business here” and kept criticisms for private 
meetings with the Turkish politicians and high-level bureaucrats. For her, 
the secretive form of policy formation and the strong leadership was the 
main reason behind the success of HTP. She stated, 
 
“Health Transformation Project happened only because it had the 
support of the prime minister and a very strong minister of health” 
(Interview no. 22).  
 
As the quotation above suggests, the informant, who worked as the 
WB team leader in health care projects in Turkey, argued that the strong 
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power of the executive in the Turkish political system and the willingness 
of the government to carry out the reform brought success to health care 
reform. This might also serve as evidence that the WB prefers a strong 
executive to a democratically vibrant political atmosphere, the latter of 
which could slow down the reform process.  
A similar perspective could be seen in the criticisms raised in the 
OECD and the WB’s report, which portrayed even the institutional checks 
and balances in the Turkish political system as obstacles for the 
introduction of a comprehensive health care reform before 2003. The report 
suggests,  
 
“Governance arrangements in the health sector were fragmented and 
considerable power ultimately belonged with the Constitutional Court 
and Grand National Assembly” (OECD and World Bank, 2008, p.38).  
 
As stated in the report, the power of the Constitutional Court and 
Turkish Parliament hindered the prospects of the introduction of reform 
projects of the MoH before 2003, and slowed down the implementation as 
discussed in Chapter 7. For the WB, reform success is possible with a strong 
government.  
 
5.8. The partnership of the World Bank and the government: 
Any disagreements? 
 
Following the completion of the Health Transition Project, the WB 
confidently stated that the government’s HTP was a good practice (World 
Bank, 2009, p.26). Turkey’s HTP was awarded one of 12 projects that 
‘improved the lives of people in Europe and Central Asia’ in 2010. OECD 
and the WB report also presented the reform as a success story: 
 
“The Health Transformation Programme in many ways reflects “good 
practice” in the development and implementation of a major health 
sector reform including UHI coverage in an OECD country. Strong 
government commitment and leadership along with major financing 
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reforms aided by strong economic growth have been complemented by 
sequential delivery system reforms. While it is too early to evaluate 
the impacts of the HTP on all aspects of health status, financial 
protection, and consumer satisfaction, the preliminary indications 
from the available data suggest that there has been important 
progress in all three areas. Turkey is closing the performance gap with 
other OECD countries and, on a number of measures including overall 
costs, performs well in relation to other comparable upper middle-
income countries. There may be much that other countries can learn 
from the recent health reforms in Turkey” (OECD and World Bank, 
2008, pp.128-129). 
 
As the quotation from the report suggests above, despite the lack of 
empirical evidence on the ‘impact’ of the reform, the WB and OECD began 
to present the HTP as a best practice that could be replicated in other 
developing countries. Both the interviews with the WB experts and the 
report quoted above demonstrate that the partnership between the WB and 
Turkish government had been a close and relatively problem-free one.  
However, there have also been disagreements and contestations 
between the WB and Turkish government during the implementation of the 
HTP. The same report provides an outline of the areas upon which the WB 
and Turkish government seemed to disagree. According to the report, the 
government could not complete the restructuring of the MoH to transform 
the Ministry into a stewardship body, nor could it strengthen the capacity 
of the SGK to implement incentive-based payment systems in purchasing 
services from health care providers or transfer regulatory functions to 
quasi-public institutions until the end of the Phase I of the HTP (OECD and 
World Bank, 2008, p.110). 
In fact, one of the informants, who was part of the reform team 
acknowledged the tension between the WB team and the government on 
decisions concerning the public presence in health care provision, as 
mentioned in the OECD and WB report. He stated, 
 
“At times, we will take measures as part of this Programme that the 
WB might not accept. Indeed, we have been doing it already. Let me 
give you an example. In the WB’s tailor-made projects for developing 
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countries, nationalisation of hospitals does not have any place. In 
contrast, there is the decentralisation of hospitals. They might even 
include the privatisation of hospitals. In Health Transformation 
Programme, nowhere you can find any prospect of the privatisation of 
public hospitals. In fact, Social Insurance Institutions were 
nationalised” (Interview no. 20). 
 
In the quotation above, the informant claimed that the reform has 
been swimming against the WB sponsored health care reforms current, 
especially in regards to the role of the state in health care provision. While 
the WB encourages developing countries to decentralise and even privatise 
health care delivery, the informant argued that the Turkish reform 
nationalised the Social Insurance Institution (SSK) hospitals and did not 
set forth any privatisation agenda. Despite the questionable validity of the 
informant’s claim that is challenged in discussion on the establishment of 
Public Hospital Unions and the introduction of PFI in public hospital 
constructions in Chapter 4, it could still be argued that the government did 
not radically decrease the role of the state in health care provision. 
While this member of the reform team presented the changes in the 
health care delivery structure as a radical divergence from the blueprint, 
one of the former WB team leaders did not perceive this as a significant 
point of contestation between the Bank and the government. She argued, 
 
“Some of the analytical advice (that is written in the WB report) were 
not taken by the government initially. … This is normal for us by the 
way. Because our objective is to advise the government based on 
available evidence. … In all countries, health reforms are guided by 
political economy decisions. … Even though you provide the best 
technical advice, there is no guarantee that any government will move 
on all directions. They have to evaluate the political situation” 
(Interview no. 22). 
 
As is seen in the quotation above, one of the former WB team leaders 
suggested that their responsibility has been to support the government with 
the best policy advice according to the WB’s criteria. However, whether or 
not the government takes the advice is the decision of the government. The 
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government decision might originate from the fact that it does not agree 
with the WB on a specific policy issue or it might derive from the fact that 
the government thinks that the moment is not right to implement that 
specific policy advice due to political reasons. In addition, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, no democratic developing country government could pursue 
direct privatisation policies in the domain of health care delivery, as it 
might hamper their chances of re-election. 
In fact, it could be argued that the government’s steps in health care 
delivery disprove the former member of the reform team who argued that 
the Government’s health care reform would not lead to decentralisation and 
privatisation. As discussed in Chapter 4, the government restructured the 
Ministry to fit into its new overseer and monitoring role, granted 
administrative and partially financial autonomy to public hospitals, and 
established a quasi-autonomous public body, the Public Hospitals 
Institution of Turkey (Türkiye Kamu Hastaneleri Kurumu, or TKHK) to 
coordinate health care delivery (The Republic of Turkey, 2011a). In line 
with these legislative changes, the Public Hospitals Unions were 
established to bring together geographically close public hospitals and grant 
them financial and administrative autonomy. The TKHK is responsible for 
overseeing and monitoring the activities of Public Hospitals Unions.  
On the one hand, the government’s further steps to decentralise health 
care delivery structure, transfer the Ministry’s powers to a quasi-
autonomous public body, and establish Public Hospitals Unions as health 
care enterprises, might be interpreted as evidence of the government’s 
perfect agreement with the WB’s policy advice. Therefore, this might prove 
the former head of the WB team leader, who claimed that the government 
was not taking necessary steps to decentralise and privatise the public 
hospitals at the time due to the unfavourable political atmosphere. It could 
be argued that once the government had the chance to go further, it did not 
hesitate to do it.  
On the other hand, the alterations of the health care delivery structure 
and the governance of this structure do not fully comply with the WB 
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blueprint. The TKHK is still affiliated with the MoH. In addition, the TKHK 
is legally responsible for complying with the Ministry’s policies and targets. 
It could be argued that the political mandate of the government over the 
health care delivery structure has not been challenged even after the 2011 
changes. From the WB’s perspective, the political mandate of the 
government on health care delivery might distort market dynamics. 
However, the government might have an interest in keeping the public 
presence in health care provision in order to use that to set up its own cadre 
in public hospitals, to appease the public with better provision and/or to 
suppress the prices of private hospitals services. Therefore, despite the 
overall agreement between the WB and the government on the main tenets 
of the reform, the government’s other political interests and concerns as 
well as its interaction with private health care provider organisations –that 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 8- might result in changes in the original 
reform programme. 
 
5.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored how and to what extent the WB has been 
influential in the preparation and implementation of the AK Party 
government’s HTP. 
The impact of the WB on the reform has taken two different paths. 
First, here it is argued that the growing dominance of the WB over the 
global health care reform agenda since the late 1970s and the engagement 
of the WB with Turkey’s health care system since the late 1980s accordingly 
popularised the pro-market health care reform paradigm among Turkish 
policy circles that paved the way for the emergence of the contemporary 
health care reform in Turkey. As shown in interview excerpts, this history 
paved the way to the fact that both WB officials as well as members of the 
reform team see the WB’s approach to health care issues as scientifically 
proven and evidence-based rather than political. This common belief 
strengthened the perception of the pro-market approach in health care 
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reforms as beyond politics and empowered the pro-market approach with 
significant discursive power. 
Concurrent to the proliferation of the health economics discourse 
worldwide, the WB came up with pro-market health care reform 
suggestions for developing countries. While the core of this approach has 
been sustained, its components have changed over time. Earlier WB 
projects on health care reform in developing countries, especially in Latin 
American countries, as discussed in Chapter 4, had a sharp and sudden 
privatisation agenda. Later on, the WB adopted a more balanced approach 
to health care reforms to give significant regulatory powers to the state in 
the establishment and running of market health care systems. 
The partnership between Turkish governments and the WB resulted 
in the institutionalisation of pro-market health care reform discourse 
within Turkey’s MoH, which then manifested itself in the establishment of 
the General Directorate of Health Project. In addition, this partnership 
helped Turkish state officials become part of the WB sponsored 
international epistemic community on health care reforms. Throughout the 
1990s, a number of governments attempted to introduce pro-market health 
care reforms in collaboration with the WB. However, all these attempts 
failed mainly due to the weak coalition governments. Despite the failure of 
these reform projects, the collaboration of the WB and the MoH resulted in 
the consolidation of a bureaucratic consensus over the need for a pro-market 
reform in Turkey’s health care system. This consensus seemed to be 
consolidated before the AK Party came to power. Therefore, as of the 2000s, 
the pro-market approach towards health care reform appeared almost as a 
non-alien approach in health care policy circles in Turkey. The TTB, trade 
unions, and other left leaning organisations were the only actors who 
refused to adapt to this new discourse. 
In fact, the AK Party’s health care reform proposal bore close 
resemblance to the WB’s suggestions for reform in Turkey’s health care 
system and its reform blueprint. Nevertheless, here it is argued that this 
was not due to the WB’s imposition of the reform on the AK Party 
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government, as the absence of an economic crisis and the political strength 
the AK Party gained over time increased the leverage of the AK Party 
government vis-à-vis the WB.  
Indeed, the members of the government’s reform team did not accept 
criticisms that the reform was a top-down WB reform blueprint. 
Alternatively, they argued that they had the power and competency to 
design the reform in line with the needs of Turkish citizens and the health 
care sector in Turkey (disregarding any possible conflict between these two 
set of needs). However, here it is argued that the same faith that they 
shared with WB experts on scientific evidence and the discipline of health 
economics, coupled with the fact that there was no alternative but pro-
market reform, made the WB and the government partnership a problem-
free one. 
The analysis in this chapter makes it clear that the AK Party 
government chose to work with the WB not because it was in need of the 
WB loans, but because it preferred benefiting from the WB’s know-how and 
expertise on health care reforms. In practice, the WB provided relatively 
insignificant amount of loans (0.5 per cent of the total public expenditures 
spent on health care) to the government. More importantly, the WB 
supported the government’s reform team with their know-how and 
expertise on health care reforms. The result was a success story not only for 
the Turkish government but also for the WB. The WB appreciated the 
Turkish reform experience and started to promote it as one of the best 
practices in health care. 
The WB experts presented strong commitment to the government in 
implementing the reform as the recipe for the success in Turkish health 
care reform. However, they did not question the design of the reform process 
as a closed one that did not allow democratic participation of significant 
stakeholders.  
Despite the fact that the WB and the AK Party government have been 
in agreement upon the general parameters of the reform, it has become 
clearer that their final destinations might not overlap. While the WB’s final 
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destination is a market health care system, the government has been 
hesitant towards retreating from the financing and provision of health care 
services. Even though the government took steps in increasing the financial 
and administrative autonomy of public hospitals and introduced strong 
private sector management methods into the modus operandi of these 
hospitals, it did not transfer the MoH’s control and even dominance over 
health care provision. This discrepancy between the WB’s and the 
government’s final destinations might spring from the fact that their 
primary political interests are different. Unlike the WB, the government 
has to secure its electoral success and might not want to lose its political 
mandate over the health care provision, which are discussed in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 8 respectively. 
In conclusion, this chapter suggests that the WB’s influence on the 
health care reform in Turkey could be better understood if the WB is 
perceived both an institution that predated the rise of the AK Party and as 
an actor that collaborated with the AK Party government. While the 
structural role of the WB originates from its long-lasting ideological 
investment in the domain of health care, its influence as an actor over 
health care reforms is subject to change due to contextual factors. The 
strength of the WB’s ideological dominance in the domain of health care has 
a clear implication for the main tenets of the health care reform. 
Nevertheless, domestic political actors have the power to alter these main 
tenets by introducing different policy formulations and manipulate the 
negative impacts of the reform by employing different strategies, such as 
changing the timing of different parts of the reform. 
Globally dominant ideas did matter in shaping the content of health 
care reform in Turkey. However, the Turkish case suggests that these ideas 
make inroads to the national policy setting not always through the direct 
imposition of the WB with loans and its conditionalities at times of 
austerity. They can also be effective through the establishment of an 
ideological consensus over how to approach health care policy, with the help 
of long-lasting investments of the WB on knowledge production and policy 
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advice and the rise of neoliberal political actors to power at the national 
level.  
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Chapter 6: The AK Party and the Politics of 
Health Care in Turkey in the Last Decade 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the role of the AK Party throughout the health 
care reform process in Turkey between 2003 and 2013. The role of the AK 
Party in forming the consecutive single-party governments that introduced 
and implemented the HTP might prima facie seem obvious for readers. 
However, there are still important questions to explore in understanding 
how and to what extent the AK Party exerted its influence on the content 
of the reform, tackled the political conflicts throughout the reform process, 
made the reform politically possible, and benefited politically from the 
outcomes of the reform. While the alliances and contestations of the AK 
Party governments with other political actors throughout the HTP are 
discussed in other chapters, this chapter explores the role of the HTP in the 
AK Party’s electoral successes and its organisational change over time.  
In light of these questions, the chapter is organised into five main 
sections in addition to this introductory part. The first section discusses the 
literature on the relations between the society and political parties. The 
second section explores the influence of the AK Party’s political ideology on 
the content of the reform. The third section examines how the HTP became 
a factor in the consolidation of the AK Party rule. The fourth section 
concentrates on how the AK Party formulated its discourse with respect to 
the reform and to what extent it successfully appealed to its social base and 
even expanded it. In the concluding section, the AK Party’s discursive and 
practical strategies in making the HTP possible are discussed to provide a 
holistic account of its role. 
This chapter suggests that the HTP has been a product of the AK 
Party’s alliance with those who were formerly left out or marginalised in 
Turkey’s health care system, as well as the emerging group of health care 
entrepreneurs who owe their allegiance to the state-sponsored capital 
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accumulation in the provision of health care services. Therefore, with 
respect to the future trajectory of Turkey’s health care system, conflicting 
political claims exist within the AK Party and among the new terrain of 
health care politics in Turkey.  
 
6.2. Political Parties and the Society 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the literature on the relations between 
political parties and the society is explored. In Chapter 2, four different 
perspectives, namely the pluralist, the power resources, the institutionalist 
and the new politics approaches, to the politics of health care are 
introduced. Amongst these perspectives, especially first two perspectives 
suggest that political parties represent pre-defined interests of different 
social groups. 
According to the pluralist approach, political parties are portrayed as 
“brokers” between civil society and the decision-making authorities (i.e. 
Truman, 1951). From another perspective, the power resources approach 
assumes that political parties represent class interests, and social 
democratic/social parties might represent working class interests in a 
capitalist democracy (i.e. Korpi, 1980).  
Alternatively, Kirchheimer, in his thesis on the emergence of ‘catchall 
parties’, suggests that political parties might not be representing the pre-
defined sectors of the society with pre-defined interests (Krouwel, 1996, 
p.30). For Kirchheimer, catchall parties are those parties, the appeal of 
which is to all social classes (Krouwel, 1996, p.30). While factors resulting 
in the emergence of ‘catchall parties’ are diverse, one of these factors is the 
increasing attraction of voters to the personality of the leaders of political 
parties, rather than their ideological stances (Krouwel, 1996, p.30). 
Kirchheimer explains the emergence of ‘catchall parties’ and their rise to 
power as an end product of a broader political transformation. Main tenets 
of the new political atmosphere include the following: the erosion of 
parliamentary democracy, the formation of a state-party cartel, the 
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personalization of electoral appeal and the undermining of separation of 
powers (Krouwel, 1996, p.31).  
Kirchheimer’s conceptualization of catchall parties might be useful in 
understanding the AK Party phenomenon in the politics of Turkey in the 
last decade. As discussed in Chapter 3, military interventions into 
democratic politics in Turkey put pressure on the rise of class politics 
throughout 1970s, which made populism in electoral politics the only way 
of doing formal politics concerning solving social and economic problems of 
the citizenry. Although the earlier works on the AK Party that are discussed 
shortly in detail in this chapter are helpful in understanding the original 
class basis of the party and the political movement that gave birth to it, 
they fail to explain the latest form that the AK Party took. In its earlier 
form in the beginning of 2000s, the AK Party resembled Kirchheimer’s 
‘catchall party’ especially in the sense that it appeals to all social classes at 
the same time, which was then transformed into a state-party cartel. 
Adding to Kirchheimer’s analysis of the transformation of political 
parties, Katz and Mair argue that the distancing of political parties from 
the civil society and the convergence of political parties with the state give 
birth to a new form of political party, which is ‘the cartel party’ (1995, p.14). 
The ‘cartel party’ is characterized by its interpenetration with the state and 
its ability to prevent the possibility of the success of external and internal 
dissent undermining its unity and authority (Katz and Mair, 1995, pp.17-
23). Later Blyth and Katz suggest that major political parties in advanced 
capitalist societies have been transformed into ‘cartel parties’ for two 
reasons: the limits of ‘catchall parties’, and the limits that globalisation has 
imposed upon political systems (2005, p.40). 
The concept of ‘the cartel party’ is helpful in understanding the current 
form that the AK Party took in Turkey’s political system. Turkey’s political 
system is prone to paving the way to the emergence of a cartel party. This 
is mainly due to three factors. First factor is that the political party funding 
structure is based upon a model that favours the political parties that gain 
more votes than 10 per cent national threshold in elections. Larger the 
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share of votes the party gets in general elections, more financial resources 
it gets from the public budget in the upcoming elections. Secondly, Turkey’s 
electoral system is clearly majoritarian. Thirdly, checks and balances in 
Turkey’s political system are weak to prevent the interpenetration of state 
and the governing party. As discussed in this chapter later on, the AK 
Party’s successive electoral victories, coupled with the lack of necessary 
checks and balances in Turkey’s political system to prevent the 
centralisation of power, paved the way to the transformation of this party 
into a cartel party. 
 
6.3. The influence of the AK Party’s political ideology on the 
content of the reform 
 
The AK Party was established 15 months before it came to power in 
the 2002 general elections. However, the leading cadre of the AK Party was 
not a newcomer to parliamentary politics. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
leading cadre of the AK Party separated from the major Political Islamist 
movement, called the National Outlook Movement, whose political parties 
had been closed down due to their allegedly anti-secular activities. In 
response, the AK Party presented itself as a “conservative democratic” 
political party that aimed to bring together different streams of centrist and 
rightist politics. Coşar and Özman argued that the leading cadres of the AK 
Party invented the label of conservative democracy in order to avoid being 
seen as a religious fundamentalist political party that would pose a threat 
against Turkish political regime (2004, p.65).  
The AK Party’s portrayal of itself as a centrist political party resonated 
in the academic conceptualisation of the party’s political stance. For 
instance, Özbudun defined the AK Party as “a moderate conservative 
democratic party” (2006, p.543). While acknowledging the historical link 
between Political Islam and the AK Party, Özbudun suggested that the AK 
Party had less in common with the political parties that represented 
Political Islam (i.e. The RP) and more in common with the mainstream 
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centre-right parties. The AK Party succeeded in rebuilding the former 
Motherland Party’s centrist coalition that brought together almost all 
components of the right and even a small segment of the centre-left 
(Özbudun, 2006, p.546). In line with Özbudun, İnsel portrayed the AK Party 
not as the heir of Political Islam but as a pragmatic middle-class party 
within which the elements of the National Outlook movement would 
eventually become marginal (2003, pp.300-301).  
Both the AK Party’s programme and the public statements of its 
leading cadre have been eclectic with respect to their approach towards 
social policies and health care policies in particular. On the one hand, the 
AK Party clearly adopted a pro-market approach to its major economic 
policies. Distinguishing itself from the National Outlook Movement’s 
Islamist “third-worldism”, the AK Party clearly aligned its economic policies 
with neoliberalism. In the party programme, the AK Party declares, “it is 
in favour of working market economy with all its rules and institutions” 
(Justice and Development Party, 2014). The AK Party’s neoliberal approach 
also manifested itself in its approach to health care policy, as evidenced in 
Erdoğan’s public statement: “I do insist on this; free markets have to be 
formed in health, as there are free markets for all other things in the world” 
(Hürriyet, 2006). 
On the other hand, the AK Party inherited the National Outlook 
Movement’s discursive and organisational expertise in appealing to and 
mobilising the urban poor, a group that had long been left out of the political 
agenda of centrist parties from the right and the left of the spectrum. The 
inheritance of the AK Party from the Political Islam of 1990s found its echo 
in the party programme and the public statements of the leading cadre, as 
both promised to expand public services, including health care services for 
all citizens of Turkey, especially for those who had been either left out or 
marginalised. For instance, one of the seven main components of the AK 
Party’s party programme is dedicated to social policies. Among other areas 
such as education services and social services, the programme lists health 
care policies under the heading of social policies and suggests that the AK 
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Party acknowledges the responsibility of the social state to offer health care 
services to its citizens (Justice and Development Party, 2014).  
Therefore, from its establishment, the AK Party’s ideological stance 
has been “a synthesis between the neoliberal context … and traditional-
conservative values” (Coşar and Özman, 2004, p.67). The AK Party utilised 
a traditional-conservative political discourse to communicate its populist 
agenda with the general public, which has been based on the use of social 
policies including health care policies for electoral success. In other words, 
the AK Party simultaneously pursued neoliberal economic policies and 
populist social policies. One of my informants, who worked within the 
health care reform team of the AK Party, suggested,  
 
“Three consecutive AK Party governments pursued liberal economic 
policies. But, they also pursued serious social policies in education 
and health. In fact, these two sets of policies are in conflict with one 
another. We have to see this. … This brought success. … If health 
will be governed with the same liberal logic, then the risk of private 
sector becoming dominant might become real. That is why this has 
to become state policy” (Interview no.20). 
 
As evidenced in the quotation above, my informant, who was part of 
the AK Party’s health care reform team, acknowledged a difference in the 
perspectives that inform the government’s economic and social policies. 
From his perspective, the coexistence of both logics in the discourse and 
practices of the AK Party secured the government’s political success. 
Similarly, my other informant from the Revolutionary Health Workers’ 
Union (Devrimci Sağlık İşçileri Sendikası, DEV-SAĞLIK-İŞ), who was 
critical of the government’s health care reform, stated, 
 
“In order to prevent social opposition to these policies (neoliberal 
economic policies), the AKP developed social policies to neutralise 
poverty. In this sense, it had a special mission” (Interview no.31). 
 
Therefore, it could be argued that representatives from both the pro-
reform and anti-reform camps acknowledged the politically successful 
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nature of the AK Party’s two-tiered policy agenda, which included 
implementing neoliberal economic policies while pursuing social policies. As 
my informant who worked as a member of the AK Party’s health care reform 
team suggested, “Health care was key in the AKP’s quest for power. The 
AKP used health care to influence people” (Interview no.8). 
As Öniş succinctly explained, the AK Party arguably was able to 
realise both of its main objectives, namely securing economic growth and 
mobilising formal and informal redistributive mechanisms (2012, p.137). 
Öniş suggested that the international political and economic environment 
also enabled the AK Party’s ability to realise both of these seemingly 
irreconcilable political objectives, which he conceptualises as ‘controlled 
populism’ (2012, p.137). 
However, the AK Party not only compensated its economic policies 
with social policies; it also introduced pro-market social policies, as it is 
argued in the case of the HTP in Chapter 4. The HTP includes both pro-
market and redistributive measures. Each set of measures has been 
creating conflicting dynamics within Turkey’s health care system. On the 
one hand, the HTP actively supported the increasing role of the private 
sector in the provision of health care services and envisaged to introduce 
supplementary private health insurance to top up the public health 
insurance. On the other hand, the HTP established a general public health 
insurance scheme to cover all citizens without recognising an opt-out option 
for those who might prefer purchasing private health insurance only. The 
HTP also made specific health care services, such as emergency services 
and cancer care in public and private hospitals, free for all citizens. In doing 
so, I argue that the AK Party’s synthesis of neoliberalism with populism 
also manifested itself in the HTP and made the reform process conducive to 
political conflicts within the AK Party and among different actors of health 
care politics. 
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6.4. The Health Transformation Programme as a factor in the 
consolidation of the AK Party rule 
 
The AK Party was established by a group of politicians who had 
resigned from the Political Islamist FP a little more than a year before the 
2002 general election. Following the economic crisis in 2001, the AK Party 
came first in the 2002 general elections. As a result of the 10 per cent 
national threshold, the AK Party could take the majority of seats in the 
Parliament, which made it possible to form a single-party government. One 
of the most important results of the general elections in 2002 was the 
historical failure of the traditionally powerful political parties in the centre-
right and centre-left (Çarkoğlu, 2002, p.131; Coşar and Özman, 2004, p.57). 
The AK Party’s electoral victory in 2002 marked a turning point for Turkish 
politics, as the Party succeeded in consolidating and then expanding its 
constituency without leaving any chance for the formation of another 
centre-right political party over the next decade.  
Before the AK Party’s rise to power in the 2002 general elections, 
Çarkoğlu defined the main characteristics of the Turkish party system as 
“the apparent lack of continuity, together with ever-increasing 
fractionalization and volatility of electoral support” (2002, p.123). Then he 
suggested, “The AK Party became the first political party in Turkish 
electoral history to gather behind it a uniform nationwide swing in its 
favour” (Çarkoğlu, 2002, p.139). After more than a decade of the AK Party 
rule, the AK Party managed to increase its share of votes in three 
consecutive general and local elections. At last, the AK Party received more 
than 45 per cent of the votes in the March 2014 municipal elections. One of 
the distinctive characteristics of the AK Party has been its appeal to the 
Kurdish electorate both in the Western provinces and in the Kurdish-
populated Eastern provinces of Turkey.  
Given the AK Party’s electoral victories in the last decade, it is not still 
possible to argue that the electoral support of the AK Party has been 
volatile. However, the AK Party’s success in consolidating its constituency 
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can hardly be explained on the basis of its ability to keep its primary 
political coalition with well-known centre-right politicians intact.  
Despite the heterogeneity of the AK Party’s parliamentary group, 
which included former members of centrist parties as well as former social 
democrats in its first term, Erdoğan’s power over the Party consolidated 
slowly in its following two terms. Erdoğan’s mandate over the AK Party 
proved to be strong especially after the political conflict on December 17th, 
2013 between the Gülen movement, which supported the Party since its 
establishment, and the AK Party’s Erdoğan-headed core cadre. Only 9 MPs 
resigned from the Party, which had 326 seats in the Turkish Parliament, 
after the rising political conflict between the Gülen movement and Erdoğan-
led AK Party (Al Jazeera Turk, 2014a). 
How could a political party dominated by a group of Political Islamists 
become the representative of the centre-right and secure the majority of the 
votes in three consecutive elections in a political context that was defined 
with the volatility of electoral support? Academics have provided various 
reasons in explaining the electoral success of the AK Party, which includes 
the economic growth delivered during its rule, its debatable ability to 
articulate democracy and Islam, and its willingness to introduce the peace 
process with the Kurdish. Here I argue that the HTP, which created mainly 
positive outcomes for the majority of citizens between 2003 and 2013, has 
also contributed significantly to the electoral success of the AK Party.  
Pioneering scholars who worked on issue salience suggest that the 
public is generally concerned about specific policy developments in 
determining which political party they will cast their vote for (i.e. RePass, 
1971, p.400). Belanger and Meguid add to this claim that the political party 
or candidate’s ownership of the issue might affect voting behaviour only if 
the issue under question is salient in the eyes of the general public (2008, 
p.489). Despite the fact that no studies are available on the issue salience 
of health care reform in Turkey so far, it might be suggested that the 
prevalent problems of the pre-reform health care system of Turkey could 
make the health care reform a salient issue for the general public 
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throughout 2000s. Health care reform had been an important part of the 
AK Party’s promises to its constituency in the 2002 general election 
campaign (Ağartan, 2008). Therefore, it could be claimed that the election 
campaigns of the AK Party demonstrated that the party claims strong 
ownership of the health care reform. 
Three sets of evidence might substantiate the claim that the 
introduction of the HTP contributed to the electoral success of the AK Party 
in general elections that took place 2007 and 2011. First, according to the 
Turkish Statistical Institute survey findings, 39.5 per cent of the population 
stated that they were satisfied with public health care services in 2003, and 
this figure increased to 74.7 in 2013 (2014). Therefore, it could be suggested 
that this dramatic rise in the percentage of the population that was satisfied 
with public health care services might have affected the voting behaviour.  
Second, the success of the health care reform has remained part of the 
AK Party’s election campaign, even 10 years after the launch of the reform. 
For example, before the municipal elections in 2014, Deputy Prime Minister 
Mr. Bülent Arınç declared health care services as the most popular policy 
of the AK Party government (Anadolu Ajansı, 2014). More recently, in the 
AK Party rally that took place in the city of Yozgat before the March 2014 
municipal elections, Erdoğan’s address to the public mentioned the positive 
outcomes of the health care reform (Sorgun, 2014).  
Third, public opinion surveys indicate that the general public assesses 
the AK Party’s performance in health care as the most successful among all 
other policy domains. For example, the International Republican Institute’s 
report indicates that the respondents ranked the government’s performance 
in the improvement of the health care system as 6.26 on a 0 to 10 scale (10 
refers to the best performance), which made the improvement of the health 
care system as the best performance of the government among different 
policy domains in the eyes of the general public (The International 
Republican Institute, 2011, p.8). In the same survey, 4 per cent of the 
respondents suggested that the improvement of the health care system 
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would be the most important issue that they would consider in the next 
elections (The International Republican Institute, 2011, p.9). 
Given the evidence stated above, I argue that the AK Party’s success 
in introducing and implementing the HTP contributed to its successive 
electoral victories. The AK Party, which first emerged as a by-product of a 
far-right Political Islamist National Outlook Movement, managed to 
establish itself as a catch-all party using formal and informal redistributive 
mechanisms, the most important of which has been the easing of access to 
health care services. As the improvements in health care services affect the 
society as a whole, the AK Party’s popularity could make its way to almost 
all provinces in Turkey.  
Nevertheless, the claim that the AK Party’s social policies contributed 
to its electoral success might seem incompatible with the zeitgeist in the age 
of neoliberal globalisation. However, both the specific features of the 
development of the welfare state in Turkey and the political atmosphere 
that the AK Party had to work within created a rather different national 
context then scholars portrayed. While Turkey’s welfare system was 
established concurrent with Western European trends in the post-WW2 
period, it was insufficient in providing social protection for all mainly due 
to the lack of universal coverage and the absence of social assistance and 
services components (Buğra and Keyder, 2006, p.212). As a result, the level 
of social expenditures in Turkey remained limited throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s when compared to its counterparts (Buğra and Adar, 2007). 
Therefore, while the limits of neoliberal globalisation also apply to Turkey, 
there still was room for Turkish governments to increase the share of public 
expenditures in the total public budget by changing the internal 
composition of the public budget. Even after seven years of AK Party rule 
that eased citizens’ access to health care services and introduced cash 
transfers for disabled people and their relatives, the share of public social 
expenditures in Turkey’s GDP did not increase drastically. According to the 
OECD Social Expenditure Database, the share of public social expenditures 
in Turkey’s GDP was 12.8 in 2009, whereas the OECD average was 22.  
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Another factor that might explain why and how the AK Party could 
initiate a health care reform that put a new burden on public budget is the 
political context within which the Party had to work. After the AK Party’s 
rise to power in the 2002 general elections, it still had to create its political 
legitimacy among the general public and high-level bureaucrats due to its 
historical affiliation with Political Islam. Given the fact that all successive 
parties of the Political Islam were shut down before, the AK Party’s leading 
cadre had to be politically cautious in order not to face a similar end. In fact, 
the first public statement of Erdoğan after the AK Party victory included 
his Party’s commitment to the EU accession process, allegiance to the 
economic program of Turkey with the IMF, and respect for non-
conservatives’ lifestyles (Hürriyet, 2002). 
In addition, despite the victory of the AK Party in forming a single-
party government in the 2002 general elections, more than 50 per cent of 
the votes were not represented in the Parliament mainly due to the 10 per 
cent national election threshold. In other words, as Sayarı suggested, “the 
Turkish electoral system –proportional representation with multimember 
districts under d’Hondt formula and a 10 per cent national threshold that 
parties must pass to qualify for seats- had a strong mechanical effect in 
translating votes into seats: the AKP won nearly two-thirds of the seats 
with about one-third of the vote” (2007, p.200). Therefore, it can be safely 
argued that while the AK Party’s first electoral victory brought it to power, 
its status as a single-party government did not come with strong political 
legitimacy (Çarkoğlu, 2002, p.152). 
What is more striking about the AK Party’s electoral success was its 
ability to increase its share of votes in the 2007 and 2011 general elections, 
which provided the Party with the political legitimacy it did not enjoy in its 
first term. I think, among other factors, the introduction of health care 
reform was sine qua non for the AK Party to become politically legitimate, 
at least for some sectors of society who did not vote for the AK Party in the 
2002 general elections. 
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6.5. The Health Transformation Programme and the AK 
Party’s alliance with the poor and the rich 
 
The AK Party’s constituency started to increase from around 35 per 
cent of all voters in the 2002 general elections to approximately 50 per cent 
in the 2011 general elections. The AK Party also expanded organisationally. 
As of 2013, according to the data of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
Prosecutor’s Office, the AK Party had the largest membership base with 
around 7.5 million registered members (out of around 50 million citizens 
above the age of 18); whereas the main opposition CHP had around 1 million 
in 2013 (Hürriyet, 2013b).  
Understanding the AK Party’s social basis and its growth has been 
among the main paradoxes studied by social scientists in Turkey in the last 
decade. In order to understand the AK Party’s social basis, it is important 
to note that the Party inherited a significant portion of the Political Islam 
votes, as the FP, which the leading cadre of the AK Party had resigned from, 
had around 15 per cent in the 1999 general election. Despite the fact that 
the new Political Islamist party that was established after the closure of the 
FP also ran for the 2002 elections, it could only received around 2.5 per cent 
of the votes. Therefore, one can safely argue that around half of the AK 
Party’s votes in the 2002 general elections came from the Political Islamist 
constituency.  
Given that the AK Party became heir to the throne of the previously 
existing Political Islamist parties, it would be beneficial to briefly discuss 
the core constituencies of these parties. Ayata suggested that the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie, consisting of artisans and shopkeepers, could 
be considered the core of the Political Islamist constituency (1993b, p.57). 
However, this group that Ayata describes constitutes far less than a 
significant proportion of the AK Party voters. 
The Nationalist Outlook movement gained pace throughout the 1990s 
as a result of its successful alliance with the urban poor. In the middle of 
the 1990s, the RP won the municipalities in key cities such as Ankara and 
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Istanbul. The Party worked hard, both before and after the municipal 
elections, to organise and support the urban poor through the use of party 
and municipality resources in the age of Turkey’s welfare system’s crisis 
(Akıncı, 1999, pp.76-78). The RP’s endeavours to reach out to the urban poor 
through its “just order” ideology, i.e. offering social services to the urban 
poor and showing sympathy towards the everyday problems of the urban 
poor throughout the 1990s, strengthened its popularity (Ayata, 1996, p.52). 
Gülalp also links the popularisation of Political Islam among the urban poor 
as a response to the lack of formal social safety nets in the age of a neoliberal 
transformation of Turkey’s economy after the military coup d’état in 1980 
(2001, p.441). As discussed in Chapter 3, the National Outlook movement 
benefited from the policy drift in social policies throughout 1980s and 1990s. 
In addition to its strong links with the urban poor, the National 
Outlook movement also organised part of the business community 
throughout the 1990s. For instance, the Independent Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (MUSİAD), which is known for its political 
affinity with Political Islam, was established in 1990. According to Ayata, 
the Islamist bourgeoisie “grew as a result of the conscious efforts of 
Islamists in the ANAP governments who provided the Islamist bourgeoisie 
access to credit from official sources. They were also given preferential 
treatment in receiving government contracts” (1993b, p.58). While the 
Islamist bourgeoisie did not constitute the strongest faction within the 
Turkish bourgeoisie at the time, its financial support for the Political 
Islamist parties proved to be important especially in assisting the urban 
poor in the age of the welfare system crisis.  
As a result of the strengthening of Political Islam, thanks to the 
alliance it created with the urban poor and the support it took from the 
Islamist bourgeoisie, the social base of Political Islam in Turkey became “a 
vertical bloc comprising segments of different socio-economic classes” 
including the capitalists in the peripheral cities, the professional middle 
class and workers who could not get integrated into the formal employment 
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(Gülalp, 2001, pp.444-445). In other words, the National Outlook movement 
already gained the capacity of forming a ‘catch-all party’ in 1990s.  
The AK Party inherited this organisational capacity from the earlier 
Political Islamist parties that brought together the rich and the poor. 
Özbudun describes the core constituency of the AK Party as “the rural 
population, artisans and small traders, urban slum-dwellers, and the 
rapidly rising Islamist bourgeoisie” (2006, p.547).  For İnsel, the AK Party 
emerged to represent “the new middle class,” the core of which is comprised 
of “small and mid range enterprisers who live mostly in midsize cities and 
some of whom are employer and employee simultaneously, and the young 
executives who have received university education, especially in technical 
fields” (2003, p.297) and “a good portion of the working class” (2003, p.299). 
Finally, Sayari describes the main alliance upon which the AK Party rested 
as follows, “Backed financially by the country’s growing Islamist business 
sector, the AKP did particularly well among the urban poor in major 
Turkish cities” (2007, p.202). 
In line with this political legacy described above, here it is argued that 
the AK Party’s health care reform was designed to cater both to the Islamist 
bourgeoisie and the urban poor at the same time. The AK Party’s election 
declaration included a section on health care, which promised citizens to 
abolish inequalities between different public health insurance schemes and 
expand the coverage of public health insurance to include all citizens 
(Justice and Development Party, 2002, p.83). The promise of the AK Party 
appealed to the grievances of those who had been either left without any 
public health insurance or who could have access to inpatient services only 
due to the limitations imposed on the Green Card scheme. In addition to 
this, the AK Party promised the private investors that it would allow them 
to take part in health care provision (Justice and Development Party, 2002, 
p.83). 
The former Minister of Health’s public statements remain as evidence 
of the AK Party’s pro-poor discourse throughout the reform process. For 
instance, Minister Akdağ suggested that no hospitals would be allowed to 
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take patients hostage in return for their debts to the hospitals (Milliyet, 
2002). Similarly, Akdağ stated that AK Party is in favour of the poor and 
the middle class, so its health care reform is pro-poor (Demirkaya, 2010). 
In relation to the inability of Turkey’s welfare system to provide a 
safety net for all, Buğra argued that the relations between state and citizens 
have been bifurcated (2008, p.261). As explained in Chapter 3, while 
Turkey’s welfare system succeeded in offering a safety net for a considerable 
segment of the society through formal employment and social rights 
attached to the employment status, it failed to universalise this safety net 
for others who could not take up formal employment opportunities. 
Therefore, these two broad social groups have dissimilar experiences with 
the state and the welfare system in Turkey. Buğra argued that the AK 
Party government employed a polarising discourse, one that presented the 
outsiders’ interests as opposed to those who were benefiting from the formal 
social security system (2008, p.263) especially state officials. Election 
results as well as a drastic increase in citizens’ rate of satisfaction with 
health care services indicate that the AK Party’s promise for the urban poor 
appealed to the grievances of this social group. 
Yoltar and Üstündağ substantiated Buğra’s argument in the domain 
of health care services. According to their qualitative study, the majority of 
society, especially Green Card beneficiaries and the members of the SSK, 
had been disillusioned with public health services before the AK Party came 
to power, while civil servants were generally satisfied with the public health 
services (2007). Therefore, the AK Party’s promises in the domain of health 
care were not ungrounded sociologically.  
One of my informants, a specialist medical doctor who had worked in 
a public hospital and a member of the Association for Human Health and 
Education, explained how the poor felt “empowered” in the hospital setting 
after the AK Party’s health care reform: 
 
“As the AKP created the perception that the lower class feels more 
integrated into the system… They did this in health. For instance we 
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tell people in emergency services that if there are urgent cases, other 
people will be denied services. This is something normal. … But they 
respond to us that we are now in the government, you have to 
examine us, you can’t deny services to us…” (Interview no.17) 
 
As the quotation suggests, the poor seem to feel empowered by the AK 
Party; they viewed the AK Party as the guarantor for access to health care 
service even at times when they might be procedurally denied.  
It could also be argued that the AK Party could easily hold sway over 
the general public thanks to the positive public perception of its leading 
cadre. Since its establishment, the AK Party created a public perception of 
the members of its leading cadre, and especially its leader Mr. Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, as “the children of the people” (İnsel, 2003, p.299). Erdoğan, who 
served as the mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, had been 
jailed after he read a poem with religious references to politics in a public 
meeting. Before the establishment of the AK Party, the imprisonment of 
Erdoğan created a public uproar, which strengthened Erdoğan’s public 
image as a “child of the people” who was subjected to undue treatment by 
the bureaucratic elite.  
The use of religious discourse has always been one of the key strategies 
of the political elite in dealing with socio-economic problems in Turkish 
political history (Heper and Keyman, 1998, p.259). Therefore, while the AK 
Party was not the pioneer of this political strategy, it might be considered 
one of its virtuosos.  
How could the AK Party reconcile the demands of the rich and of the 
poor in health care reform? It should be noted that the AK Party used a 
specific way to integrate the urban poor into the health care system without 
harming the interests of the middle and small-sized entrepreneurs, who 
traditionally tended to favour the Political Islamist parties. Buğra 
suggested that the AK Party’s approach to the working poor should be 
understood with reference to its alliance with SMEs (2008, p.250). Given 
that the majority of working poor are informally employed, their employers 
consist mainly of SMEs. The AK Party, rather than pursuing a health care 
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finance strategy that would bring responsibility to the employers of SMEs 
to contribute to the public health care fund as it does for the formal sector, 
did not feel the need to break the path dependency in health care finance 
model intact in Turkey’s health care system. Subjecting all those out of the 
formal labour market to means-testing procedures, the AK Party treated 
the working poor no different from those out of the labour market, and made 
those individuals responsible for contributing to the public social insurance 
fund. 
The AK Party’s health care reform also strengthened its alliance with 
the Islamist bourgeoisie by opening up new areas of capital accumulation 
for this group, which is discussed in Chapter 8. This strategy of using public 
tenders and other public tools to open up new areas of capital accumulation 
for allied businessmen is not peculiar to the AK Party. As Heper and 
Keyman stated, “the process of capital accumulation through contracts with 
the state was the beginning of the formation of vertical links between the 
state and the society” (1998, p.261). Çarkoğlu also suggested that rent 
creation and patronage distribution lay at the centre of party politics in 
Turkey (2002, p.139). As Buğra and Savaşkan evidenced, the AK Party also 
utilised this strategy by using legislative and administrative mechanisms 
“to support capital accumulation by newly emerging businesspeople” (2012, 
p.33). Listing the AK Party-allied businessmen invested in health care, 
Buğra and Savaşkan successfully demonstrated that the health care sector 
has been part of this government’s selective support for capital 
accumulation (2012, p.36). 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, it is argued that the AK Party’s successful synthesis 
of neoliberalism and populism with a conservative discourse manifested 
itself in the framing of the HTP in two ways. First, the AK Party succeeded 
in creating satisfaction among the poor with health care reform while 
implementing neoliberal economic policies, which strengthened the alliance 
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it had inherited from the previous Political Islamist parties with the urban 
poor. Second, the AK Party managed to use the health care reform process 
as a new contour of capital accumulation for its allied businessmen by 
integrating the private sector into the provision of health care services.  
However, the future of the political alliance backing the reform under 
consideration is bleak. This is mainly due to the incompatibility of pursuing 
both strategies in the medium term. While health care entrepreneurs aim 
to increase out-of-pocket payments to top up public health insurance in 
accessing private health care services, citizens are against the rising out-of-
pocket payments. Therefore, the very political strategy of the AK Party, 
which made health care reform a success story in the first place, might 
create hard-to-solve dilemmas in near future. 
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Chapter 7: The Turkish Medical Association as an 
Actor in the Politics of Health Care 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the role of the TTB as an actor in the politics of 
health care in Turkey during the launch and implementation of the HTP in 
2003.  
This chapter is organised into five sections including this introductory 
one. In the second section, the main arguments stemming from the 
literature on the role of medical doctors and their professional organisations 
in health care reforms are reviewed. Following this review, the third section 
introduces the brief political history of the TTB and situates this 
organisation within Turkey’s political system. The fourth section examines 
the origins and modes of contestations between the TTB and the 
government. The last section provides an analysis of the role of the TTB as 
an actor in the politics of health care in light of the literature on the role of 
medical doctors and their professional organisations in health care reforms. 
This chapter suggests that the role of the TTB during the launch and 
implementation of the HTP does not fully conform to existing claims in the 
literature. As a professional medical organisation, the TTB could not escape 
from its role as an interest-based organisation promoting the rights of 
medical doctors in different moments during the health care reform. The 
main contestation between the AK Party government and the TTB has been 
the control over medical doctors’ labour. In addition, following the 
ideological change in the leading cadre of the TTB in 1970s, the TTB 
attempts to push the limits of working for the interest of medical doctors 
and works for transcending prima facie the conflict between the medical 
doctors’ rights and citizens’ right to health care in its political discourse. 
This endeavour of the TTB supports the emphasis that ideational 
institutionalism puts on the role and importance of ideas in welfare politics. 
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7.2. The literature on the role of medical doctors and 
professional medical organisations in health care reforms 
 
The literature on the politics of health care acknowledges medical 
doctors and their professional organisations as pivotal actors in health care 
reforms. It might be argued that the power of medical doctors in the politics 
of health care originates from the moral authority of the medical profession 
and medical doctors’ exclusive expertise. For instance, Hyde argues that the 
power and influence of the American Medical Association (AMA) originates 
from the professionalism of the medical community, its monopoly over the 
medical practice, its power of coercion in the form of medical ethics (1954, 
pp.948-949). In addition, he suggests that the political power of the AMA 
can be attributed to the higher social status of medical doctors in American 
society, its mastery over political tactics as an organised professional group, 
the increased activity of medical doctors in politics, its established relations 
with the administrative bodies (Hyde, 1954, pp.954-958). For some scholars, 
this moral authority and expertise gives medical doctors a significant power 
over health care reform decisions (Normand, 1997, p.223, Blank and Burau, 
2010, p.4).  
The literature on professional medical organisations demonstrates the 
interplay between health care policies and professional politics. In his 
seminal book on the case of British Medical Association (BMA), Eckstein 
suggests that the development of public health policies was closely 
correlated with the politicization of the BMA, which stayed away from 
politics and concentrated its activities mainly on the regulation of the 
medical profession before (1960, p.42). The ratification of the National 
Health Service Act in 1946, which made the state as the main employer in 
health care services, led to the expansion of the membership base of the 
BMA to include the majority of medical doctors in Britain (Eckstein, 1960, 
p.44). Despite the fact that the BMA opposed the establishment of the NHS 
and appeared as the chief enemy of the Ministry of Health before 1946, the 
establishment of the NHS then empowered the BMA organisationally and 
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financially, transformed the BMA into a corporatist body that started 
cooperating with Ministry of Health later on (Eckstein, 1960, p. 48). In 
addition, Eckstein’s study also indicates differences in the professional 
institutional context within which professional medical organisations 
operate do matter in determining their power vis-à-vis other political actors. 
For instance, Eckstein notes that the BMA does not enjoy the monopoly over 
professional politics, as the AMA does, due to the presence of the Royal 
Colleges. As a result, the Ministry of Health had the power to play the Royal 
Colleges off against the BMA in some cases (1960, p.48). 
In the literature, there is a tendency to explain the political discourses 
and acts of medical doctors and their professional medical organisations in 
a uniform way. For instance, Navarro suggests that the impact of medical 
doctors on health care policy should be understood on the basis of their class 
positions in the society. According to Navarro, as most medical doctors in 
the U.S. belong to the upper middle classes (1976, p.206), he expects them 
to act according to their class interests in political controversies over health 
care. Similarly, Moran suggests that the major objective of medical 
associations has been to “control over entry to, and competition within, the 
market, while at the same time allowing the profession to control its own 
affairs” (2000, 144). Parallel to Moran’s insight, Eckstein argues that the 
BMA’s prior opposition to the establishment of the NHS was a result of its 
general distrust of the entry of non-medical organisations into the domain 
of health care, more than a result of its ideological stance (1964, p. 130). 
The power of medical associations over health care reforms is debated 
in the literature. While some scholars argue that the success of a particular 
health care policy requires at least tacit support of the medical community 
(Normand, 1997, p.223, Blank and Burau, 2010, p.4), others suggest that 
the power of medical doctors should not be overestimated, as it has been 
proved to be fragile when it conflicts with stronger business interests or 
organised public interest in general (Arrow, 2001, p.1201).  
It should also be noted that the power of medical associations might 
vary according to the different dimensions of health care politics. In this 
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respect, Moran’s functional categorisation of the politics of health care 
might be helpful. Moran places the politics of health care into three 
categories: politics of consumption of health care; politics of production of 
health care; and politics of medical profession (1999, p.5). Moran suggests 
that the politics of consumption receives the largest attention from the 
general public due to its collective form of financing and access (1999, pp.5-
6) especially in state and societal type health care systems. Governments 
are also highly involved in politics of consumption for two reasons. First, 
they are in control of the largest portion of health care expenditures (Moran, 
1999, p.175). Second, the politics of consumption of health care may have 
an influence upon the electoral fortunes of governing and oppositional 
political parties (Moran, 1999, p.7). Political struggles over the consumption 
of health care have been carried out at the national level (Moran, 1999, 
pp.177-178). Unlike the politics of consumption, a significant volume of 
contemporary politics of production are organised at the international level 
(Moran, 1999, pp.177-178). Lastly, professional politics generally take place 
between the organised medical profession and governments at the national 
level (Moran, 1999, pp.177-178). Therefore, medical associations might 
enjoy greater power over the politics of the production of health care and 
professional politics, and to a limited extent over the politics of the 
consumption of health care. 
Other scholars note that power is not evenly distributed within the 
medical community. In a study on the AMA, Hyde suggests that urban 
practitioners and specialists, whose incomes are above the average income 
of medical doctors, are in a better position to devote time and energy into 
health care politics (1954, p.947). In a study on the BMA, Eckstein argues 
that the BMA has largely been a general practitioners’ association, which 
has an impact on the political positions it takes during conflicts (1960, p.50). 
Another line of thought, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, is 
institutionalism. Institutionalism mainly suggests that the power of 
medical associations depends on the political system within which they are 
embedded. Immergut, in her analysis of health care reforms in Switzerland, 
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France and Sweden, found out that while medical associations in all three 
countries opposed the governments’ efforts to introduce national health 
policies, the policy outcomes were all different (1992, p.xxi). Therefore, 
Immergut argues that the power of medical associations derives not from 
their internal power resources but from the political system that enables or 
disables them to influence the policy outcomes. In her words, “the political 
impact of a particular group is contingent on strategic opportunities 
stemming from the logic of political decision processes” (Immergut, 1992, 
p.11).  
In addition to Immergut’s insight, it might also be claimed that the 
level of organisation among the medical community, the internal coherency 
of the medical association, and the strategic tactics of the medical 
association might also have an impact on the extent to which medical 
associations influence the policy outcomes.  
While these accounts provide insights for the students of health care 
politics, here it is argued that the role of the medical community and 
medical association in concrete health care reforms could be better 
understood by situating the medical community and the association within 
the historical and political context of the country under consideration.  
 
7.3. A brief political history of the Turkish Medical 
Association and its power resources within Turkey’s political 
system 
 
The emergence of the medical community in Turkey dates back to the 
Late Ottoman period when the first Western-type medical schools were 
established in the early 19th century. The graduates of the first medical 
schools, who then became defenders of modern ideologies, had a significant 
impact on the Late Ottoman politics and on the politics in the early 
Republican Period. In the early Republican period, medical doctors played 
a key role in establishing legitimacy for the new regime and were considered 
the bearers of the official Kemalist ideology. 
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As explained in Chapter 3, the TTB was established in 1953 by law 
(The Republic of Turkey, 1953) and was officially designed as a corporatist 
professional organisation expected to support the health care policies of the 
government, serve the medical community, and act as an advisory body for 
the government and the MoH in particular. Schmitter defines corporatism 
as follows:  
 
“A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and 
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on 
their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support.” 
(Schmitter, 1974, pp.93-94).  
 
Parallel to Schmitter’s definition, lawmakers designed the TTB as a 
corporatist body that would represent the medical community at the policy 
level, while not offering it much power over policy outcomes. However, the 
transformation of the TTB into a de facto non-governmental organisation 
as well as a locus of leftist opposition proves that actual discourses and 
practices of organisations might push the predetermined limits imposed on 
them.  
In the 1970s, young medical doctors sympathising with leftist views 
started to gain the upper hand within the executive board of the TTB, which 
resulted in the transformation of the TTB from a corporatist professional 
body into a dissenting civil society organisation composed of medical doctors 
who had a say on matters not limited to health care issues. While the 
military coup d’état in 1980 suppressed all forms of civil society 
organisations including the TTB, the Association was one of the pioneering 
organisations within Turkey’s civil society that succeeded in revitalising 
itself in late 1980s. 
Today, the TTB is a public corporate entity that works under the 
purview of the MoH. However, in practice, the TTB works independently 
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from the MoH and acts more like a non-governmental organisation. As the 
former head of the TTB argued, governments have acknowledged the 
Association as an opposing force since the second half of the 1970s 
(Interview no.9). The former head of the TTB explained the current state of 
the Association as follows: 
 
“Concerning the foundation law of the TTB, we are not fully a non-
governmental organisation. We are founded by the law. We have a 
legal link with the Ministry of Health in one way or another. That is 
why the Ministry of Health always wanted the TTB to be its backyard” 
(Interview no.14).  
 
However, as the TTB’s ability to oppose the government’s health care 
reform proposals discussed in this chapter indicates, the agency of the 
TTB’s leadership managed to restrict the influence of the Ministry on the 
TTB and transformed the TTB de facto into a civil society organisation. In 
the words of the former head of the TTB: 
 
“The Ministry of Health wants to monitor the TTB. They also have 
legal basis. But we are against the monitoring of the Ministry. We 
defend the position that professional organisation should be 
independent. We think this is the only way we can protect the values 
of the medical profession” (Interview no.9). 
 
As the quote above indicates, the agency of the TTB’s leading cadre is 
decisive in keeping the organisation an independent professional 
organisation capable of promoting and protecting “the values of the medical 
profession” vis-à-vis governments and the bureaucracy.  
The TTB today has chambers of medicine in 65 cities across Turkey. 
Membership is compulsory only for medical doctors working independently. 
Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of medical doctors work 
either for public or private hospitals, it could be argued that non-compulsory 
membership to the TTB undermines its representative power. Despite the 
lack of compulsory membership, however, the TTB states that its 
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membership base covers around 80 per cent of all practicing medical doctors 
in 2006 (Turkish Medical Association, 2014).  
Unlike most of its counterparts in other countries, the TTB does not 
accept sponsorship from private companies operating within the health 
sector. The former head of the Association explains the rationale behind 
this decision as follows: 
  
“We, as the TTB, are an organisation that can define its own position 
when we get into a political conflict. Membership fees constitute the 
largest portion of the Association’s total revenue. We reject the 
sponsorship proposals from the pharmaceutical sector. We know that 
pharmaceutical industry can make the Association rich. We are aware 
of that. But then we will lose the ability to develop our own political 
position in line with our values” (Interview no.9). 
 
As is seen in the quote above, “values of the medical profession” have 
a central place in the TTB’s political discourse. The TTB bases its legitimacy 
upon the universal values of the medical profession, which are defined on 
the basis of international human rights conventions, the Hippocratic Oath, 
and medical ethics. In fact, earlier studies on other medical associations 
indicate that the use of ethics in opposing political reforms is not limited to 
the case of TTB. For instance, Hyde argues that the AMA substantiated its 
opposition to the state’s attempts to control medical practice by referring to 
the ethical values of the opposition. For Hyde, in doing so, the AMA failed 
to address economic issues in the domain of health care politics realistically 
(1954, p.976). 
The representatives of the AK Party government, and especially the 
Minister of Health at the time, constantly accused the TTB of being “too 
political” on health care issues and trespassing the boundaries of acting as 
a professional organisation. For instance, the Minister of Health at the 
time, Mr. Recep Akdağ, explained the major cause of contestation between 
the government and the TTB as follows: 
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“We are not in a struggle with the TTB as a professional organisation. 
There is an ideological battle. They are struggling with us on 
ideological grounds” (Medimagazin, 2011b). 
 
As the quote above suggests, on the one hand, the Minister 
acknowledges the political character of the TTB as a professional 
organisation. On the other hand, the Minister of Health does not consider 
an ideological battle with a professional organisation as legitimate. He 
continues to explain: 
 
“In this professional organisation, my invaluable friends represent 100 
to 200 thousand people. I am representing 74 million people. I am sorry 
but I am not going to let any person, any professional organisation to 
stamp on the national will” (Medimagazin, 2011b). 
 
Akdağ draws attention to the broader legitimacy of the government 
vis-à-vis the TTB, a legitimacy that originates from electoral victory and the 
greater representative power of the government. Therefore, any political 
opposition of the TTB against the government, according to Akdağ, is 
acceptable. This is because it implies an opposition against “the national 
will”, which is presented as almost sacred and clearly indivisible especially 
after the AK Party’s transformation into a ‘cartel party’ as it is claimed in 
Chapter 6.  
The former head of the TTB explains how two different bases for 
legitimacy clash during conflicts between the government and the TTB: 
 
“The Minister takes a position against the TTB’s proposals as follows. 
He argues that they take their legitimacy from the populace. But he 
says, you only do what your colleagues want you to do. He says, you 
are not a political party. He asks us to establish a political party and 
run in forthcoming elections. But we cannot seek recognition of 
universal values from the public. Of course the government 
determines health care policies. But it is also a right to dissent these 
policies. It should be possible to develop criticisms on the basis of 
medical ethos” (Interview no.9). 
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In practice, it could be argued that the TTB has been an outlier in the 
global scene of medical associations in terms of its overtly left-leaning 
political position that aims to reconcile the interests of medical 
professionals and patients and introduce an egalitarian public health care 
system funded by general taxation. 
In addition to its reference to “universal values of the medical 
practice”, the TTB suggests a paradigm that reconciles the medical doctors’ 
rights with citizens’ rights to health care. For instance, the former head of 
the TTB suggests, 
 
“Our objective is to protect medical practice and its values for the good 
of the society. For us, there is no distinction between the rights of 
medical doctors and the rights of the patients. For us, there is only the 
right to health care” (Interview no.9).  
 
The holistic approach to the right to health care explained by the 
interviewee above is grounded in Marxian class analysis that the leading 
cadre of the TTB internalised since 1970s. He argued, 
 
“In the end, medical doctors are workers. They have a special form of 
labour, but it is a form of labour. Medical doctors are increasingly 
becoming part of the majority that does not have anything to sell but 
their labour power. … Class conflict underlies the contestations in the 
domain of health care.” (Interview no.9). 
 
In light of the values and the basis of legitimacy stated above, the TTB 
has also been active in health care politics, including the politics of 
production and consumption. While the TTB does not have a veto point 
concerning health care decisions, it has developed two main strategies in 
order to influence policy outcomes. The first of these strategies is legal 
activism. As the former head of the TTB stated, “Legal activism is at the 
forefront of the TTB’s opposition strategies, as getting a result is faster. We 
use all legitimate means” (Interview no.9). Once the government introduces 
a change in health care policies that is not compatible with the TTB’s 
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political position, the TTB opens a case against the change either in the 
Supreme Court or in the Constitutional Court.  
The second of the TTB’s main strategy is to organise press conferences 
and labour strikes of medical doctors, generally in collaboration with other 
health workers including nurses and caregivers. The success of these 
strategies is not guaranteed by the political system and depends on the 
particular case. As the former head of the TTB states, the TTB keeps its 
distance from interest-based lobbying strategies: 
 
“We do not use lobbying strategies, using the word lobbying in a 
pejorative way. We do consult with other stakeholders, but we keep 
our distance. We do not have ‘go-getter’ skills. What we rather do is 
the following: preparing opinions, publications, press releases, labour 
strikes…” (Interview no.9). 
 
In fact, the TTB used judicial activism to annul critical changes in the 
health care reform through organised labour strikes and street protests 
against the reform,17 especially during the Day of Medicine, which has been 
celebrated in Turkey on every March 14th and is accepted as the anniversary 
of the launch of modern medicine teaching in the early 19th century. 
From another perspective, the health care reform team perceived the 
TTB’s rejection of lobbying strategies and pursuit of a hardliner position 
with respect to health care reform as “uncooperative” (Interview no.20). 
Politically speaking, the TTB has been acting in alliance with other 
left-leaning professional organisations, trade unions, and non-
governmental organisations. My interviewee explained the rationale 
behind this alliance as follows: 
 
“The TTB is part of the broader labour struggle. It prioritises values. 
We do not prioritise medical doctors, we defend health workers as a 
whole” (Interview no.9). 
 
                                                        
17 i.e. Labour strike on 5 November 2003, protest on 24 December 2003, protest on 10-11 
March 2004, protest on 13 March 2011. 
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The allied organisations of the TTB include but are not limited to the 
Turkish Nurses Association, the Health and Social Services Labourers 
Union (Sağlık ve Sosyal Hizmet Emekçileri Sendikası, SES), the Union of 
Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar 
Odaları Birliği, TMMOB), and the Revolutionary Health Workers Union 
(Devrimci Sağlık İşçileri Sendikası, DEV SAĞLIK-İŞ). In addition, the TTB 
has been the leading organisation that informs and shapes the opinion of 
other allied organisations on health care issues. It could be argued that 
allied organisations of the TTB are all political parties on the left -including 
today’s main opposition party (CHP)- and organisations that place 
themselves on the left of the political spectrum.  
The TTB holds general elections for its executive board. Despite the 
fact that the Active Democratic Group (Etkin Demokratik Grup) of left-
leaning medical doctors has ruled the Association since 1970s, politics 
within the TTB have been vibrant. There are strong alternative groups 
seeking to come to power within the Association. These alternative groups 
include but are not limited to Turkey’s Platform for Medical Doctors 
(Türkiye Hekim Platformu), Rights of Medical Doctors Group (Hekim 
Hakları Grubu) and Medical Doctors’ Union of Forces (Hekim Güçbirliği).  
As confirmed by the former head of the TTB, a major fault line between 
the three largest groups in the TTB echoes the broader political fault lines 
in the country (Interview no.14). Turkey’s Platform for Medical Doctors is 
Turkish nationalist; Rights of Medical Doctors Group is neo-liberal 
conservative; and Medical Doctors’ Union of Forces is Kemalist nationalist. 
To exemplify, Medical Doctors’ Union of Forces calls for medical doctors to 
join the ranks of their union with these statements: 
 
“Distinguished colleagues, … we have been unified and struggling 
against trivialisation of all of our medical doctors and their labours 
and the enslavement of them; we have been and are defending our 
national values, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and revolutions of the 
Republic that are under threat…” (Hekim Güçbirliği, 2012b).  
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One of the major critiques raised by the Medical Doctors’ Union of 
Forces against the Active Democratic Group is that the TTB prepared 
posters in minority languages in Turkey (Kurdish and Armenian) under the 
administration of the Active Democratic Group (Güzelant, 2012). 
Interestingly, the socialists—represented by the Active Democratic 
Group within the TTB—are clearly a minority group in Turkish politics that 
managed to remain in power in the TTB. In response to my question about 
how the socialists managed to remain in power in the Association, the 
former head of the Association gave the following answer: 
 
“Concerning medical doctors’ rights, people who are ideologically close 
to the government lately established relationships that were aside 
from TTB. They negotiated with the Ministry. They tried to improve 
the situation at the time. They worked to initiate some positive steps. 
None of them succeeded. Therefore, they had to deal with this: they 
don’t have a problem with privatisation but those defend medical 
doctors’ rights are us, those against privatisation” (Interview no.14). 
 
As the quote above suggests, one could argue that the legitimacy of the 
leading cadre of the TTB originates from its know-how on legal and street 
activism. However, this legitimacy has always been elusive, as there is 
tension between the values of the leading cadre and the membership base 
of the TTB. 
 
7.4. The Turkish Medical Association’s opposition to the 
Health Transformation Programme: Contestations with the 
AK Party governments 
 
As discussed in an earlier section, the TTB bases its political discourse 
of the critique of health care reform on universal values of the medical 
profession and a Marxian class analysis that sees medical doctors as part of 
the working class. In this respect, the TTB rejects the bifurcation of “the 
right to health” between the rights of medical doctors and the rights of 
citizens. Instead, it aims to unify the struggles of medical doctors’ rights 
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and the citizens’ rights to health care. For the TTB, this can only be possible 
in a fully socialised national health care system that provides free and 
universal access to all citizens. 
The AK Party’s HTP has a rather different approach to health care 
that aims to transform the health care domain into a quasi-market model. 
In this model, different actors will operate in a self-interested fashion. The 
conflict among the self-interested behaviours of different actors is expected 
to provide the optimal distribution of resources. In order to guarantee the 
optimal distribution of resources within the health sector, the state has the 
responsibility to regulate the behaviours of all actors, including medical 
doctors, health care providers, patients, and health insurance providers.  
Throughout the reform process, the ideal of a fully socialised national 
health care system that provides free and universal access to all citizens 
remained a vantage point for the TTB in its critique of Turkey’s new health 
care system represented by the HTP. Nevertheless, it should be also noted 
that the underlying conflict between the TTB and the AK Party 
governments is not limited to their opposing views with respect to reform 
in health care system. As a secularist organisation supportive of the rights 
of the Kurdish minority, and part of a pro labour rights alliance with 
professional organisations, trade unions, and civil society organisations, the 
TTB has been overtly critical of the AK Party’s neo-liberal economic policies 
and its conservative outlook. In fact, the TTB was an active participant of 
Gezi Park protests in 2013. For instance, the TTB expressed their solidarity 
with the 69 detained members of the Confederation of Public Labourers’ 
Union (KESK). In the public statement on the detainment of KESK 
members issued by the TTB with DİSK and TMMOB, these three 
organisations define the ‘new regime’ of Turkey established by the AK Party 
government with three concepts: “pro-market, reactionist, pro-dependency” 
(Turkish Medical Association et al., 2012).  
In this respect, it could be argued that the relationship between the 
TTB and the AK Party started from almost irreconcilable political 
standpoints in a polarised political atmosphere like Turkey. In fact, this 
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conflict became visible in a number of events, including but not limited to 
the Gezi Park protests. Therefore, it could be argued that the conflict 
between the two actors over the HTP was also a manifestation of a deeper 
conflict between anti-communists vs. socialists, the right vs. the left, 
conservatives vs. seculars, and pro-market vs. pro-state.   
Against this background, in line with the scope of this study, here the 
conflict between the TTB and the AK Party government is explored with a 
special emphasis on health care issues. The TTB’s criticisms of the reform 
included the following five main pillars: the reform results in the 
privatisation of health care services; the reform is the replica of neoliberal 
health care reforms that have been imposed by the WB on developing 
countries; the reform leads to the deterioration of working conditions for 
medical doctors and other health workers; the reform leads to an increase 
of violence against health workers; and the reform results in the dissolution 
of teamwork among medical doctors and other health workers by 
introducing performance-based payments and increasing subcontracting 
within the sector (Turkish Medical Association, 2011b).  
 
7.4.1. The clash over the role and function of the Turkish Medical 
Association 
 
Despite the fact that the TTB does not enjoy an institutionalised ‘veto 
power’ in the Turkish political system, the single-party government takes 
it seriously because the TTB plays a moral leadership role with the power 
to shape the popular perception of the health care reform. This is evident in 
the Minister of Health’s public statements that openly address the 
criticisms raised by the TTB. To exemplify, in response to the TTB’s 
criticism of the reform resulting in privatisation of health care services, the 
Minister of Health felt the need to declare that the AK Party is not a 
neoliberal party but rather a proponent of social justice and care for the 
public and individuals (Medimagazin, 2011b).  
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While the HTP is based upon an understanding of the health care 
market that brings together different actors with their own self-interests, 
this understanding that applies to the market itself seems not to apply to 
health care politics. In other words, the government does not allow the TTB 
to push the limits of an interest organisation of medical doctors. 
However, the TTB’s leading cadre incorporates and even prioritises 
voicing of criticisms against health care reforms on the basis of the 
universal values of the medical profession in its mission. TTB 
representatives suggested that the following phrase of the founding law of 
the TTB provides them a legitimate ground to develop and voice criticisms 
against the health care reform under consideration: “to secure the progress 
of medical profession in favour of public and individual interest” (The 
Republic of Turkey, 1953).  
It should also be noted that while it is a professional organisation 
without any real representative power with respect to the general public, 
the TTB also has an implicit claim to define “the public interest” even better 
than the government. The TTB’s claim might be explained on the basis of 
medical doctors’ perception of themselves as disinterested and highly 
educated people working for the good of the society and never against the 
society. 
The ability of the TTB to assess the outcomes of the reform on behalf 
of the general public was challenged by the members of the reform team. 
According to a member of the reform team, despite the positive outcomes of 
the reform becoming evident in time, medical doctors working in public 
universities and those serving in the central authority and metropolitan 
branches of the TTB failed to change their opposing views, mainly because 
they have limited contact with the public (Interview no.20).  
The government felt the need to take a step to exclude all political 
activities out of the allowed scope of the TTB’s activities. By issuing a 
statutory decree, the government removed the phrase “to secure the 
progress of medical profession in favour of public and individual interest” 
from the foundational law of the TTB (The Republic of Turkey, 2011a). With 
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this change, the duties of the TTB as described in its foundational law (The 
Republic of Turkey, 1953) were limited to the catering for the solidarity 
among the members of medical profession and pursuing the interests of 
medical doctors. While the government representatives have been accusing 
the TTB of pursuing the private interests of medical doctors at the expense 
of the general public interest, this change affirms that the government 
prefers the TTB to act merely as an interest organisation without claiming 
a broader responsibility to reconcile the interests of the medical 
professionals with the general public.  
The TTB’s opposition to the above-mentioned change found echo 
among the ranks of the main opposition party, namely the CHP. Two well-
known members of the parliament, Ms. Emine Ülker Tarhan and Mr. 
Muharrem İnce, mobilised more than a hundred MPs to open a case against 
the statutory decree removing the phrase “to secure the progress of medical 
profession in favour of public and individual interest” from the foundational 
law of the TTB in the Constitutional Court. The petition included the 
following phrases: 
 
“The statutory decree under consideration annuls the clause of 
‘securing the progress of medical profession in favour of public and 
individual interest’, which is the reflection of the responsibility that is 
given to professional organisations by the 135th Clause of the 
Constitution. The statutory decree aims at annulling the right and the 
authority given to the organisation by the 135th Clause of the 
Constitution.  
… 
In addition, the statutory decree aims at undermining the functions of 
Turkish Medical Association by removing the clause of ‘securing the 
progress of medical profession in favour of public and individual 
interest’. It is aimed at suppressing the pressure group character of 
professional organisations that do not comply with the policies of the 
Ministry of Health. Rather than adopting an approach that recognizes 
and protects the independent institutional identity, aiming at 
changing the role and the character of professional organisations is 
against the democratic, social and constitutional qualities of the state” 
(2013, p.67).  
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Finally, the Constitutional Court decided to annul the above-
mentioned change in 2013 (Turkish Medical Association, 2013). In the 
reasoned decision, the Constitutional Court declared, 
 
“The Turkish Medical Association is a professional organisation with 
public institution status established in line with the 135th Clause of 
the Constitution. It is not possible to make amendments in the 
statuses of professional organisations with public status within the 
scope of this Empowering Law no. 6223 (for the Council of Ministers 
to issue statutory decree)” (The Constitutional Court of Turkey, 2013, 
p.151). 
 
As stated in the decision, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that 
the legitimacy of the TTB originates from the Constitution. Therefore, a 
simple majority in the legislative body does not have the power to amend 
the roles and functions of the TTB. This decision could be interpreted as the 
legal recognition of the TTB’s official position, which claims to represent the 
universal values of the medical profession—values that may not necessarily 
reflect the popular will. In addition, the decision can also be read as the 
reinstitution of checks and balance mechanisms that restrict the power of 
the executive vis-à-vis professional organisations and their political 
activities.   
 
7.4.2. The clash over the employment status of medical doctors 
 
The second key issue that sparked a conflict between the TTB and the 
AK Party governments was the employment conditions of medical doctors. 
Since the military coup d’état in 1980, Turkey’s medical doctors had been 
enjoying the privilege that no other civil servants had. Medical doctors 
gained the right to work for their own private clinics or private health 
institutions without quitting their jobs in the public sector. Therefore, 
medical doctors enjoyed the privilege of being civil servants as well as self-
employed workers at the same time. The ‘dual commitment’ of medical 
doctors to public hospitals and their private clinics opened up the health 
 187 
 
care system to informality. Before the implementation of the HTP, it was a 
common practice for patients to pay a visit to medical doctor’s private clinic 
in order to receive better treatment in public hospitals. Therefore, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, Turkey’s health care system before the HTP could 
hardly be classified as fully decommodified, as informal out-of-pocket 
payments constituted a significant expenditure for many households. 
The clash of the government and medical doctors over the employment 
conditions of medical doctors started just after the AK Party came to power. 
Mr. Akdağ, the Minister of Health of the time, made the following statement 
in the Congress of the TTB in 2003: “Medical doctors should keep away from 
patients’ wallets from now on” (Tıp Dünyası, 2003). It could be argued that 
the government accused medical doctors of blocking citizens’ access to 
health care services before the reform, thereby legitimising the HTP with 
anti-medical doctor discourse. One of my informants, who is a professor of 
public health, explained how the government gained the upper hand vis-à-
vis TTB during the debates on full time work law using the deficiencies of 
the previous health care system:  
 
“The government acted as if all guilt is on the medical doctor, as if 
there was no connection between the fact of medical doctors being 
caught up in these kinds of business and market mechanisms. Then 
the government threw this mess up to medical doctors and the TTB. 
As a solution, it proposed, it would unlink the private sector and the 
public sector by introducing full time work requirement for medical 
doctors” (Interview no.13). 
 
In the aftermath of the 2007 general elections, the AK Party 
government brought full time work for medical doctors to the agenda. It is 
important to note that full time work requirement came to the agenda in a 
context within which the HTP excluded private clinics of medical doctors 
from health care providers offering services to the insurees of the SGK. The 
exclusion of private clinics from the new health care system was not a 
necessity. As the head of the Right to Health Association stated, “they could 
integrate private clinics into the new system. The new model permitted this 
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integration” (Interview no.15). However, the government’s choice was in 
favour of the promotion of the establishment of large-scale private hospitals 
and their integration into the system. One of my informants, a professor of 
public health, examined the introduction of full time work requirement for 
medical doctors in light of changes occurring in the health care delivery 
market. He argued,  
 
“Full time work, in its current meaning, is a regulation that 
encourages the intensification of capital to the benefit of large 
corporations. It is the manifestation of a will that legally lays the 
ground for this intensification. Small enterprises were being ruled out 
with a political intervention” (Interview no.13).  
 
The TTB has been traditionally in favour of “full time work regulation” 
for all medical doctors, which mainly referred to full time work in the public 
sector. However, referring to the line of thought that the quote above 
suggests, the TTB strongly opposed the government’s attempt to introduce 
a full time work requirement for medical doctors. In order to explain its new 
position, the TTB made a distinction between “real full time work 
proposals” and “fake full time work proposals” and argued that it supports 
the former and not the latter (2012). The TTB calls for a full time work that 
allows medical doctors to earn a salary that corresponds to their labour 
spent and education attained. The former head of the TTB also explained 
his position on the introduction of the full time work requirement:  
 
“From my perspective, the full time work principle is a rightful 
principle. In a public system, private clinics and public service should 
not go together. However, if you implement full time work in a 
marketized privatized system like this, you cannot meet the expected 
efficiency. I am against the full time practice proposed by the Ministry, 
but I am for a rightful implementation of the full time work” (Interview 
no.14).  
 
In parallel to the former head’s position, the TTB suggested that the 
level of medical doctors’ salary should eliminate the need for medical 
doctors to top their salaries up with extra work and this level should be 
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reflected in retirement pensions. The TTB released a draft law proposal on 
full time work (Turkish Medical Association, 2011c), and declared that it 
was open to negotiation with the MoH for the implementation of “real full 
time work” (Turkish Medical Association, 2012). 
 Studying the TTB’s arguments against the introduction of a full time 
work requirement for medical doctors as part of the HTP and looking at how 
the government responded to the TTB’s opposition is critical to 
understanding the limits of the TTB’s political position to defend the right 
to health care without separating the rights of medical doctors from the 
rights of patients. Understanding the complexity of the TTB’s position with 
respect to the introduction of the full time work requirement and the 
responses it has given might be telling when examining to what extent it is 
possible for the TTB to keep a distance from interest-based professionalism 
in an increasingly marketized health environment and an institutional 
history within which medical doctors with private clinics played key roles. 
The government announced the draft law that included the 
introduction of a full time work requirement for medical doctors in 2008. 
The draft law included clauses prohibiting all medical doctors working for 
public and university hospitals to work outside these premises, and for all 
medical doctors with private clinics to work at the same time for private 
hospitals that have contracts with the SGK.  
In response, the TTB released a report on the draft law. The report 
suggested that the full time work requirement that the government 
proposed was different from the full time work proposal of the TTB. While 
the TTB was in favour of full time work in public hospitals, it was so within 
a public health care system. However, the new health care system of Turkey 
is increasingly dependent upon private health care providers. Therefore, 
this attempt to regulate the medical doctors’ labour and employment status 
is not justified and is aimed at strengthening the control of private sector 
health care providers over medical doctors. This form of a full time work 
requirement, according to the TTB’s report, will eventually result in the 
depreciation of the cost of medical doctors’ labour (Turkish Medical 
 190 
 
Association, 2008). The TTB used three slogans in this report: ‘No to the 
depreciation of medical doctors’ labour!’; ‘You cannot have full time work 
with a merchant’s logic!’; and ‘So-called full time work of the MoH: Flexible 
work, indeed!’ (Turkish Medical Association, 2008). In addition, the former 
head of the TTB explained why they expect depreciation of the salaries of 
medical doctors in the near future as follows, 
 
“In a pro-market system I have mentioned before, full time work 
requirement inevitably leads to the weakening of the negotiation 
power of medical doctors. … You increase the private sector, you want 
medical doctors to work there, you don’t provide them union rights, 
you don’t make contract a precondition while the TTB is fighting for 
it” (Interview no.14).  
 
In response, the Minister of Health drew the attention of the public to 
the high revenues of a minority of medical doctors running private clinics. 
The Minister stated: “All this uproar is because of 1,200 professors. They 
insistently want to earn more” (Yalçın, 2009). As mentioned before, this 
statement could also be read as evidence that the government presented 
medical doctors as “penny pinchers” in the eyes of the general public in 
order to create legitimacy for the health care reform.  
A senior economist from the WB supported the Minister in analysing 
the opposition of medical doctors to the introduction of full time work 
requirement: 
 
“Those who oppose the reform are the pro-status quo camp. These were 
the medical doctors who benefited from the old system. These were 
civil servants working in public universities, teaching and using the 
bed capacity of university hospitals and had their own private clinics. 
Specialist academic group… I even received hate messages from this 
group” (Interview no.25) 
 
Signifying a success for the pro-reform camp composed of the 
government and the WB, the government passed the law in 2010 (The 
Republic of Turkey, 2010). The law aimed to give an end to this historical 
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privilege of medical doctors, which caused a political uproar from the 
medical doctors’ side.  
In response, the TTB, in collaboration with MPs from the CHP, applied 
to the Constitutional Court in order to annul the implementation of the law. 
The Constitutional Court annulled the articles of the law that prohibit the 
private practice of professors of medicine as well as put a time limit for other 
medical doctors to decide which institution they want to work for full time 
(The Constitutional Court of Turkey, 2010). The Court based its decision on 
the violation of procedure. 18  Despite the decision of the Constitutional 
Court, the MoH issued a statement announcing that medical doctors 
working for public hospitals cannot open up private clinics after the time 
limit determined in the law. The TTB applied to the Council of State to 
annul the ruling of the MoH and won the case (CNN Türk, 2010). The 
Council of State declared that all medical doctors have the right to open up 
private clinics. In response, the MoH contested the earlier decision of the 
Council of State. In its new decision, the Council of State accepted the 
objection of the Ministry and decided that medical doctors with the 
exception of professors of medicine in universities cannot open up private 
clinics (Sabah, 2011c).  
Then the Council of Ministers once again issued a statutory decree 
that introduced the full time work requirement for all medical doctors in 
2011 (The Republic of Turkey, 2011b). Following the promulgation of this 
statutory decree, 1,157 medical doctors resigned from the public sector and 
246 medical doctors retired (Medimagazin, 2012). The Constitutional Court 
once again annulled the statutory decree (The Constitutional Court of 
Turkey, 2012) on the basis of the violation of procedure. In response, the 
TTB announced that the government should respect the decision of the 
Constitutional Court and respect the professional autonomy of medical 
                                                        
18  In Turkey’s political system, The Parliament is authorised to promulgate an 
Empowering Act that permits The Council of Ministers to pass a statutory decree that has 
the power of law. In this case, the Constitutional Court decided that the Empowering Act 
did not authorise the Council of Ministers to make regulations on the labour market for 
medical doctors. 
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doctors (Turkish Medical Association, 2012). In a press release published 
after the Constitutional Court annulled the law on full time work in 2012, 
the TTB made the statement below:  
 
“The insistence of the AKP government on “full time work law” is 
neither for the good of medical doctors or patients, it is a regulation for 
the good of private hospital bosses. Aim is not to encourage medical 
doctors to provide better services in public facilities or patients to 
easily access health care services, but to cheapen the labour of the 
medical doctor” (Turkish Medical Association, 2012).  
 
However, the government did not lose its determination to regulate 
the labour market for medical doctors. Instead of issuing a statutory decree, 
it introduced a new law, which prohibited those working for public sector 
providers, including universities, to run private clinics, while allowing them 
to work additionally for private hospitals under certain regulations (The 
Republic of Turkey, 2014a). By allowing medical doctors working in public 
universities to work additionally for the private sector providers but 
prohibiting them to work for their private clinics, it could be argued that 
the government made a conscious political choice in the reconfiguration of 
the health care delivery structure at the expense of private clinics. This 
decision is also in line with the prior decision of the government to exclude 
private clinics from the SGK’s health care providers’ portfolio. The circular 
that followed the law set a new time limit for medical doctors to make their 
decisions within three months (The Republic of Turkey, 2014b). The TTB 
met with the President of the Republic and the Head of the Constitutional 
Court and shared their criticisms on the new law (Mayda, 2014, Öngel, 
2014). In response to the application of MPs from the CHP, the 
Constitutional Court decided to stop the execution of the time limit, after 
which university professors would be prohibited to run their private clinics 
without leaving their positions in the universities (The Constitutional Court 
of Turkey, 2014). Finally, the Constitutional Court decided to decline the 
CHP’s application in the end of 2014 (CNN Türk, 2014), which could be 
regarded as the end of the conflict over the introduction of full time work 
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requirement for medical doctors including those working in public 
universities. 
As the brief history of the conflict between the TTB and the AK Party 
government suggests, the introduction of a full time work requirement has 
been the key issue. It could be argued that the TTB’s priority to oppose the 
full time work requirement was the result of the TTB’s defence of the self-
interests of clinic-owner medical doctors. In fact, clinic-owner medical 
doctors can be regarded as a special interest group within the community 
of medical doctors.  
Not all medical specialties are suited to opening up and profitably 
running a private clinic. As the former head of the TTB suggested, clinic-
owner medical doctors are generally obstetricians, organ transplantation 
specialists, haematologists and oncologists. He added, “They are a group 
that earns quite high levels of incomes and does not pay much taxes. Their 
number does not exceed 1000-2000” (Interview no.14). The total number of 
specialist medical doctors in Turkey in 2010 was 63,563 (The Ministry of 
Health of Turkey, 2011). If the higher estimation of the informant is 
accepted, clinic-owner medical doctors constitute only 3 per cent of all 
specialists in the country. The former head of the TTB openly expressed the 
hardship to convince clinic-owner medical doctors to work for a salary either 
in the public or in the private sector. He stated,  
 
“The TTB conducted a survey on full time work. Clinic-owner medical 
doctors abstained from proposing a certain level of salary that could 
convince them to work full time for the public sector. I asked is it 10 
thousand Turkish Liras (app. 5500 Euros), 15 thousand Turkish Liras 
(app. 8250 Euros), 20 thousand Turkish Liras (app. 11000 Euros), they 
answered me arguing if I want them to starve. Therefore it is 
impossible to satisfy this group as their expectations are that high” 
(Interview no.14).  
 
As the quotation above suggests, the leading cadre of the TTB has been 
aware of the fact that clinic-owner medical doctors constitute a privileged 
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minority within the medical community and are not prone to support the 
TTB’s ideal type public health care system.  
However, here I argue that the political opposition of the TTB is a 
synthesis of the reflection of clinic-owner medical doctors’ self-interest and 
an expression of the leading cadre’s opposition to the growing importance of 
private sector health care providers. It could be argued that the broad scope 
of the conflict originates from the issue at hand, which is the question of the 
ownership of medical doctors’ labour in a marketized health care sector. 
While the government attempts to tie medical doctors’ labour either to the 
public or private sector providers without leaving room for medical doctors 
to run their private clinics, the TTB defends medical doctors’ right to work 
independently, which in practice only serves a minority of medical doctors. 
Indeed, the depreciation of medical doctors’ salaries and the 
labefaction of the position of medical doctors in health care delivery have 
been taking place. For instance, a hospital manager of a nationwide hospital 
chain argued: 
 
“People now come to X Hospital. They used to go a specific medical 
doctor before. They used to visit a specific medical doctor in public 
hospital. … Now they directly come for our name. Recognition of our 
brand is more important than the recognition of medical doctors now” 
(Interview no.3). 
 
This statement proves that the full time work requirement for medical 
doctors might have contributed to the marginalisation of medical doctors in 
health care delivery and the proletarianisation of medical doctors. In 
addition, as the former head of the TTB suggested, after the introduction of 
cost containment measures in 2008 by the SGK, private health care 
providers decreased the salaries of medical doctors (Interview no.9).  
Despite the proved appropriateness of the TTB’s criticisms of the 
introduction of the full time work requirement, it should also be stated that 
this conflict left the TTB in a defensive position and reduced its political 
stance to the defence of the rights of medical doctors only in the eyes of the 
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general public. Given the fact that the government framed the introduction 
of the full time work requirement for medical doctors as the only way to 
decrease unjustified informal out-of-pocket payments, the defensive 
position of the TTB has been perceived as the defence of the previous status 
quo that patients suffered. One of my informants, who is a politically active 
professor of public health, criticised from within the stance of the TTB 
during public debates on full time work for medical doctors by claiming,  
 
“The TTB should not oppose the loss of the privileges of clinic-owner 
medical doctors, rather it should popularise ‘full public’ rather than 
full time work in its current meaning. … The TTB chose to explain 
itself to medical doctors only, and did not explain itself to the general 
public” (Interview no.13).  
 
As the criticism above suggests, the TTB seems to fail in popularising 
the rationale behind its opposition against the introduction of the full time 
work requirement to the general public.  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
The literature on the role of medical associations in health care politics 
has a tendency to assume that professional medical associations are 
organisations that only aim to represent the interests of medical doctors, 
which are considered similar across countries (i.e. Moran, 2000). However, 
the case of the TTB explained in this chapter challenges these assumptions. 
Despite the fact that protecting and promoting the interests of medical 
doctors is part and parcel of the TTB, the TTB’s self-description, its political 
stance with respect to health care issues, and its political discourse 
transcends the ideal-type medical association that the literature suggests. 
Drawing on a particular historical experience and situated within a specific 
health care as well as political system, the TTB aspires to promote a holistic 
approach to the right to health and works for the establishment of universal 
public health care system.  
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Second, the literature that examines the possible influence of medical 
associations in health care reform processes by focusing on the 
opportunities that a given political system provides to these associations 
(i.e. Immergut, 1992) is insufficient in understanding the influence of the 
TTB during the HTP. While the lack of the TTB’s ‘veto point’ in the political 
system limits its opportunities to influence the reform process, the TTB 
successfully challenged the government by using judicial activism, 
especially in the case of the introduction of full time work requirement for 
medical doctors. Therefore, here it is claimed that the Turkish case 
demonstrates that both the political stance and the influence of medical 
associations are rather context-specific, historically grounded and open to 
the influence of the agency of the actors under consideration. 
The TTB’s endeavour to act both as a professional organisation and a 
dissenting civil society organisation aiming to establish a universal public 
health care system for all has its practical limits. These limits include the 
limited opportunities the TTB has in its ability to appeal to the general 
public, especially when compared to the government, and the responsibility 
that the leading cadre of the TTB has towards its constituency. Given these 
limits and within an increasingly marketized health care arena, it is 
expected that the TTB might face difficulties in reconciling the rights of the 
medical doctors with citizens’ right to health care in its political strategies, 
as it did during the conflict over full time work proposal.  
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Chapter 8: Private Health Care Provider 
Organisations as New Actors in the Politics of 
Health Care 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
Until this chapter, I analysed the health care politics that led to the 
emergence of the HTP and the impact of the political actors that existed 
before the reform on the HTP. However, in line with Skocpol’s emphasis on 
the importance of ‘policy feedback’, “as politics creates policies, policies also 
remake politics” (1992, p.58). In this regard, this chapter explores how the 
HTP has changed the health care politics scene in Turkey by paving the 
way for the privatisation of health care provision. The inclusion of private 
hospitals into public health insurance plan, which can be conceptualised as 
policy layering, led to the emergence of new strong political actors, namely 
the private health care provider organisations. In doing so, this chapter 
examines the following: the emergence and the role of private health care 
provider organisations as actors in the politics of health care in Turkey, the 
discourse they employ in influencing the reform, the content of their 
demands and concerns about the reform, and the strategies they use to 
reach out the members of the government and health care bureaucracy.  
This chapter is organised into eight sections, including this 
introductory one. The second section reviews the literature on the relations 
between the state and business organisations with a special focus on studies 
conducted within the field of health care politics. The third section provides 
the review of the literature on state-business relations in case of Turkey. 
The fourth section sets background on the role of private health care 
providers in Turkey’s health care system before the launch of the HTP, and 
also explains the new direction that Turkey’s health care system has taken 
with the reform. The fifth section offers an empirical analysis of the impact 
of the reform on health care provision. Against this background, the sixth 
section explores the newly emerging actors of health care politics, namely 
private health care provider organisations. The seventh section examines 
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the discourse and strategies that private health care provider organisations 
used in order to influence the future direction of Turkey’s health care 
system. The last section, in light of the literature, provides an analysis of 
the impact of the HTP on the landscape of health care politics in Turkey, 
and how the new actors arising from the Programme influence the reform 
itself.  
Here it is argued that the privatisation of health care provision, which 
resulted from the implementation of the HTP, drastically changed the 
health care politics scene. While governments and the TTB dominated the 
health care politics scene up until the 1980s, and the WB became another 
major actor at the end of the 1980s, the HTP led to the creation of additional 
strong political actors: private health care provider groups and their 
business associations. The Private Hospitals and Health Institutions 
Association (Özel Hastaneler ve Sağlık Kuruluşları Derneği, OHSAD), 
established as a voluntary business organisation one year after the launch 
of the reform, emerged as the pioneering actor representing the private 
health care providers in health care politics. The OHSAD consolidated 
sectoral interests and also began to function as a pressure group to push 
the government to increase the role of the private sector in health care 
provision. It is argued that the relations between the OHSAD and the 
government can be better understood within the peculiar political and 
historical context of state-business relations in Turkey. 
 
8.2. Literature on the relations between the state and business 
organisations in health care politics 
 
In response to the liberal perspective that naturalises free markets, 
Polanyi suggested, “The road to the free market was opened and kept open 
by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organised and controlled 
interventionism” (2001, p.146). As discussed in the following two sections of 
this chapter, the HTP can be interpreted as the quintessential example of 
the market-constituting role of the state. The HTP created a new market, a 
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quasi-market, in health care provision by including private health care 
providers in the public health insurance plan and by providing incentives 
for the establishment of private hospitals. As discussed in the fifth and sixth 
sections of this chapter, the establishment of the market in health care 
provision and the increasing marketization of health care services had a 
substantial impact on health care politics, namely by diversifying the 
political actors in the health care politics landscape and reshuffling the 
power distribution among these actors.  
Against the thesis arguing that economic globalisation leads to the 
convergence of economic as well as social welfare policies in different 
countries, the scholars introduced the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach to demonstrate that responses of national economics to 
globalisation are path-dependent. Scholars suggest, 
 
“The varieties of capitalism approach, for example, has insisted on 
institutional inertia and path dependency to highlight the continuing 
difference between liberal market economies and coordinated market 
economies.” (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
 
Following the footsteps of the VoC approach, which is discussed earlier 
in Chapter 2, it is argued here that the Turkey’s pre-existing health care 
system, political system, and the different actors of health care politics 
significantly transformed the health care reform blueprint of the WB and 
paved the way for the HTP as we know it today.  
However, the implementation of the reform reshuffled the power 
dynamics within health care politics and changed the landscape of health 
care politics. These new actors, understood here as mainly private health 
care providers and their associations, emerged in health care politics as a 
result of the marketization dynamic that the reform created. They came 
with their own stakes and a new discourse. They came into contact with 
pre-existing actors, negotiated with the health care bureaucracy, the 
government and others and contested them in order to change the direction 
of the health care system to favour their own interests. In order to 
understand the relations between private health provider organisations 
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and other key players, as well as the influence of these organisations on 
health care policies, it is crucial to contextualise and historicise these 
relations. 
Bennett notes that the literature on the role of private health care 
providers in contemporary health care systems in developing countries has 
been under-researched (1991, p.50). In fact, the literature on the influence 
of private health care provider organisations on health care reform is not 
abundant. While the health care reform literature on developing countries 
successfully addresses the influences of international financial institutions, 
national governments, health care bureaucracy on reforms leading to 
marketization of health care services (Batley, 2004; Armada et al., 2001; 
Berman and Bossert, 2000), international epistemic communities 
(Freeman, 1999) and ‘peer dynamics’ between similar countries (Brooks, 
2005), it hardly examines private health care provider organisations as 
possibly important actors in health care reforms in the developing world.  
Giaimo and Manow’s comparative study of health care reforms in 
Britain, Germany and the United States (1999) and Giaimo’s follow-up 
study on the same countries (2005) are some of the few studies that have 
included the relationship between states and the private health care 
providers in their analysis of health care politics. Following the footsteps of 
Historical Institutionalism and using the insights of the VoC approach, 
Giaimo argues: 
 
“The reasons for these different reform outcomes lay in the specific 
constellation of actors and institutions in the political and health care 
systems of each country that underpinned the capitalist settlement in 
health care. Together, they created distinct reform politics in each 
nation that produced different mixtures of governance instruments 
and that proved more or less amenable to market solutions. Formal 
institutions and the balance of political forces in the political arena 
either granted or denied health care stakeholders entry to the policy 
process to shape reform and thus affected the capacity of governments 
to formulate and enact a radical market programme.” (Giaimo, 2005, 
p.4) 
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As the quote above suggests, Giaimo successfully contextualises the 
politics of health care; she invites the students of health care politics to see 
the diversity of political actors, examine the power dynamics between these 
actors, and locate them within a political system. While Giaimo comes up 
with strictly institutionalist conclusions, such as claiming that single-party 
governments in centralised political systems are free to unilaterally decide 
the terms of the health care reform (2005, p.195), she also underlines the 
agency of the interest groups (i.e. organisational characteristics of interest 
groups and the capacity of interest groups to take collective action) that may 
challenge the institutional barriers that block their access to decision-
making mechanisms (Giaimo, 2005, p.196). Similarly, in Giaimo and 
Manow’s co-authored article, they questioned the static analysis of 
institutionalism and argued that arguments based on the power of political 
systems to shape each political actor’s influence on policy outcomes (i.e. 
Immergut, 1992) do not help scholars to examine the exact direction that 
health care systems take after the reform (Giaimo and Manow, 1999, p.993). 
Therefore, their suggestion for students of health care politics is to 
take the pre-existing institutional context that shapes the politics without 
underestimating the power of existing actors to make a change. As Giaimo 
and Manow argues, 
 
“Policy makers have had to anticipate the views of key health care 
actors in the reform debates and have tailored their reform policies to 
fit the existing institutional configuration of their given health care 
system. In addition, sectoral institutions may provide or deny 
government actors leverage over, and links to, health care providers 
and payers. These linkages, in turn, affect state capacity to intervene 
in the health sector, to shape market forces in health care, and to take 
a leading role in the project of reform” (Giaimo and Manow, 1999, 
pp.993-994). 
 
As the quote above suggests, non-state actors might have an influence 
on state capacity to introduce and implement specific reforms. Therefore, it 
can be suggested that the merit of Giaimo and Manow’s perspective lies in 
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its ability to relativize the power of policy makers and situate them within 
a set of other political actors.  
Despite its emphasis on the multiplicity of political actors in health 
care politics, Giaimo’s approach does not call for analysis based upon a 
pluralist understanding of politics. While politics create markets, as Polanyi 
suggested, markets also shape politics. When an actor gains economic 
power in the health care market, his or her economic power can translate 
into political power in health care politics. Giaimo argues that it is crucial 
to examine the inter-linkages between the health sector and health care 
politics in order to understand the power basis of each political actor. In her 
own words, she explains this inter-linkage between the health sector and 
health care politics as follows: 
 
“However, the political arena tells only part of the story of health care 
reform. A full explanation requires that we look also at the health 
sector itself and its interplay with the political arena. Thus, existing 
policies and institutional arrangements in the health sector both 
created and reinforced certain expectations on the part of the public 
and stakeholders as to the appropriateness of state intervention in the 
health sector.” (Giaimo, 2005, p.4) 
 
Another of Giaimo’s contributions to the study of health care politics 
is her emphasis on the on-going political conflicts in the post-legislative 
process of health care reforms and even after the failure of a reform effort 
(2005, p.196). Giaimo’s abovementioned insight is in line with the Historical 
Institutionalist scholars’ emphasis on the impact of policies on politics, or 
‘the policy feedback’ (Pierson, 1993). Taking this insight into consideration 
is especially important in understanding the role of private health care 
providers and their associations in health care politics in Turkey, as the 
creation and influence of these actors came after and as a result of the 
implementation of the reform.  
While political scientists only focus on the legislative victories and 
failures in investigating the politics during health care reforms, Giaimo 
underlines the fact that political contestations continue after the 
promulgation of key legislations, and these contestations can be as powerful 
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as pre-legislative ones in terms of their impacts on policy outcomes. Jacobs 
and Skocpol’s study on the case of the health care politics during President 
Obama’s health care reform also indicates that the legislative victory in a 
health care reform is not the finish line for political contestations between 
different political actors. Instead, a victory can ignite new contestations, 
which may have the power to fundamentally change the direction of the 
health care system in the future (Jacobs and Skocpol, 2010, p.7).   
 
8.3. Literature on the relations between the state and business 
organisations in health care politics in Turkey 
 
In light of the insights in the above-mentioned literature, one has to 
look closely at the historical and political structures of the state-business 
relations in Turkey in order to understand the actual contestations and 
negotiations that have been taking place among private health care 
providers, their organisations, and the government. 
Relations between the state, governments, and business in Turkey are 
rather complex. Historically, Turkey’s bourgeoisie has been a product of the 
nation-state making process. One of the major objectives of the newly 
founded Republic of Turkey was to give birth to “the national bourgeoisie” 
that would replace the non-Muslim and non-Turkish bourgeoisie of the late 
Ottoman period. Therefore, it could be argued that Turkey’s bourgeoisie 
owes its very existence to the state.  
After the establishment of the Republic, the bureaucracy contributed 
to the emergence of a domestic manufacturing bourgeoisie and allied with 
it in pursuing import-substituting industrial developmentalist policies 
(Keyder, 1987, pp.129-137). As the state had the upper hand, the ability of 
the business community to formulate its interest independent from the 
state remained restricted. In line with the corporatist ethos of the first 
three-quarters of the 20th century, Heper suggests that all of the business 
community organisations in Turkey were either directly established by the 
state or with the support of the state (1991, p.15). The establishment of the 
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Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) in 1950 by 
law exemplified this trend.  
However, the fact that business organisations were closely associated 
with and controlled by the state did not mean that the business community 
did not negotiate its interests. As Heper argues, negotiations between the 
business community and the state did not operate through institutional 
channels; “Individual members of the private sector often by-passed their 
interest group associations and attempted establishing clientele relations 
with government officials” (1991, p.17). Therefore, clientelism and 
particularism had been the main characteristics of the relations between 
the state, governments, and the business community. While governments 
supported the capital accumulation of the business community, they never 
welcomed the participation of business organisations in public policy 
making processes (Buğra, 1997, p.324) or the use of an interest-based 
discourse by business organisations (Buğra, 1997, p.355). In response, 
Buğra argues, while Turkish businessmen perceived the state as the main 
source of uncertainty in the growth of the private sector, they were also well 
aware that they owed their acquired social statuses to the state. Therefore, 
businessmen in Turkey did not call for a ‘free market’ economy but rather 
always asked the state to closely cooperate with the private sector (Buğra, 
1997, p.176). 
There were attempts from the business community to formulate its 
own class interests relatively autonomously from the state by coming 
together under the umbrella of voluntary organisations. Established in 
1961, TİSK was the first voluntary organisation of the business community. 
However, big industrialists were not content with the representation 
structure of TİSK, which distributed power in favour of small and medium 
sized companies like TOBB. As a result, the TÜSİAD was established in 
1971. TÜSİAD “is the first example of an explicit interest group that is 
voluntary” (Esmer, 1991, p.132). Esmer suggests that big industrialists 
established TÜSİAD because they felt that they were not as powerful as 
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they deserved in TOBB and TİSK according to their power in the market 
(1991, p.133).  
While TÜSİAD proved to be politically effective in developing a class 
agenda that could be more confrontational then corporatist business 
organisations like TOBB, Esmer underlines the fact that the TÜSİAD 
always sought public legitimacy in its public statements by aiming to 
reconcile its interests with general social interests (1991, p.133). Similarly, 
Buğra states that the narratives of Turkish businessmen were almost 
apologetic with respect to their quest for capital accumulation and even 
businessmen themselves felt uneasy about the social legitimacy of working 
for material gains (1997, p.42).  
Nevertheless, the birth of TÜSİAD could hardly break the clientelistic 
relations between individual businessmen and the state. The state 
continued not to recognise TÜSİAD as an institution of mediation between 
the state and big business. Instead, the state continued to deal with 
individual businessmen, which in turn disempowered the legitimacy and 
representative power of TÜSİAD within the business community (Buğra, 
1997, p.349). Buğra and Savaşkan explain the nature of state-business 
relations in Turkey before 1980 as follows: 
 
“The Turkish business environment was characterised, first and 
foremost, by the nature of the relations between the government and 
big business, which were carried outside the frame of organised 
interest representation. The relations of the latter with the 
government were characterised by particularism and clientelism, but 
were also rife with tensions. To the extent that one can see these two 
parties as partners in development, the dominant partner was surely 
the one holding the political power” (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p.10). 
 
Yalman questions Buğra and Savaşkan’s claim that those holding the 
political power had more power than the business community. 
Alternatively, Yalman suggests that the fact that the state in Turkey 
always acted in favour of the business community in its economic policies 
might well prove the strength of the bourgeoisie rather than its relative 
impotency (2009, p.344). While Yalman’s theoretical argument might be 
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valid in understanding the relationship between the state and the business 
in the long term, it is hardly useful in an empirical analysis of interactions 
between the state and the business community, conflicts within the 
business community, and the formulation of “business interests” in a 
specific sector and within a particular historical and political context.  
In response, Buğra and Savaşkan come up with a perspective that 
enables an empirical yet historically grounded analysis of state-business 
relations and demonstrates how market actors might well define their 
political interests that transcend their short-term market interests: 
 
“Individual economic gain does not seem to be a sufficient motive to 
explain the broader scope and underpinnings of the relations among 
the actors involved. In the Turkish case, these relations were part of a 
politically guided process of class transformation that reshaped and 
influenced the configuration of business interests and the interface 
between economic power and the political influence of the private 
sector. The interaction was situated in networks that brought business 
actors together with the government and operated according to a logic 
that extended beyond economic concerns and, in certain cases, even 
conflicted with efforts to maximise short-term private economic 
interests” (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p.77).  
 
As the above quote suggests, Buğra and Savaşkan note that individual 
economic gain, which is apparently crucial for the sustainability of the 
business, is not the only motive that drives the business community. 
However, the inter-linkages between the business community and the state 
might require the business community to go against its immediate economic 
gains for achieving a greater goal, which Buğra and Savaşkan conceptualise 
as “the politically guided process of class transformation” (2014, p.12). 
Therefore, rather than searching for the dominant partner in state-business 
relations, scholars suggest investigating “a form of interaction that involves 
a mutual dependency between the government and the business” (Buğra 
and Savaşkan, 2014, p.12).  
In their analysis of state-business relations in the AK Party period, 
Buğra and Savaşkan come up with four significant conclusions. First, they 
argue that particularism is still salient in government-big business 
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relations (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p.109), which is hardly mediated by 
business associations (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p.12). Second, voluntary 
business associations gained more power than before, which should be 
taken into consideration (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p.109). Third, they 
suggest “the state might not only form the market, but also the market 
actors themselves through the processes of politically supported capital 
accumulation and business development” (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, 
p.170). In other words, the state has a significant role in giving birth to the 
market actors and distributing power within the market. Fourth, scholars 
underline that the provision of health care services had been one of the 
sectors where the state created markets and gave birth to new market 
actors (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p.92). 
In light of this review, this chapter investigates the following: how and 
to what extent the objective of increasing private sector involvement in 
health care provision could be put into practice with the HTP in Turkey, 
how this process changed the political landscape in the domain of health 
care, what kind of political conflicts have risen during the implementation 
of this measure, and how and to what extent have these political conflicts 
been solved (or not solved).  
 
8.4. Private health care providers in Turkey’s health care 
system: A brief history and the Health Transformation 
Programme 
 
Before the reform was launched in 2003, health care provision in 
Turkey had been dominated by public hospitals and public health centres. 
Yet as discussed in Chapter 3, public facilities failed to provide sufficient 
services for the size of the population. Furthermore, the geographical 
distribution of these services had been unbalanced, and primary health care 
services did not function as the first stop for patients.  
Along with the domination of the public sector in health care provision, 
private clinics of medical doctors also played an important role in the 
 208 
 
structure of health care provision before the reform. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, medical doctors had the privilege to open their 
own private clinics and work for their clinics alongside their duties in public 
hospitals. In a health care system that failed to provide sufficient services 
for all and offered relatively low salaries for medical doctors, the presence 
of dual practice opened up the system to informality. People willing to cut 
in the waiting line visited the private clinics of medical doctors before and 
during their treatments in public hospitals and sometimes made table 
payments to medical doctors before undergoing an operation. Given the 
eclectic structure of health care provision before the reform, Turkey’s health 
care provision structure could be categorised as a publicly dominated one 
that had strong informally commodified elements in it.   
In the early days of the Republic of Turkey, private hospitals were 
established and operated by minorities and foreigners, which constituted a 
marginal element of health care delivery. The promulgation of the Private 
Hospitals Act provided them a legal status and introduced the regulations 
they had to comply with (The Republic of Turkey, 1933). During the 1960s 
and 1970s, the private sector in health care provision was comprised of 
private clinics of medical doctors and small sized laboratory and radioscopy 
services (Temel, 2003, p.4). In the aftermath of the military coup in 1980, 
which oppressed political opposition to the liberalisation of Turkish 
economy, the Turkish economy began marching towards liberalisation and 
an externally oriented growth strategy.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the change in the country’s macroeconomic 
policy was reflected in the domain of social policies, which manifested itself 
in the commencement of a political agenda promoting more private sector 
involvement in education and health care services. In line with the global 
wave of health care reform described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, 
governments started to adopt a new language within which health services 
began to be called a “health sector” after the 1980s (Ersoy, 1998). In fact, 
governments introduced economic incentives for the private sector to invest 
in health care provision (Günal, 2008). This policy started to bring results 
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in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the rise of the share of private sector 
presence, first in outpatient and then in inpatient services (Temel, 2003, 
p.4; Belek et al., p.1998). At a time of low levels of public investment in 
health care, the share of the private sector in the total volume of investment 
to health care services exceeded that of the public sector in the early 1990s 
(Soyer, 2005). 
Despite the emergence of private hospitals in the 1980s, it should be 
noted that the scope of private health care provision remained quite limited 
up until the implementation of the HTP. Private hospitals established 
between the 1980s and the early 2000s were based in metropolitan cities 
and primarily served prosperous citizens; private health insurance coverage 
did not exceed one per cent of the total population.  
One of my interviewees, who established a medium-sized private 
hospital in the early 1990s and still runs it, succinctly summarised the state 
of private hospitals before the mid-2000s:   
 
“There was almost no connection between private hospitals and the 
public sector before 2000. We were generally catering those not 
covered by public social security or having money. I am talking about 
the structure in Istanbul. There was really a very powerless structure 
in Anatolia (Author’s note: Anatolia here refers to Turkey except 
Istanbul)” (Interview no.24). 
 
Against this background, the HTP symbolised a new era for the private 
sector in the provision of health care services. First of all, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, the Urgent Action Plan of the first AK Party government 
declared that one of the government’s main objectives in health care was to 
provide incentives for the private sector to invest in health care (The 
Republic of Turkey, 2003, p.11). Despite the vague expression in the Urgent 
Action Plan, the HTP explicitly stated that the Programme will deliver 
“competition in service provision” and the MoH will be restructured in order 
to take up planning and controlling responsibilities (Ministry of Health of 
the Republic of Turkey, 2003, pp.26-27). Similarly, the WB project, which 
aimed to support the success of the Programme, set the transformation of 
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the MoH from a provider body to a controlling and planning agency as the 
first indicator of success of the project (World Bank, 2010, iii). Finally, as 
noted in Chapter 6, Prime Minister Erdoğan openly declared, “Free markets 
should also be established in health care” (Hürriyet, 2006). Indeed, as 
Ağartan suggested, the market direction of the HTP has been most visible 
in the provision dimension of the Programme (Ağartan, 2012, p.465).  
Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, the government began to use the 
Public Private Partnerships model in the construction and operation of 
public hospitals (The Republic of Turkey, 2005).19 With the objective of 
finding an alternative way of financing the extension of health care services 
rather than increasing the public expenditures in a short period of time, the 
government seeks private investment in health care provision through the 
introduction of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in the establishment of 
large hospital complexes, namely “city hospitals” (şehir hastaneleri). In 
return for the private companies’ investments in the construction of the 
hospital complexes, the government offers these companies the right to 
contractually operate all non-medical services for 49 years. Construction 
companies expressed interest in these projects. Given that the 
implementation of PPPs in the construction of large public hospital 
complexes had been recently initiated, this chapter does not examine the 
case of PPPs in the construction of large public hospital complexes and the 
operation of non-medical services in these complexes by the private sector.  
                                                        
19 In Turkey, PPPs have been increasingly used after 1980s in different sectors ranging 
from the construction of highways to the production and distribution of electricity. Earlier 
forms of PPPs in Turkey had been in line with the Build-Operate Model and the Build-
Operate-Transfer Model. In the aftermath of the promulgation of the memorandum 
allowing public hospitals to purchase non-medical services from the market by the Ministry 
of Health in 1985, the first use of PPPs in Turkey’s health care sector has been in the 
procurement of non-medical services in public hospitals including catering, maintenance, 
security etc. Following this, PPPs have been extended to the diagnostic services in public 
hospitals. In the form of a Setup-Transfer-Operate model, private investors have been 
allowed to set up diagnostic machinery (i.e. computed tomography (CT), magnetic 
resonance (MR)) in public hospitals and operate the diagnostic services for a specific period 
of time, later transfer the ownership of the machine to the hospital. Please look at TEKIN, 
P. Ş. 2012. Public-private partnerships and the health care sector. Turkish Review, 2, 48-
55. 
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The government decided to integrate private hospitals 20  into the 
public health insurance plan in 2005, which could be considered the next 
step after the purchaser and provider functions were split in the health care 
system. Before the reform, for instance, the SSK used to function as an 
insurance body for blue-collar workers, and also owned and operated 
hospitals serving this constituency. Once all public hospitals had been 
transferred to the MoH with the objective of giving them financial and 
administrative autonomy in the future, the government began to implement 
one of the key objectives of the HTP: fostering competition in the provision 
of health care services. 
The integration of private hospitals into the public health insurance 
plan works in the following way. The SGK annually sets fees for services to 
be provided by private hospitals in the form of Health Implementation 
Statements. If interested, private hospitals sign Service Procurement 
Agreements with the SGK. Once annual agreements are set between 
private hospitals and the Institution, every citizen of Turkey (who does not 
have any premium debts to the Institution) has the choice to receive health 
care services from private hospitals. As mentioned before, there is no 
working referral system in Turkey’s health care system. Therefore, citizens 
are not required to apply first for general practitioners (or family 
                                                        
20 Foundation university hospitals constitute a grey area in the study of the role of private 
hospitals in Turkey’s health care system. In the Turkish higher education system, it is 
legally prohibited to establish private universities, thus private university hospitals. 
Alternatively, the Turkish higher education system allows the establishment of foundation 
universities and foundation university hospitals. In theory, both these universities and 
their hospitals are not allowed to work for profit. The legal status of foundation universities 
and their hospitals is vague since it renders some privileges to foundation hospitals that 
public institutions have without authorising them with all privileges of the public 
institutions. On the one hand, hospitals by foundation universities are not under the direct 
control of the state but instead are administered by the private foundation’s board of 
trustees. On the other hand, these institutions, which are affiliated with the Higher 
Education Council, enjoy privileges that public institutions traditionally enjoy. From the 
perspective of the patients, however, hospitals of foundation universities are private 
hospitals because they charge additional payments like private hospitals. Therefore, for 
the purpose of this study, hospitals of foundation universities might be considered a form 
of private hospitals. However, in the official data, hospitals of foundation universities are 
categorised under the category of “university hospitals” as public university hospitals are 
categorised. Due to this problem, the official categorisation is used in the data presented 
in the following section.  
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physicians, as they have been called in Turkey’s health care system since 
the reform). In addition, no other restriction has been imposed upon citizens 
in choosing the hospital they want to apply (i.e. geographical restriction).  
However, citizens may be required to make additional payments to top 
up their public health insurance if they apply to private hospitals. Private 
hospitals are legally authorised to charge the patients in order to subsidise 
their own services. Two factors influence the rate of additional payments. 
The first of these factors is that the SGK determines the cap of additional 
payments. However, this cap varies according to where the specific hospital 
stands in a ranking by the MoH on the quality of health care services 
provided. Therefore, one has to make additional payment to access private 
hospitals, but has to make larger payments in order to access better quality 
private hospitals. As a result, I argued elsewhere that the introduction of 
additional payments and the inclusion of private hospitals into the public 
health insurance plan strengthened income-based inequalities in access to 
health care services (Yılmaz, 2013).  
Similar to the integration of private hospitals into the public health 
insurance system, the HTP also aimed to turn the MoH into a stewardship 
agency rather than a provider of health care services. With the transfer of 
all publicly owned health facilities to the MoH,21 the Ministry became the 
owner of the overwhelming majority of public health care providers in the 
country, the only exception being public university hospitals. However, 
transforming the MoH into a stewardship agency and granting financial 
and administrative autonomy to public hospitals could not happen as easily 
as the integration of private hospitals into the system. Finally, as the new 
legal changes were enacted, the transformation of the Ministry’s role from 
                                                        
21 Despite the dominance of the insurance-based social security system in Turkey, social 
security institutions (Social Insurances Institution for blue collar workers, Retirement 
Fund for civil servants and the Pension Fund for the Self-Employed for farmers and the 
self-employed) did not enjoy financial and administrative autonomy in practice. Despite 
the resistance of trade unions against the transfer of health facilities owned by these 
pension and health insurance funds as a part of the Health Transformation Programme, 
the government could make the transfer possible without receiving much criticism from 
the general constituency. 
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provision to stewardship began, and “public hospital unions” were 
established (The Republic of Turkey, 2011).22 
 
8.5. The state of the private sector in health care provision 
after the reform 
 
Turkey’s new health care system, as described in the previous section, 
redrew the boundaries of the private sector in the delivery of health care 
services in Turkey. In addition to the inclusion of private hospitals into the 
public health insurance plan, government incentives for the establishment 
of private hospitals continued. The IFC also financially supported selected 
large hospital chains from the beginning of the reform process 
(International Finance Corporation, 2012; International Finance 
Corporation, 2007; Joseph, 2006; Albawaba, 2003), which increased the 
presence of private hospitals in health care provision. Before discussing the 
politics of the integration of private hospitals into public health insurance, 
this section demonstrates how and to what extent the role of the private 
sector in health care delivery has changed in the last decade of health 
reform. 
The HTP clearly led to an increase in the number of private hospitals 
and the share of private hospitals out of all hospitals in the country. Table 
1 shown below evidences this. 
 
 
                                                        
22 According to the new configuration, all public hospitals are transformed into autonomous 
“public hospital unions” in order to foster competition between private hospitals and public 
hospital unions as well as among these unions. The TKHK was founded as a new 
department of the Ministry of Health in charge of establishing new public hospitals and 
administering the health care services in public hospitals. While this configuration did not 
provide full autonomy of public hospitals, as the head institution is still directly part of the 
Ministry, this step could be examined as the first step in experimenting with autonomy of 
public hospitals. The main difference between public hospitals and newly established 
public hospitals unions is in their management structures. While chief medical doctors 
administered the state hospitals before, managers who were employed on contract for two 
or three years administer public hospital unions. Unlike life-long positions of medical 
doctors working for public hospitals, these managers can be fired and replaced by a new 
manager. 
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Table 1. Number of hospitals  
 
(The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2012, p.121) 
 
As the table above suggests, the number of private hospitals nearly 
doubled after the launch of the HTP. While the number of private hospitals 
drastically increased, the rate of increase of other hospital types did not 
reach the rate of increase in the number of private hospitals.  
Another indicator of the increasing role of the private sector in the 
provision of health care services is the increasing number of beds in private 
hospitals. Table 2 shown below designates these figures. 
 
Table 2. Bed capacity in different hospital types 
 
(The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2012, p.64) 
 
As the table above indicates, bed capacity of private hospitals almost 
tripled since the start of the health care reform. Similarly, bed capacity of 
both public and university hospitals increased in this time frame. Yet the 
rate of increase in the bed capacity of these hospital types remained far 
below that of private hospitals.  
Table 3 shown below demonstrates the changes in the share of the 
number of beds in different hospital types in proportion to the total number 
of hospitals beds. 
 
Table 3. Share of bed capacity/total bed capacity for different hospital types  
 
Calculated by the author using (The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2012, p.64) 
 
2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Public 774 767 848 847 834 843 840
University 50 56 56 57 59 62 65
Private 271 331 365 400 450 489 503
Other 61 49 48 46 46 45 45
Total 1156 1203 1317 1350 1389 1439 1453
2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Public 107394 110819 112037 114428 115443 120180 121297
University 26341 31193 30978 29912 30112 35001 34802
Private 12387 14639 17397 20983 25178 28063 31648
Other 18349 17691 17588 17905 17905 16995 6757
Total 164471 174342 178000 183228 188638 200239 194504
2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Public 65,3 63,6 62,9 62,5 61,2 60,0 62,4
University 16,0 17,9 17,4 16,3 16,0 17,5 17,9
Private 7,5 8,4 9,8 11,5 13,3 14,0 16,3
Other 11,2 10,1 9,9 9,8 9,5 8,5 3,5
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As the table above designates, the largest change in the share of bed 
capacity occurred in private hospitals. While the share of bed capacity in 
private hospitals more than doubled since the launch of the health care 
reform, the share of bed capacity in public hospitals in proportion to the 
total bed capacity in the country experienced a slight decrease of roughly 3 
per cent. University hospitals, which include hospitals of foundation 
universities, also increased their share of bed capacity in this time period, 
yet with a small increase of approximately 2 per cent. Table 1, 2 and 3 
clearly suggest that privatisation, though not in the form of direct transfer 
of public hospitals into the private sector, has been increasing in the 
provision of health care services.  
While figures on the number of hospitals, bed capacity and the share 
of bed capacity are demonstrative of the major trends in health care delivery 
structure, it is also important to look at the amount of applications that 
different hospital types receive. Table 4 below indicates this change. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of total applications to hospitals by type of health care 
providers 
 
Calculated by the author using (The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2012, p.64)23 
 
As shown in the table above, although some scholars argue that the 
share of private provision is low overall (Ağartan, 2012, p.467), private 
hospitals received more than one-fourth of all applications to health 
institutions in 2011.  
As the HTP made the SGK the single payer of health care services and 
included private hospitals into the public health insurance plan, 24  the 
                                                        
23 Unfortunately, no data is available for years before 2008. This data has been requested 
from the Ministry of Health, yet the Ministry did not respond. 
24  For more information, please look at AGARTAN, T. I. 2012. Marketization and 
universalism: Crafting the right balance in the Turkish health care system. Current 
Sociology, 60, pp.456-471, YILMAZ, V. 2013. Changing Origins of Inequalities in Access to 
Healthcare in Turkey: From Occupational Status to Income? New Perspectives on Turkey, 
2008 2009 2010 2011
Public sector 67,1 66,3 66,2 65,1
University 6,6 6,8 7,9 8,0
Private sector 26,3 26,9 25,8 27,0
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Institution began to transfer financial resources for all these hospital types 
in return for the services they provided. It should be noted that the share of 
expenditures made for health care services has been on the rise since 2002. 
Table 5 below shows the changes in the breakdown of the SGK’s 
expenditures according to different hospital types. 
 
Table 5. Breakdown of the expenditures of the SGK according to different 
hospital types 
 
Figures of 2002 and 2006 were calculated by the author using (Sönmez, 2011, p.60). Figures 
of 2009, 2010 and 2011 were calculated by the author using (The Social Security Institution 
of Turkey, 2012). 
 
Table 5 above indicates that the largest increase in the share of funds 
transferred to different hospital types occurred in private hospitals. While 
the SGK spent 14 per cent of its total expenditures for health care services 
in private hospitals in 2002, the share of its expenditures for private 
hospitals increased to 28.2 per cent in 2011. Despite a more than 10 per cent 
decline in the share of expenditures made for public hospitals, these 
expenditures still constitute more than half of the SGK’s total expenditures 
for health care services. 
The breakdown of figures of total investment in health care according 
to the investment of public and private sectors suggests that the private 
sector has the potential to increase its role in health care delivery in the 
future. As mentioned before, the share of the private sector in the total 
volume of investment in health care services exceeded that of the public 
sector in the early 1990s (Soyer, 2005). The share of private investments in 
health care provision between 2006 and 2010 roughly constituted two-
                                                        
48, pp.53-75. YILMAZ, V. (2013). "Changing Origins of Inequalities in Access to Healthcare 
in Turkey: From Occupational Status to Income?" New Perspectives on Turkey48: pp.53-75. 
 
 
2002 2006 2009 2010 2011
Public sector 64,2 64,0 51,8 52,1 52,3
University 21,8 15,6 19,1 20,3 19,5
Private sector 14,0 20,4 29,1 27,6 28,2
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thirds of total investments made in health care provision (Sönmez, 2011, 
pp.71-72).  
One should note that private health care providers constitute a 
heterogeneous group. Three types of variation within private hospitals can 
be identified. These variations include: private hospitals established before 
the reform or after the reform, different sizes of private hospitals, and 
whether private hospitals have a foreign capital component.  
First, the HTP encouraged the establishment of new private hospitals. 
While the private hospital sector established in the pre-reform period was 
concentrated in metropolitan cities and served only the top quintiles of the 
income distribution, newly emerging private hospitals substantially 
increased capacity, spread all over the country, and began to serve middle-
income patients. These two hospital groups differ from one another on the 
basis of the source of their main revenues. While the major source of 
revenue for most pre-reform private hospitals is out-of-pocket payments of 
high-income individuals and private health insurance companies (for the 
list of leading private health insurance companies in Turkey please look at 
Sönmez, 2011, pp.67-68), the major source of revenue for most private 
hospitals established after the reform is the public health insurance fund 
and contributory payments made by public insurees.  
Second, there are different sizes of private hospitals in the sector. 
Table 6 shown below designates the diversity in the sizes of private 
hospitals on the basis of their bed capacities for the year 2010. 
 
Table 6. Sizes of private hospitals 
 
(Sönmez, 2011, p.75). 
 
As Table 6 above indicates, the private hospital sector is a diverse one 
in terms of its bed capacities. Private hospitals with capacities up to 49 beds 
Bed capacity No. of hospitals No. of beds Share of hospitals Share of beds
200-600 10 2791 2 9,9
100-199 58 7374 11,8 26,2
50-99 137 9215 28 32,7
0-49 285 8767 58,2 31,1
Total 490 28147 100 100
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constitute more than half of the sector in terms of their numbers. However, 
their bed capacity constitutes approximately 31 per cent of total bed 
capacity in private hospitals. At the top end of the spectrum, only 10 private 
hospitals have a bed capacity of more than 200 beds. While the share of 
hospitals in this cluster stands at only 2 per cent, the share of bed capacity 
in these hospitals constitutes almost 10 per cent of total bed capacity in 
private hospitals.  
By providing an overview of the different sizes of private hospitals, this 
table only offers a snapshot of the sector at one point time. News stories (i.e. 
Doğu, 2010) suggest that there is a concentration tendency in the private 
hospital sector. This sector has become home to private hospital groups (i.e. 
Acıbadem Health Group) that have been listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (Sönmez, 2011, p.74). Given that the economic rationale of the 
SGK’s current pricing system for private hospitals depends on the logic of 
gaining from high demand, chain hospitals benefit most from this system, 
as they have the ability to use economies of scale. If the current pricing 
system remains intact in the near future, this will further increase pressure 
upon private hospitals to form hospital chains or join one of the existing 
ones.  
Foreign direct investment in private hospitals sector might result in a 
variation within the sector. Table 7 below demonstrates the total amount of 
foreign direct investment in the health care sector as a whole. 
 
Table 7. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in health care 
 
(The Ministry of Economy of Turkey, 2012, p.14) 
 
As the table suggests, the share of foreign direct investment in 
Turkey’s health care sector (both the pharmaceutical and private hospital 
sector) in total FDI per year oscillated between 0.9 per cent and 1.8 per cent 
between 2006 and 2011. While 111 million dollars was invested in the 
health care sector in Turkey in 2010, investment increased to 232 million 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total FDI in health care services (million dollars)265 177 149 106 111 232
Total FDI (million dollars) 17639 19137 14747 6252 6238 15703
Share of FDI in health care 1,5 0,9 1,0 1,7 1,8 1,5
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dollars in 2011 (The Ministry of Economy of Turkey, 2012, p.4). Despite the 
fact that this increase is substantial, a breakdown of this investment into 
different sectors of health care is required to make sensible conclusions 
about this increase.  
Interviewees had conflicting views on the potential of the private 
hospital sector to attract foreign direct investment. For instance, one of my 
interviewees, who is a professor of public health, argued: 
 
“It is logical to expect the flow of foreign direct investment to go to the 
hospital sector in the coming period. If health complexes with 
thousands of bed capacity (referring to the city hospitals that will be 
constructed as PPPs) are established as promised by the government, 
I think it will not be possible for the national capital in Turkey to 
operate these hospitals by itself, and such a scale in the hospital sector 
will whet foreign hospital chains’ appetite” (Interview no.13). 
 
In fact, mergers between domestic hospital groups and international 
health care groups started to occur. For instance, one of the most well 
known mergers in the health care delivery sector was the International 
Heath Care Holding’s purchase of 75 per cent of Turkey’s Acıbadem Group’s 
stocks at the end of 2011 (Habertürk, 2011). 
An overview of the private hospital sector after a decade of health care 
reform suggests that the reform clearly resulted in the expansion of the role 
of the private sector in health care provision. Once a marginal component 
of the health care delivery structure, private hospitals have reached a 
significant capacity. This is evident as they receive roughly one-fourth of all 
applications to health care institutions. In return for their services, the SGK 
started to transfer more than one-fourth of its total expenditures for health 
care services to private hospitals.  
Given the fact that the level of private investment in health care 
provision exceeded the level of public investments even before the HTP, it 
could be argued that this might increase the rate of the already rapidly 
expanding role of the private sector in Turkey’s health care provision and 
imply passive privatisation.  
 220 
 
Domestic capital has dominated the private hospital sector until today. 
Due to the SGK’s pricing policy, one could observe a concentration tendency 
in the sector. However, with the exception of small number of mergers 
between domestic hospital groups and international hospital groups, there 
is still no significant change in the share of inflow in the health care sector 
in total FDI.  
Finally, the analysis of the impact of the reform on private health care 
providers made in this section demonstrates that the reform led to the 
emergence of a new cluster of private health care providers that depend on 
the revenues from the SGK and contributory payments from public 
insurees. This dependency relationship between the state and the new 
business created by the reform seems to echo the insights provided by 
scholars working on state-business relations in Turkey, which is discussed 
in the following sections. 
 
8.6. The birth of new actors in health care politics: private 
health care provider organisations 
 
After the expansion of the private sector’s role in the delivery of health 
care services, private health care providers started to organise. 
Organisation of private health care providers might be seen as a necessity 
to negotiate with the government (the Council of Ministers) and the two 
strong state institutions, namely the SGK and the MoH. In fact, private 
hospital owners established working groups within national business 
organisations and founded their sectoral business organisations, which 
have increasingly become involved in the debates on the developments in 
the domain of health care policies.  
However, channels for institutionalised dialogue with non-
governmental stakeholders, including private health care provider 
organisations, are limited. Even in cases of inclusion of non-governmental 
stakeholders into specific policy making mechanisms, their representation 
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remains symbolic. Therefore, the interaction between private health care 
providers and the government is not an exception to this rule. 
Among the organisations of private health care providers, three 
organisations stand out as key players: the Health Sector Committee of the 
TÜSİAD, the Health Sector Union of The Union of Chamber and 
Commodity Exchanges, and the OHSAD. 
The Union of Chamber and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) was 
founded in 1950 by law. In the corporatist structure of Turkey’s political 
system, TOBB served as the highest representative of the private sector. 
The Health Sector Union of TOBB was established in 2008. Following the 
corporatist legacy of TOBB, membership of the Union is composed not only 
of leading private hospitals in Turkey but also related high-level state 
officials and representatives of voluntary organisations of private health 
care providers. In addition, the Health Sector Union of TOBB represents 
private health care providers with one representative in the Planning of 
Human Resources in the MoH and the Classification Committee in the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security. As explained by one of my 
interviewees, who served as the head of the Health Sector Union of TOBB, 
the Union uses all legal channels for lobbying in order to influence the 
preparation of laws on the health sector. These channels include, but are 
not limited to, the arrangement of meetings with the bureaucrats from key 
ministries, sharing their opinions with the members of the Council of 
Ministers, presenting their views in the Parliamentary Committees, and 
working with MPs in order to make necessary changes to the upcoming 
legal regulations in the General Assembly of the Parliament (Interview 
no.10).  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, TÜSİAD is Turkey’s most 
powerful voluntary business association that represents the largest 
enterprises in Turkey’s economy. TÜSİAD has a Commission on Social 
Policies, under which the Health Sector Committee operates. However, this 
Committee does not work as a representative body. Instead it functions as 
an expert group that prepares and publishes reports on health care policies, 
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including policy recommendations. For instance, the Health Sector 
Committee published a policy report titled “Charting the Way Forward: 
Health Care Reform in Turkey” (Turkish Industralists' and Businessmen's 
Association, 2005), which argued for the introduction of compulsory public 
health insurance for the entire population but with an opt-out option for 
those having incomes above a specified threshold. The report also supported 
an increase in the role of private health care providers as well as the 
recognition of greater financial and administrative autonomy for public 
hospitals (Turkish Industralists' and Businessmen's Association, 2005, 
pp.19-35). 
In addition to the growing interest in health care and establishment of 
committees within national business organisations, private hospital owners 
and hospital managers began to establish their own voluntary sectoral 
associations (i.e. the Association of Health Managers in Turkey and the 
Aegean Health Institutions Association) or revitalise other organisations 
that existed before the reform (i.e. the OHSAD). All of these business 
organisations can be categorised as interest groups in the classical meaning 
of the concept.  
Among these organisations, the OHSAD has been the most active. The 
OHSAD is a product of a working group that was initiated in 1991. It was 
later established as an association in 2004. The Private Hospitals 
Association, Health Institutions Association, Touristic Regions’ Health 
Institutions Association and South Eastern Anatolia Private Health 
Business Association joined forces and founded the OHSAD. Today OHSAD 
represents roughly 80 per cent of the private hospital sector and has been 
quite active in developing a common position for private health care 
providers and voicing the demands of the private hospital sector.  
The composition of OHSAD’s executive board reflects the distribution 
of power within the private health care provision market.25 However, mid-
                                                        
25 The executive board of the OHSAD was composed of, but not limited, to the following 
persons affiliated with largest hospital chains in the market as of 2014: Fahrettin Koca 
from Medipol Group, Sema Akgün from Memorial Group, Ahmet Şah Kolan from Kolan 
Hospitals, Muharrem Usta from Medical Park and Liv Hospitals, Hüseyin Bozkurt from 
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size hospitals representatives and hospital groups also have places on the 
executive board, one of which has been serving as the head of the executive 
board.26 In line with the distribution of power within the executive board, 
OHSAD’s honorary committee is composed of the pioneers of the private 
health care provision sector.27 
OHSAD’s decision-making structure gives more power to the largest 
private health care providers, while still favouring small and medium sized 
hospitals in comparison to their market shares. In the general assembly of 
OHSAD, each hospital has a voting weight according to its number of beds. 
OHSAD’s charter declares that hospitals with more than 75 beds will have 
7 representatives, hospitals with 50-75 beds will have 5 representatives, 
hospitals with 20-49 beds will have 3 representatives, hospitals with 10-19 
will have 2 representatives, and all other health institutions will have 1 
representative in the general assembly. In addition, the charter states that 
the number of representatives of the hospital groups that own more than 
one hospital will not increase linearly as the number of hospitals they own 
goes up. The increase in the number of hospital group representatives will 
be less than the sum of each hospital’s number of representatives if each 
one is owned by different individuals or companies (Private Hospitals and 
Health Institutions Association, 2004).  
Therefore, while the voting structure of OHSAD favours the large 
hospital groups compared to that of TOBB, it also restricts the direct 
translation of the market power of the largest health care providers on the 
decision-making structure of the OHSAD. Given the tendency of 
particularism in the relations between government and big business, this 
                                                        
Medicana Group, Azmi Ofluoğlu from Universal Group, Erhan Kamışlı from Medline, 
Nurettin Demirkol from Hisar Hospitals.  
26 The executive board of the OHSAD also included the following representatives of mid-
sized hospitals as of 2014: Yusuf Ziya Yıldırım from Konukoğlu Hospital, Reşat Bahat from 
Bahat Hospitals, Hayreddin Yekeler from Emsey Hospital and Abdurrahman Külünk from 
Erdem Hospital.  
27 The honorary committee of the OHSAD is composed of but not limited to the following 
persons: Mehmet Ali Aydınlar from Acıbadem Group, Turgut Aydın from Memorial Group, 
Cemşid Demiroğlu from Florence Nightingale Group, Doğan Birgül from Doğan Hospital, 
Hüseyin Urlu from Avrasya Hospital, Ömer Güzel from Biruni Laboratories and Yusuf 
Elgörmüş from Medicine Hospital Group. 
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might create an additional incentive for the largest health care providers to 
enter into particularistic relations with the government, rather than relying 
upon OHSAD only.  
The analysis of the OHSAD’s connections with the health care 
bureaucracy and the AK Party indicates that the OHSAD includes members 
who worked for health bureaucracy in the public administration and/or 
members of the leading cadre of the AK Party both in its executive board 
and its honorary committee. For instance, Mr. Tahsin Güney, who was a 
member of the OHSAD’s executive board in 2014, served as the former head 
of the SGK between 2008 and 2009. In addition, Mr. Mehmet Nil Hıdır, who 
was also a member of the OHSAD’s executive board in 2014, worked for the 
health care bureaucracy as the head of North İzmir Public Hospitals Union 
and then as the head of the Public Health Department in İzmir. Finally, 
Mr. Süleyman Soylu, who was the vice president of the AK Party, was also 
the member of the honorary committee of the OHSAD in 2014.  
These connections between the private health care provider 
association and the health care bureaucracy (and the government to an 
extent) challenges the distinction made between the business community 
and the bureaucracy as well as between the business community and the 
government. While the OHSAD resembles the Health Sector Union of 
TOBB as it includes bureaucrats as well as politicians in its decision-
making structure, it is important to note that members of the OHSAD chose 
to organise and work under the umbrella of a voluntary organisation rather 
than remaining within the Health Sector Union of TOBB. However, the 
rationale behind their preference to work within a voluntary organisation 
seems not to exclude the members of health care bureaucracy and the 
members of the government, as OHSAD includes them as well. This 
selective network, which gives strength as well as leverage to OHSAD, 
might prove that “the politically guided process of class transformation” 
(Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p.12) is also operating within the health sector.  
In fact, given the differences in each organisation’s decision-making 
structures, the OHSAD might not be facing the difficulty that the Health 
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Sector Union of TOBB faces in formulating its political position. In response 
to my question of how and to what extent the Health Sector Union of TOBB 
has been able to accommodate the demands of private hospitals with quite 
different scales of investment and different clientele, the former head of the 
Health Sector Union stated:  
 
“I can’t tell you that we are confident on that. After 2002 a significant 
imbalance emerged in the sector. On the one hand, you have chain 
hospitals established by important investors. On the other hand, you 
have small and medium size hospitals. … I don’t think that it is easy 
to find a solution that will satisfy all” (Interview no.10). 
 
As the quote above suggests, the former head of the Health Sector 
Union of TOBB acknowledges the complexity of reconciling the interests of 
private health care providers, which is diversified in terms of the scale of 
their investments and the market shares. While the decision making 
structure of the Health Sector Union of TOBB does not provide an easy 
solution to this, the dominance of the larger private health care providers 
in OHSAD eases the task of developing a common sectoral discourse, which 
would likely be in favour of larger private health care providers. As 
discussed earlier, the current pricing policy of the SGK already favours 
chain hospitals as they can benefit from the economies of scale. This policy, 
as part of the reform, did not only change the distribution of power among 
different players in the market, but also transforms health care politics by 
undermining the legitimacy of TOBB among private health care providers 
and paving the way to the emergence of OHSAD as the strongest actor 
representing the private sector in health care provision. 
 
8.7. Private health care provider organisations at work: 
discourses, demands and strategies 
 
This section discusses contestations as well as alliances mainly 
between the government and private health care provider organisations 
during the implementation of the HTP. 
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Increasing the role of the private hospitals in health care delivery in 
Turkey has never been a popular political promise in Turkish politics. 
Public opinion has been averse to the retrenchment of the state from the 
provision of health care services. For instance, in a nationwide survey, 
researchers found that only 19.1 per cent of the respondents agreed with 
the following statement: “the government should only provide limited basic 
health care services” (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2012, p.11). In other 
words, an overwhelming majority of Turkey’s population is in favour of the 
dominance of the state in health care provision.  
As discussed in the earlier chapter, in spite of their limited political 
power and lack of institutional ‘veto power’, organised labour and the TTB 
strongly resisted all governmental attempts to increase the role of the 
private sector in health care provision. In a society that has been 
overwhelmingly in favour of the public provision of health care services, this 
opposition has always had the potential to become popular in case the 
government fails to absorb the public demands. Even after a decade of 
health reform, none of the opposition parties in the Parliament (CHP, 
Nationalist Action Party, Peace and Democracy Party) embrace the 
privatisation of health care services.  
These political values, therefore, had a major impact in framing the 
discourse of the government as well as the private health care provider 
organisations on health care reform. Neither the government nor private 
health care provider organisations explicitly called for the privatisation of 
health care services.  
Despite the fact that direct privatisation was not chosen as the main 
method in the HTP, another form of privatisation occurred during the 
implementation of the Programme. This form of privatisation, that is 
passive privatisation, was allowing the private sector to increase its share 
in the health care delivery. Many scholars also analysed the reform as an 
attempt to privatise health care services (Belek, 2012; Civaner, 2011; 
Sönmez, 2011; Soyer, 2007). Among those, Soyer successfully addresses the 
distinctive feature of privatisation in the Turkish case -which is in line with 
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the passive privatisation experiences in other developing countries 
discussed in Chapter 4- that the privatisation of health care services was 
carried out through the integration of private hospitals into the public 
health insurance system. In addition, he claims, the state transferred public 
resources to finance the private sector that increased the pace of 
privatisation (Soyer, 2007, p.90, 105).  
Belek argues that privatisation and marketization trends have become 
clearer in Turkey’s health care system in the aftermath of the 
implementation of the HTP. In addition, these trends have given way to the 
oligopolisation of the private health care delivery sector. Taking these 
developments into account, Belek concludes that the HTP has been in 
perfect tune with the interests of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, there is also 
evidence that the bourgeoisie has been in charge of implementing the 
Programme (Belek, 2012, p.11). As Belek’s line of argumentation suggests, 
this form of analysis has the tendency to treat the private sector in health 
care delivery as a homogenous group with a clear political prospect of full 
privatisation of the provision of health care services, and does not 
differentiate the power resources and interests of the government and the 
private health care provider organisations (and the World Bank as well). 
Thus, their analysis has become short of explaining how on some issues 
alliances could be built between private health care providers and the 
government, how they can disagree with one another on some other issues 
and what balance the government would like to strike between public and 
private health care delivery. It could be argued that this line of analysis has 
the potential to underestimate the role of politics in making predictions for 
the future. 
In fact, without underestimating the political affinity between the 
neoliberal AK Party governments and the private health care provider 
organisations, the following part of this section discusses a diverse set of 
issues that caused controversies between these actors during the 
preparation as well as the implementation of the HTP. While two parties 
 228 
 
were in agreement on some issues, they were in open contestation with each 
other on solutions on others.  
First, as discussed in Chapter 6, the HTP has been a double-edged 
sword for the AK Party governments from the beginning. On the one hand, 
the Programme’s positive impacts on citizens’ access to health care services 
clearly became one of the main factors that led to the popularity of the 
governing party especially among the low-income constituency. On the 
other hand, the governing party had been keen to foster private sector 
involvement in health care and make the health care delivery sector one of 
the main sectors within which it created its allied bourgeoisie. Despite its 
success in delivering both promises at the same time in the early years of 
the reform process, pursuing this conflicting political strategy put the 
governing party in an ambivalent political position. Therefore, in order to 
understand the future direction of Turkey’s health care system, one has to 
examine the negotiations and contestations between private the health care 
provider organisations and the government. 
The HTP did not come into existence due to long discussions between 
the government representatives and important stakeholders in the domain 
of health care. In fact, the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association’s (MÜSİAD), a business organisation that has a political 
affinity with the AK Party, stated that there has been an “absence of 
sufficient exchange of ideas with stakeholders… during the reform process” 
(Müstakil Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği, 2009, p.17). The interview 
with the former head of the WB team assisting the reform process 
(Interview no.22) also provides sufficient evidence for this. The HTP was 
instead a product of a small “change team” (Ağartan, 2008) which adopted 
the WB blueprint for Turkey’s context. The government constituted the 
team and backed most of its proposals politically. The WB provided 
financial but more importantly know-how support for the team.  
Members of the change team clearly did not have unfavourable 
attitudes towards the increasing role of the private sector in health care 
delivery. The content of the resulting reform, the discourse of the change 
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team, and their professional career paths both before and after the reform 
provide sufficient support for this thesis. However, they differentiated their 
positions from the private health care provider organisations during the 
interviews. They spoke on behalf of the state, felt accountable to the 
government and presented the direction of the reform in a different way 
than the private hospitals representatives generally did. For instance, one 
member of the change team argued: 
 
“One of the important objectives of the Health Transformation 
Programme was this: Serving the people with all resources in the 
country regardless of their ownership in health care” (Interview 
no.20). 
 
As this statement suggests, this member of the change team presented 
both the public and private hospitals as national resources, which the state 
could use in order to provide services to its citizens. Another member of the 
change team made a quite similar statement: 
 
“For citizens, rather than the ownership of health care services 
providers, it is more important whether service is being provided or 
not” (Interview no.32). 
 
Both of these statements demonstrate that the portrayal of private 
hospitals as “national resources,” which might imply a corporatist 
understanding of the business, was common among the members of the 
change team. A member of the change team noted that private health care 
providers that existed before the reform did not share this approach in the 
early days of the reform: 
 
“We have seen that once groups who defend their commercial interests 
realized that the political power would implement this reform and the 
reform was inevitable, they declared themselves as actors of this 
process. But we have also seen that they were generally not that 
supportive of what was being done” (Interview no.20).  
 
Here the interviewee says clearly that the Government, in his view, 
was powerful enough to initiate the reform without the need for consent 
 230 
 
from commercial interests. Therefore, he suggested, private health care 
provider organisations had no chance but to secure a place within the 
process. In contrast, one of my interviewees, a high-level representative 
from one of the leading private hospital organisations, argued that they 
have been willing to collaborate with the government from the beginning. 
The former head of OHSAD stated, 
 
“We (Author’s note: Private hospitals sector) asked them (Author’s 
note: The government) to purchase services from us. We constitute a 
significant capacity. This capacity should not be left idle. We told them 
to benefit from us and we signed an agreement with public social 
security in 2005. This agreement was an agreement that the private 
sector was overzealous about.” (Interview no.24).  
 
Regardless of the willingness of the private hospitals to be integrated 
into the public insurance system, as the statement above suggests, both the 
government (and the change team) and the private sector seemed to share 
the same discourse: private hospitals are no different from public ones, and 
the state could and should better use these resources in delivering health 
care services to its citizens. This common discourse seemed to work well in 
covering possible conflict scenarios and thus in satisfying both parties for a 
fresh beginning as well as not challenging the public aversion towards 
privatisation of health care services. 
After the SGK started to purchase health care services from private 
hospitals in 2005, the HTP generally served the private hospital sector well 
up until 2008. During this period, as noted before in this chapter, more than 
a hundred new private hospitals were established, and bed capacity of 
private hospitals nearly doubled. One of my interviewees, who worked in 
the health care reform team, succinctly summarised the state of the private 
sector in the laissez faire period of the reform: 
 
“The private sector found a significant opportunity here. The Ministry 
of Health failed to respond timely to this process before 2008. It was 
not against this process. But it could control the process and it could 
institute a controlled competition. The Ministry of Health was late to 
transform the free market atmosphere into a regulated competitive 
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one. That’s why there was an explosion in the numbers of private 
hospitals at the time” (Interview no.20). 
 
This free market atmosphere in private hospitals sector did not last 
long. A historic moment that changed the relationship between the state 
and the private hospital sector occurred in February 2008, when the MoH 
issued a bylaw that introduced significant limitations on the further 
expansion of the role of the private sector in health care provision (The 
Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2008). This bylaw ruled that the private 
hospital sector would remain the same and would not be able to extend the 
range of services it provides, hire new health professionals, or establish new 
private hospitals. In other words, the bylaw only allowed for the 
establishment of new private hospitals in places specified by the Ministry 
and obliged already established private hospitals to comply with the central 
planning of the Ministry. In the bylaw, the MoH defines its planning role 
as follows:  
 
“In accordance with the mentioned objectives, the Ministry is 
authorised to plan covering both public and private sector health 
institutions, health human power working for these institutions, 
medical service branches of these institutions and the qualifications of 
these branches, and the distribution of technologically intense medical 
devices” (The Ministry of Health of Turkey, 2008, Clause 9).  
 
Private hospitals were caught unprepared for this sudden change 
(Güneş, 2008). It could be argued that the discourse shared by the 
government and private hospital organisations—which conceptualised 
private hospitals as “national resources”—broke down with this change. 
Some private health care provider organisations even applied to the 
Turkish Competition Authority with the claim that the bylaw created a 
double standard for private hospitals vis-à-vis public hospitals (Coşkun, 
2008). In response to the strict regulation of private hospitals after the 
promulgation of this bylaw, some scholars criticised the process by coining 
the term “étatisation of private hospitals” and argued that the MoH 
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overstepped its boundaries of the stewardship role promised in the health 
care reform (Aksoy, 2008). 
Despite the fact that private health care provider organisations raised 
harsh criticisms against this bylaw, they failed to make a difference. This 
is mainly due to two factors. First, the private health care provider 
organisations did not have the option of turning to the constituency. In a 
recent nationally representative survey on public trust in institutions, 
researchers found that public trust in public hospitals was greater than in 
private hospitals. According to the results, 72.3 per cent of the respondents 
expressed their trust in public hospitals, 13.9 per cent said they neither 
trusted nor distrusted public hospitals, and 13.8 per cent expressed distrust 
in public hospitals. Meanwhile, 45.5 per cent said they trusted private 
hospitals, 17.7 per cent responded that they neither trusted nor distrusted 
private hospitals; and 36.8 per cent said they did not trust private hospitals 
at all (Konsensus Araştırma, 2011). In a political context where private 
hospitals are not trusted as much as public hospitals and there is no 
alternative political party supporting the cause of private hospitals, private 
health care provider organisations had no choice but to keep the dialogue 
with the government.  
The second factor that impeded the capacity of private health care 
provider organisations to take a politically effective step against the MoH’s 
dominance over health care delivery is that the majority of private hospitals 
had already become dependent on the SGK—and thus the government in 
the Turkish context— for their financial sustainability. One of my 
interviewees, a high-level representative of private hospitals sector, 
succinctly made this dependency clear in his statement as follows: 
 
“More than 60 per cent of the revenues of private hospitals that signed 
agreements with the SGK come from the SGK. We have no possibility 
of living without public social security” (Interview no.24). 
 
The dependency of the majority of private hospitals on the revenues 
from the SGK forced the private health care provider organisations to 
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concentrate their efforts on increasing the prices of the services set by the 
SGK. In this regard, the Health Implementation Statement, which the SGK 
issues annualy and amends from time to time, has become one of the most 
important regulatory tools in the hands of the government. Almost all of my 
interviewees from the private hospitals expressed their displeasure with 
the SGK’s pricing of their services. They argued that these levels do not 
match their costs, especially in metropolitan cities, as they claimed that 
private hospitals in metropolitan cities generally pay higher rents and 
better wages for specialist medical doctors.  
Despite the fact that representatives of private health care provider 
organisations met with high-level public officials several times, they failed 
to increase the level of prices in the Health Implementation Statement. This 
failure could be explained on the basis of two factors. First, as any increase 
in the level of prices for services would automatically translate into a 
burden on the public budget, the interests of the private hospitals sector 
directly conflicted with that of the government on this issue. Second, the 
government has quite strong ammunition in his hands, as my interviewee 
from the WB brilliantly pointed out: 
 
“If there were more private health facilities there to deal with, the 
government would not be able to avoid working with medical 
associations or hospital associations. Here they can implement the 
reforms while avoiding all these people. So it is again the reflections of 
the specifics of your heath sector” (Interview no.22). 
 
As the quote implies, while the private sector is dependent on the 
government for its revenues, the government is not yet dependent as much 
on the private sector for delivering health care services. This is mainly 
because; the government has the power resource of directly controlling more 
than half of the health care delivery structure. Promulgation of the bylaw 
in 2008 might be considered as the government’s inertia to lose this quite 
effective power resource. From an institutionalist angle, it might well be 
argued that the dominance of the public hospitals in health care provision 
before the reform created a ‘lock-in effect’ in Turkey’s health care system. 
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The government also took additional steps to protect its dominance in 
the health care delivery structure. In doing so, the SGK ruled that patients 
willing to access outpatient services of private hospitals would have to pay 
15 TL (roughly 4 GBP (Great Britain Pounds) or app. 5 Euros contributory 
payments on the spot, while the rate is 8 TL (app. 2 GBP or 3 Euros) for 
patients willing to use outpatient services of public hospital services (The 
Social Security Institution of Turkey, 2010, Clause 3.2.1.). In response, one 
of the private health care provider organisations applied to the Competition 
Authority. In his own words, 
 
“Patients coming to our hospitals pay 15 Turkish Liras, patients going 
to public hospitals pay 8 Turkish Liras. We applied to the Competition 
Authority. … it replied that it could not intervene into this. Why? It 
declared that this is public, and you are private. The relationship 
between public and private sectors is not a horizontal relationship. The 
rules of competition cannot be applied to this relationship. This is a 
vertical relationship. Therefore, one cannot talk about competition 
here” (Interview no.24).  
 
The decision of the Competition Authority could be interpreted as 
evidence for the argument that the idea of free competition between public 
and private units in health care delivery services has not become 
mainstream in the bureaucracy. However, the Council of State made a 
decision in the opposite direction. The Association of Health Corporations 
in Turkey prosecuted a suit against the SGK in the Council of State with 
the claim that the introduction of higher rates of contributory payments for 
private hospitals was not legal. The Council of State decided to grant a 
motion for a stay of execution (NTVMSNBC, 2009). In its decision, the 
Council of State declared that there is no legal basis for the introduction of 
different levels of contributory payments for public and private hospitals 
(The Council of State of Turkey, 2009). Despite the fact that this decision 
was repealed by another circle of the Council of State afterwards and not 
implemented, the partial success of the private health care provider 
organisations in legal advocacy efforts might bring results in future cases 
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and signal a shifting perspective amongst the bureaucracy on competition 
in the delivery of health care services. 
The government also mobilised its discourse on private hospitals as 
“national resources” and used the dependency of the sector to its benefit 
when it prohibited private hospitals from charging money from patients for 
emergency health care services. The SGK pays for the emergency services 
of private hospital patients with public health insurance use. In fact, this 
was to the detriment of private hospitals, as they would not serve as many 
patients and therefore sell services at a higher price than they would receive 
from the SGK. However, it was not easy for private health care provider 
organisations to challenge the government’s position on this issue, mainly 
due to the illegitimacy of such an opposition in the eyes of the general public 
and financial dependency of private health care providers on the state. As 
the head of OHSAD suggested in an interview: “Do you think it is possible 
to go out and tell people that you want to charge emergency health care 
services?” (Akdağ, 2012).  
This exemption was extended to include intensive care services; burn 
injury treatment services; health care services for new-borns; organ, tissue, 
stem cell transplantation; cardiovascular surgeries; dialysis; surgeries for 
congenital anomalies, and oncology services (The Social Security Institution 
of Turkey, 2010, 3.3.3.).28 Private health care provider organisations did not 
publicly express their discontent with these new responsibilities and 
decided to use them to lift the cap (to be discussed later) on additional 
payments in other health care services.  
Another controversial issue in the relations between the private health 
care provider organisations and the government was the distribution of 
specialist doctors into public and private health care providers. As discussed 
in Chapter 7, the government chose to serve the interests of private health 
care providers vis-à-vis those of medical doctors. In response, the TTB 
strongly opposed the government’s attempts to give an end to the private 
                                                        
28 For these specified services that private hospitals provide for free, the SGK makes 
payments according to the Health Implementation Statement it issues. 
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practices of medical doctors, which push medical doctors to work for either 
public or private health care providers. In the context of the shortage of 
specialist medical doctors, private health care provider organisations have 
to compete with public health care providers to attract medical doctors. 
While they succeeded in attracting a significant share of medical doctors to 
work for the private sector before 2008, the government intervention, which 
prohibited the further migration of medical doctors from the public sector 
to the private sector in 2008, restricted the ability of private health care 
providers to increase their share in the market.  
In response to the growing discontent with this restriction among 
private health care providers and the active advocacy of OHSAD, the 
government and the OHSAD signed a letter of memorandum in 2011 
(Private Hospitals and Health Institutions Association, 2011). The 
memorandum represented the recognition of the government’s sole 
authority over the employment of medical doctors. However, with this 
memorandum, the government agreed to provide private hospitals a 
thousand additional specialist medical doctor positions. Therefore, once 
again private health care provider organisations failed to challenge the 
government regulation—this time of the employment of medical doctors—
yet succeeded in improving their relative position within the new 
configuration.  
Another governmental regulation is the cap on additional payments 
that private hospitals are allowed to charge patients (The Social Security 
Institution of Turkey, 2010). The SGK sets this cap as a percentage of the 
SGK’s prices for services. The cap level varies according to the quality 
category that each hospital falls under within the classification of the MoH. 
Since increasing the prices set by the SGK is a strenuous objective that 
increases the burden on the public budget, private health care provider 
organisations built their strategies on lifting the cap on additional 
payments. Two of my interviewees from private health care provider 
organisations claimed that the rationale for their acceptance of all other 
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conditions from the government was a hope to lift the cap on additional 
payments: 
 
“The SGK would pay part of patients’ payments and we would top it 
up with our prices. … Because we thought we would top it up by 
charging people, we didn’t really evaluate whether the prices offered 
by the public social security for our services were realistic or not. We 
were free to opt out of the system as well” (Interview no.24). 
 
“If caps would be lifted, then our demand to increase prices in the 
Health Implementation Statement would cease to exist” (Interview 
no.10).  
 
The Health Sector Union of the TOBB concentrated its energy on 
lifting the cap on additional payments that they could charge patients with 
public health insurance plans, which meant, if successful, the introduction 
of free markets. While the government did not accept this demand, the 
Health Sector Union of the TOBB succeeded in increasing the ceiling set for 
the rate of additional payments from 20 per cent of SGK prices at the time 
to 100 per cent (Interview no.24). With the interviewee’s words, this process 
unfolded as follows: 
 
“In the draft law, there was a clause allowing private hospitals sector 
to charge 20 per cent of prices set in the Health Implementation 
Statement. Our demand was to remove this clause. Our lobby could 
succeed in changing the clause, which then allowed the Council of 
Ministers to have the authority to determine the cap on additional 
payments to 100 per cent. The final law included this clause. While we 
were trying to make negotiations about the rate, we learnt that the 
Ministry of Health was insistent upon the clause that specified the 
ceiling as 20 per cent. The change of the clause that we pushed forward 
offended the Ministry. In order to appease the Ministry, the Council of 
Ministers determined that the level of contributory payments would 
be 30 per cent” (Interview no.10).  
 
As the quote above suggests, the Health Sector Union of TOBB had 
the power to challenge the MoH’s proposed rate on the cap on additional 
payments using its connections with the members of the Council of 
Ministers. While the original proposal of the Health Sector Union of TOBB 
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was not accepted, it succeeded in increasing the cap, thus further 
marketizing health care services. 
There is also evidence that implies the failure of the regulative acts of 
the state on the exchange relationship between patients and private health 
care providers. There have been many cases where private hospitals in 
practice charge additional payments from patients with public health 
insurance that are above the determined level. As this illegal practice has 
become quite widespread, many newspapers have published stories of how 
excessive payments have been unlawfully requested from patients who used 
outpatient services of private hospitals (i.e., Samanyolu, 2012; Sonay, 2012; 
Tezel, 2009).  
In response, different public institutions began to increase their 
regulative and punitive capacities. For instance, the Court of Accounts 
imposed a record fine on private hospitals on the basis that the hospitals 
charged higher amounts of additional payments from patients than the 
legally permitted amount (Avcı, 2012). In addition, the SGK introduced new 
procedures to obstruct the private hospitals’ unlawful charge of higher 
additional payments from the patients. These procedures include obliging 
private hospitals to ask their patients to sign a printed agreement 
indicating that they are aware of the amount of the additional payment in 
advance and they agreed to pay this amount, which obliged private 
hospitals to prepare an invoice for the additional payments exceeding a 
specific amount (100 TL, app. 35 GBP), to give this invoice to the patient, to 
inform the patient and their relatives once the patient was no longer an 
emergency case, etc. (The Social Security Institution of Turkey, 2011).  
As a result, the representatives of private hospital organisations 
argued that private hospitals, especially those in metropolitan cities,29 had 
no other option but to charge patients more than the permitted amount in 
order not to go bankrupt (Interview no.10; Interview no.24). Therefore, 
                                                        
29 Interviewees from organisations of private hospitals stated that both rents and salaries 
of medical doctors are substantially higher in metropolitan cities than middle and small 
sized cities. 
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while private health care provider organisations continue to negotiate the 
rate of the cap on additional payments and the prices set by the SGK with 
the government, private health care providers searched for informal ways 
to trespass regulative arrangements. However, state institutions responded 
to this trend with the introduction of stricter regulative arrangements. 
Despite the fact that the SGK did not increase the prices it set for the 
private health care providers, an increasing application of patients in 
private hospitals increased the financial burden on the state budget. In this 
context, the SGK took a further step to discourage people to access private 
hospitals using their public health insurance. With the new regulation, the 
Institution declared,  
 
“The Institution may set up procedures and principles regarding the 
direct use of services of the private health providers on the basis of 
factors stated as follows: the province that the service is provided, 
whether the provided service is of vital importance or not, whether the 
service may be given in public health care service providers (author’s 
emphasis) and the quality of service” (The Social Security Institution 
of Turkey, 2010, 4.2).  
 
With this regulation, the SGK indicated that it might put restrictions 
on the use of private health care services when public health care providers 
offer the same services. This was a significant divergence from the original 
objective of the HTP, which clearly included fostering competition in health 
care provision. This regulation of the SGK might be read as a form of 
‘institutional inertia’. 
The relationship between the private health care provider 
organisations and the government has become tense since regulations that 
took place in 2008. In this context, one of the representatives of OHSAD 
made a controversial statement to the public before they signed the Service 
Procurement Agreement with the SGK in 2012: “Two thousand would die 
the next day unless we signed the agreement” (Vatan, 2012). 
It could be argued that this statement symbolised the power that 
private health care providers gained within the health care provision, which 
manifested itself in the fact that the total number of patients that private 
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hospitals served in 2011 was more than 3 million people (The Ministry of 
Health of Turkey, 2012, p.92). However, even during this conflict, the 
OHSAD representative could not stay away from expressing the private 
sector allegiance to the state, which he perceives as sine qua non to the 
sustainable growth of private health care providers.  In his own words, he 
stated, “We established these hospitals by trusting the state’s word. We 
trust the state’s word” (Vatan, 2012). Therefore, for private health care 
providers, it is again the state that has the responsibility to save them.  
The current direction of health care policies in the domain of health 
care provision might imply that the alliance established between the 
government, private health care providers, and patients is in the process of 
breaking up. The former head of OHSAD also argued that the government 
has come to a decision point: 
 
“The state has to decide at this point. Will the private sector exist in 
this sector or not? To what extent will it exist? To what extent will the 
state allow the private sector? Where will the planning go? … These 
questions are all open questions. People’s votes will determine the 
result. I don’t believe that this has been done as part of a long-term 
plan” (Interview no.24).  
 
As the quote suggests, the head of OHSAD does not believe that the 
government has already decided the future direction of Turkey’s health care 
system. However, the current context requires the government to make a 
decision on the role of the private sector in health care provision and its 
limits. Once again the government’s preferred balance of the public and 
private mix in health care provision would be important in determining the 
future direction of Turkey’s health care system.  
While this question is still valid and the on-going political 
contestations including those within the AK Party will shape the future 
direction of Turkey’s health care system, recent developments give a hint. 
Despite the fact that the government did not increase the prices set by the 
SGK and offered ad hoc increases in the number of specialist medical 
doctors that private health care providers can hire, it allowed private health 
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care providers to shift the financial burden on patients. In 2013, the Council 
of Ministers increased the cap on additional payments from 90 per cent to 
200 per cent (NTVMSNBC, 2013). This change is clearly in line with the 
demands of private health care provider organisations and has the potential 
to break the financial dependency of private health care providers on the 
SGK in the long run.  
In response to increase in the cap on additional payments from 90 per 
cent to 200, OHSAD representatives declared that they were not content 
with this increase for three reasons. First, the cap was calculated on the 
basis of prices set by the SGK that had been lower than their expectations. 
Therefore, an increase in the cap did not substantially improve the financial 
situation of private health care providers. Second, competition between 
private health care providers over additional payments is high, which limits 
the ability of each provider to increase additional payments up to the limit 
of the cap. Third, the exemption of patients from making additional 
payments for key services (i.e. oncology services and emergency services) 
limits the revenues of private hospitals from patients. In response, OHSAD 
representatives suggested that the government should provide incentives 
for citizens to buy private health insurance plans (Al Jazeera Turk, 2014b). 
It could be argued that the OHSAD opened up a new battlefield for further 
marketization, which this time expanded its boundaries to cover health care 
finance. 
It is important to note that the government had different options to 
solve this crisis with the private health care providers, including the 
increase in the prices set by the SGK or providing incentives for patients to 
choose public health care providers. By choosing this policy, the government 
appeased the private health care providers and did not openly restrict 
patients’ access to private health care providers using their public health 
insurance plans. However, in practice, this policy shifted the financial 
burden on patients and strengthened the marketization of health care 
services.  
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8.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the scale of the privatisation of health care 
provision in Turkey’s health care system as a result of the HTP and its 
impact on the politics of health care. In light of Giaimo and Manow’s 
insights, the chapter focuses on the period that follows the legislation of the 
original reform and examines the political contestations between different 
actors as well as the impact of these contestations on the direction that the 
reform takes as a result. 
As discussed before, the role of private health care providers increased 
substantially in the last decade. From negligible share in the total bed 
capacity and applications of patients annually, private health care 
providers started to constitute around 20 per cent of the total hospital bed 
capacity in the country and receive more than one-fourth of all applications 
for health care providers annually. 
Given the fact that the general population supports the dominance of 
the public sector in health care provision, the government pursued a passive 
privatisation policy in line with the trend that started long before it came 
to power. The main mechanism through which the government fostered the 
private sector involvement in health care provision was to include private 
health care services into a public health insurance plan. In line with 
Polanyi’s insights, this process is evidence of how the state creates markets. 
Drawing on the insights of the literature on state-business relations in 
Turkey, here it is argued that health care has been selected by the AK Party 
as one of the sectors through which the Party aimed at creating and 
strengthening its own business community. Linkages between private 
health care provider organisations and the government as well as the health 
care bureaucracy demonstrate the intricate relations between state and 
business in Turkey’s politics. 
The privatisation of health care provision led to the emergence of new 
strong political actors, namely the private health care provider 
organisations. The emergence of private health care provider organisations 
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and their integration into health care politics can be understood with the 
concept of ‘institutional conversion’, which refers to “the adoption of new 
goals or the incorporation of new groups into the coalitions on which 
institutions are founded can drive a change in the functions that these 
institutions serve or the role they perform” (Thelen, 2004, p.36). 
As discussed in detail before, the OHSAD and the Health Sector Union 
of TOBB emerged as the strongest actors representing private health care 
providers. It is important to note that private health care providers do not 
constitute a homogenous group. They differ in terms of their sizes and their 
ability to attract patients with private health insurance plans. However, 
the government’s health care policy, which favoured big players in the 
health care provision market, found its echo in the interest representation 
of private health care providers. In addition to the sustenance of 
particularistic relations between the government and individual 
businessman, big players preferred to work for the common demands of the 
sector under the umbrella of OHSAD, the decision-making structure, as it 
offered higher weight to big players in comparison to the Health Sector 
Union of TOBB.  
While the OHSAD generally took the lead, both of these organisations 
focused on three key issues: the prices set by the SGK for private health 
care services, the cap on additional payments that private health care 
providers could charge patients, and the distribution of specialist medical 
doctors between public and private health care providers. In all of these 
issues, private health care provider organisations lobbied the government 
and related public institutions to make changes in favour of its 
constituency. Due to the fact that private health care provider organisations 
had been dependent upon the state for the overwhelming portion of their 
revenues and the political impossibility of mobilizing the public in favour of 
privatisation, these organisations had been modest in their demands and 
stayed away from direct confrontation with the government.  
The government has been committed to increasing the role of private 
health care providers throughout the implementation of the HTP. While the 
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conflict of interest between the government and private health care 
providers has been there and will continue to exist in the near future, the 
two parties seem to agree on a temporary win-win solution. For instance, 
private health care provider organisations can persuade the government 
when their interest is in conflict with that of medical doctors and patients 
willing to use private hospitals, but they fail to succeed when their interest 
is in conflict with that of the government. As a result, rather than increasing 
the prices set by the SGK to be paid for private health care services, the 
government decided to shift this financial burden to the patients by 
increasing the cap on additional payments.  
On the one hand, it can be claimed that the government serves further 
marketization of health care services without always serving short-term 
economic interests of private health care providers. Its ability to act 
relatively autonomous from the sector originates from its dominance in 
health care provision, despite the drastic increase in the role of the private 
sector. Nevertheless, it is not clear if the government can keep its 
bargaining power vis-à-vis private health care providers intact in the future 
if the pace of privatisation in health care provision and the oligopolisation 
tendency in the sector continue. The increase of the private involvement in 
health care provision and its translation to the politics of health care seems 
to further strengthen the marketization tendency in Turkey’s health care 
system, which may infiltrate into health care finance in near future.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
Health care reforms are products of political processes, which can 
hardly be reduced into automatic responses of national health care systems 
to economic growth, demographic change, and deficiencies in citizens’ 
access. As discussed in Chapter 1 and substantiated with different cases of 
health care reforms in developing countries in Chapter 4, both the viability 
of the reform and its content are dependent upon global and domestic 
political dynamics. 
This study, which can be qualified as a historically grounded single 
country case study, examined how the HTP in Turkey between 2003 and 
2013 reconfigured the distribution of power that formed the basis of 
Turkey’s health care system. In doing so, the study analysed the political 
dynamics that enabled the introduction and implementation of the reform, 
the political dynamics that the HTP generated, and the impact of these 
dynamics on the direction of change that the reform engendered.  
At the empirical level, the study examined the interplay between the 
direction of change in the domain of health care finance and delivery and 
different political actors’ subjective interpretations of the reform, their 
interests, and their strategies throughout the reform process. In this study, 
actual political conflicts—such as the struggle over the introduction of the 
full time work requirement for medical doctors, or the struggle over the cap 
on additional payments that patients make to private hospitals—between 
different actors were explored to understand the power relations between 
these actors and their differential impact upon the reform. Finally, the 
study makes an analysis of how and to whose benefit these political conflicts 
were resolved, which demonstrates the direction of change in Turkey’s 
health care system and describes the new distribution of power it rests 
upon. 
This study is inspired by the Historical Institutionalist perspective, 
which calls for the careful examination of the political system and political 
culture of the country case under consideration in order to explain 
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institutional change and changes in the distribution of power upon which 
this institutional change rests. The use of the Historical Institutionalist 
perspective is restricted to taking history and political systems into 
consideration, rather than relying on a purely institutionalist explanation 
for the reform (i.e. Immergut, 1992). In addition, ideational institutionalism 
has been used to account for the role of the subjective interpretations of 
political actors in their strategies throughout the reform process. 
The study focuses on existing political actors in health care politics and 
investigates their subjective perspectives towards the reform at hand, their 
strategies to influence the reform to their self-defined benefits, and their 
interactions with one another. In analysing these three factors, the study 
draws on different approaches to health care politics, namely pluralism, the 
power resources approach, the institutionalist approach and the new 
politics approach. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, health care today is both a commodity and 
a human right. This elusive state of health care makes it a locus of political 
contestations both at the global and domestic level. From another angle, 
health care is both a sizeable economic sector and a significant area of social 
policy. Therefore, it lies at the intersection of economics and politics and is 
subject to significant influences both from the market actors and states. 
While welfare states emerging in the aftermath of WW2 initiated ‘the 
decommodification of health care’ as defined by Bambra (2005), Moran 
emphasises how these states simultaneously invested in private-run 
pharmaceutical and health technology sectors and thus contributed to the 
commodification of health care (1999).  
With the fall of Keynesianism in the late 1970s, which had previously 
formed the basis of the equilibrium for health care services in welfare 
states, neoliberal perspective slowly established itself as the modus 
operandi of the economy and society of the new age. Starting from the late 
1970s, neoliberalism, according to Hay (2004), can be defined as confidence 
in market distribution, a movement towards a global free trade regime, and 
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a push for the transformation of the role of the state from market 
alternative to a market facilitator.  
With neoliberalism, political struggles over health care gained pace 
and took a new shape. In the domain of health care, neoliberalism signifies 
the extension of the commodification of health care services to health care 
finance and delivery, thus the privatisation of health care finance and 
delivery and/or the adoption of private sector management techniques by 
the public sector.  
As explained in Chapter 5, international organisations, especially the 
WB, and international epistemic communities of health economists 
(Appleby, 1998) have been the harbingers of neoliberalism in the domain of 
health care policies. Both of these actors pioneered the translation of health 
care policy issues into the health economics discourse. The WB took one step 
further and popularised pro-market ‘policy paradigm’ in health care policies 
especially among developing countries. 
However, as the analysis of different cases of health care reforms in 
developing countries in Chapter 4 suggests, it is not possible to argue that 
all developing countries followed the neoliberal route in reforming their 
health care systems from the late 1970s. Therefore, understanding the 
political dynamics behind health care reforms requires a careful analysis of 
domestic political factors, actors and their interaction with global actors and 
factors. While international influences are important, here it is argued that 
domestic politics also matter in making health care reform possible and in 
shaping its direction. 
As described in Chapter 3, from the first half of the 20th century to the 
introduction of the HTP in 2003, Turkey’s health care system had developed 
as a result of two key factors: cumulative governmental attempts to 
introduce social health insurance schemes, and attempts to establish state 
capacity for preventive and curative health care service delivery. Separate 
public health insurance schemes were established for each occupational 
status group (i.e. private sector workers, state officials, farmers and 
artisans etc.). As discussed in Chapter 3, the development of a full-fledged 
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health care system in Turkey was the product of populist attempts by a 
series of governments in power after the bifurcation of the ruling bloc that 
established the Republic (Keyder, 2007b, p.147). In other words, social 
insurance-based financing, coupled with a tax financed non-contributory 
scheme for the very poor since 1992, was the main financial source of health 
care. Public sector health care providers, combined with the private clinics 
of specialists working at the same time for the public hospitals, dominated 
the provision of health care services. Turkey’s health care system before the 
reform most resembled state health care systems within Wendt et al.’s 
typology (2009). Pressing issues affecting Turkey’s health care system 
before the reform included the vertical and horizontal expansion of services, 
the question of outsiders to the social insurance-based system, the problem 
of medical doctors’ dual commitment to public hospitals and their private 
clinics, and the increasing fiscal deficits of social security institutions. 
 Turkey’s health care system witnessed a series of reform attempts 
throughout the 1990s, but all failed mainly due to the political instability of 
governments that were unable to tackle internal and external oppositions 
to their reform proposals. Therefore, the ‘policy drift’ is the best concept that 
defines the state of Turkey’s health care system between 1980s and 2000s 
with the exception of the introduction of the Green Card scheme in 1992. 
With the AK Party’s rise to power as a single-party government in the 2002 
general elections, a significant transformation in Turkey’s health care 
system finally began.  
In this regard, the first political dynamic that paved the way to the 
introduction of the HTP was the electoral victory of the AK Party in the 
2002 general elections. The AK Party, which came onto the scene less than 
a year before the 2002 general elections, was an inheritor of the Political 
Islamist National Outlook movement and aspired to become a ‘catchall 
party’ as defined by Kirchheimer (Krouwel, 1996). The AK Party inherited 
the political alliance that the Political Islamist National Outlook movement 
built, which included the small and medium-sized conservative 
entrepreneurs located outside of metropolitan cities and the urban poor 
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throughout the 1990s. The AK Party, primarily based on this alliance, 
promised to make health care services accessible for all with a special 
emphasis on those outside of the formal social security system, i.e. those 
benefiting or aspiring to benefit from the Green Card scheme. The AK Party 
successfully appealed to this social group growing in numbers over time, 
which, according to a concept defined by Alfred (1975), had ‘repressed 
structural interests’ on health care policies. In return, the AK Party became 
the most popular political party among the urban poor. 
Understanding the state of Turkey’s political system and culture 
during the introduction and the implementation of the HTP is crucial in 
deciding which approach or approaches to health care politics might best 
explain the political dynamics that formed the basis of the reform. Turkey’s 
political system could be considered a form of ‘state corporatism’ as defined 
by Schmitter (1974). Both the medical doctor organisations and business 
organisations were state-created entities that lacked ‘veto points’ in 
Turkey’s political system, which makes it impossible to understand politics 
from a pluralist perspective. Their presence in policy-making bodies (i.e. 
special commissions in the MoH) is merely symbolic. The role of the 
judiciary is limited to a compliance audit of the legislations. Therefore, 
electoral politics is the key to acquiring power. The electoral system is 
majoritarian, both in its structure of representation and political finance, 
which is amenable to the rise of a ‘cartel party’ as defined by Katz and Mair. 
Within this system, once a single-party government succeeds at remaining 
in power, the only check and balance mechanism that might still function 
is the monitoring of the judiciary.  
Historically, major political parties have not been organised along 
class lines. As Keyder suggests, due to political-economic factors like late 
industrialisation and the suppression of class-based political actors since 
the establishment of the Republic, neither farmers nor workers were 
organised enough to exert a strong influence on mainstream politics 
(Keyder, 2007b). This scenario makes it impossible to apply the power 
resources approach. However, this low level of organisation among workers 
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and farmers does not make class irrelevant in understanding the politics in 
Turkey. Alternatively, one could investigate how and to what extent 
catchall parties could integrate different social classes into their hegemonic 
projects. Van Kersbergen’s analysis of the influence of Christian democratic 
political parties on social policies might be useful in understanding the role 
of the AK Party in the health care reform under consideration. Finally, 
while the new politics approach (Pierson, 1996) might explain the continued 
support of the public for the dominant role of the state in health care 
provision and delivery, it fails to explain the rationale behind the increase 
in public spending for health care services in Turkey in the age of 
neoliberalism.  
It might be suggested that available theories on the politics of social 
policies and health care draw heavily on the empirical cases of advanced 
capitalist countries, which reduces their ability to explain the politics of 
social policies and health care in developing countries. The theorisation of 
the politics of social policies and health care in developing country cases 
remains in the contours of welfare regime typologies (i.e. Gough, 2004, 
Rudra, 2007). This underdeveloped theorisation might partially originate 
from the limited number of empirical studies on the issues under 
consideration. Therefore, this study might contribute to this body of 
knowledge, which would pave the way to theorisation attempts in the 
future.  
The second political dynamic that made it possible to both introduce 
and shape the content of the HTP was the involvement of the WB. The WB’s 
influence on the HTP is two-fold: the influence of the WB on health care 
policies, which originated from its historical partnership with the 
governments of Turkey; and the hands on impact of the WB during the 
preparation and the implementation of the HTP.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the WB became the pioneering 
international organisation that promoted neoliberal health reforms in 
developing countries. In practice, the WB offers loans to carry out 
comprehensive health care reforms and provides empirical information and 
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know-how on reforming health care systems. While the WB experts who I 
interviewed disagreed with the idea that the WB has a health care reform 
blueprint, they acknowledged that the WB offers a ‘loose jacket’. This jacket, 
however, has distinctive components, including the purchaser-provider 
split in health care systems, the necessity of out-of-pocket contribution of 
patients, and the transformation of the role of the state from provision to 
stewardship. Therefore, one could argue that the looseness of the jacket 
refers mainly to the flexibility on the implementation of these components 
in different institutional contexts. As shown in the interview data in 
Chapter 5, the WB experts present their pro-market perspectives in health 
care policies as scientific, evidence-based and beyond politics, which 
legitimises the technocratisation of health reform processes in developing 
countries that is in line with Hay’s account for neoliberalism.  
 The partnership between the WB and the Turkish governments on 
health care policies started in the 1990s. While this partnership could not 
initiate a reform process immediately, it is argued here that it had a 
moulding effect for a pro-market reform in the future. Indeed, the WB’s 
involvement in Turkey’s health care system equipped the organisation with 
the necessary information on health care policies. More importantly, with 
this partnership the WB succeeded in exporting its approach to the MoH 
bureaucrats, and some of those officials took part in the AK Party’s reform 
team that prepared the HTP. As shown in Chapter 5, the WB’s influence on 
the bureaucrats’ perspective to health care policies manifested itself in the 
presence of a pro-market approach in the five-year development plans of 
Turkey since the mid-1980s.  
The WB’s influence on the HTP was not limited to its success in 
promoting a pro-market approach among the health care bureaucracy 
throughout the 1990s. In addition, the WB collaborated with the AK Party 
government in preparing and implementing the HTP. In fact, as discussed 
in Chapters 7 and 8, the preparation of the HTP was a closed process that 
excluded not only the TTB and trade unions organised in health care 
services, but also the business organisations. The government’s reform 
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team, whose pivotal role was discussed in detail elsewhere (Ağartan, 2007), 
worked closely with the WB experts throughout the reform. Given their 
shared perspective on health care policies, which could be partly attributed 
to the previous integration of these experts into the WB-created epistemic 
community, they did not disagree on the main framework of the reform.  
In some countries, as discussed in Chapter 4, factors such as economic 
crises, the lack of public resources to carry out a reform, or the absence of 
know-how made the governments amenable to the influence of the WB in 
shaping their health reforms. Nevertheless, considering the contemporary 
outcomes of the reform, here it is argued that the AK Party government 
took rather hesitant steps to immediately decrease the provider role of the 
state in health care provision, which is incompatible with the WB’s 
blueprint. In other words, the AK Party government might have prioritised 
the success of the reform in order to create legitimacy in the eyes of the 
general public. The AK Party was able realise this objective thanks to the 
favourable economic atmosphere. Given the AK Party’s ownership of health 
care reform and the saliency of the issue for the general public, here it is 
argued that the success of the HTP contributed to the consecutive electoral 
successes of the AK Party.  
In fact, the AK Party’s electoral successes are especially noteworthy in 
a context where electoral support, as Çarkoğlu suggests (2002) has been 
traditionally considered volatile. As a result of consecutive electoral 
successes and thanks to the majoritarian character of Turkey’s political 
system that lacks sufficient checks and balances, it could be suggested the 
AK Party established itself as a cartel party, in the sense that Katz and 
Mair define the concept (1995), especially after its victory in the 
constitutional referendum in 2011. 
The HTP, which bears similarities with the neoliberal perspective in 
health care reform, aimed to basically create a quasi-market in health care 
delivery, introduce the new public management tools to public hospitals, 
and unify all public health insurance schemes under a single umbrella. On 
the one hand, the HTP could be considered an investment by the AK Party 
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in the sustenance of its alliance with the urban poor, as it equalised the 
benefit package of the non-contributory tax financed Green Card scheme 
with other contributory public health insurance schemes. On the other 
hand, the AK Party redefined health as an economic growth sector, 
especially in the areas of health care delivery and health tourism; created a 
quasi-market, as Le Grand defines it (1991) in health care provision; and 
reconfigured the public health institutions according to private sector 
management techniques, as Ferlie et al. describes elsewhere (1996). Similar 
to Moran’s description of the relationship between Western European 
welfare states and health care (1999), the HTP eased citizens’ access to 
health care services while creating a commodification dynamic at the same 
time. To use Öniş’s conceptualisation, the increase in the rate of citizens’ 
satisfaction with health care services in this context might symbolise the 
success of the AK Party’s ‘controlled populism’ (2012), which manifested 
itself in the HTP in the first decade after the legislation of the reform.  
Nevertheless, political contestations between different political actors 
over the direction of the HTP did not come to an end after the legislation of 
the reform. The distribution of power in Turkey’s political system made it 
possible for the government to introduce the reform without getting the 
consent of other domestic actors. However, Skocpol emphasizes the ‘policy 
feedback’ as follows: “as politics creates policies, policies also remake 
politics” (1992, p.58). The changes brought forward by the HTP had an 
impact on health care politics. For instance, the TTB and the government 
contested each other on the issue of control over the labour of medical 
doctors, while the OHSAD and the government were in disagreement about 
what kind of opportunities should be available to private health care 
providers for capital accumulation. 
The third political dynamic that partially shaped the direction of the 
HTP was the involvement of the TTB in the reform process as a contending 
party to the government, and the struggle between the TTB and the 
government over the control of the labour of medical doctors. As described 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, TTB occupied a special place in health care 
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politics originating from their privileged status within the history of the 
nation-state making process in Turkey, their central position in the practice 
of medicine, and the corporatist structure that gave the TTB a monopoly 
over the representation of medical doctors’ interests.  
While the TTB performed its corporatist function until the end of the 
1970s, the democratic takeover of the TTB executive board by a socialist 
group in 1977 led to its transformation into a non-governmental 
organisation fighting for a universalistic health care system that would 
provide free and quality health care for all citizens. The TTB based its 
political stance upon the universal values of the medical profession, and 
pursued organisational strategies to secure its autonomy from the private 
sector as well as from the MoH. While the autonomy of medical associations 
from the state is not an exception in most advanced capitalist countries, the 
TTB’s funding policy that excludes financial contribution of the private 
sector can be considered as an exception, given scholars criticise the lack of 
stringency about the policies of professional medical associations 
concerning conflict of interests in their relations with the private sector 
(Rothman et al., 2009, p.1367). In light of its broader understanding of 
health care politics, the TTB engaged not only in professional politics, but 
also in the politics of production and consumption throughout the reform 
process. 
As suggested in Chapter 5, the AK Party government, in collaboration 
with a reform team and the WB, carried out the preparation process of the 
reform as a closed one. In fact, in the polarised atmosphere in Turkey, the 
collaboration between the TTB under a left-leaning leading cadre and the 
AK Party government was unlikely. Given the fact that state corporatism 
of Turkey did not allow the TTB to have a veto point on health care reform 
decisions, the TTB did not have any institutional channels to influence the 
preparation of the reform under consideration. Alternatively, the TTB used 
the only available checks and balances mechanisms that could have an 
impact on the decisions of a single-party government: street protests and 
legal activism. While street protests could arguably serve the consolidation 
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of the TTB’s constituency over common goals, they did not have an 
observable impact on the reform. However, the TTB’s legal activism centred 
upon stopping the government’s plan to introduce the full-time work 
requirement for all medical doctors -an action that would practically end 
private clinics of medical doctors, their proletarianisation, and their 
professional autonomy- proved to be successful for almost a decade. While 
the TTB’s political stance aims to unify the interests of medical doctors and 
the general public under the broader demand for a universalist public 
health care system, the political system within which it operates and the 
marketized health care domain left no room for the TTB to focus its political 
strategies on the politics of consumption as much as it does on professional 
politics and the politics of production. 
From another angle, the reform also had an impact on professional 
politics within the TTB. While the TTB was politically in favour of the full 
time work requirement before the introduction of the HTP, it had to revise 
its political stance. On the one hand, this revision might be attributed to 
the fact that the introduction of the full time work requirement would lead 
to the weakening of medical doctors vis-à-vis the state and the market 
actors. On the other hand, it could be argued that the leading cadre was 
squeezed between the expectations of its constituency to act as an interest 
organisation of medical doctors, and its values centred upon a demand for 
a universalist public health care system for Turkey. In the end, in this case, 
here it is argued that the TTB failed to unify the interests of medical doctors 
and the interests of the general public and prioritised the former over the 
latter.  
The fourth political dynamic that partially shaped the direction of the 
reform in the post-legislative process was the birth of private health care 
provider organisations (the OHSAD in particular), their involvement in the 
reform process as a partner of the government, and the tension between the 
OHSAD and the government over the limits of capital accumulation in the 
health care delivery sector. As discussed in Chapter 8, the HTP was both a 
social policy change and an opening up of a new area for capital 
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accumulation. The HTP opened up a new area for capital accumulation by 
including private hospitals into the public health insurance plan and 
excluding the private clinics of medical doctors; which can be defined as 
‘policy conversion’. In fact, the most visible market direction of the HTP has 
been in health care delivery (Ağartan, 2012). As shown in Chapter 8, the 
share of bed capacity of private hospitals among all hospitals tripled 
between 2002 and 2011 and private hospitals started to receive one-fourth 
of all applications to health institutions in 2011.  
Following the footsteps of Polanyi’s insights (2001) and the application 
of those insights to the health care domain as presented in Giaimo (2005), 
it is argued that this partial privatisation of health care delivery, which was 
a result of state intervention to create a market in this domain, had a 
significant impact on health care politics by giving rise to new actors in 
health care politics, namely private health care provider organisations. 
The Health Sector Union of the TOBB (the corporatist body) and the 
OHSAD emerged as the strongest parties aiming to represent private 
health care providers (voluntary business organisations) in health care 
policy making. It is argued here that the OHSAD’s structure of 
representation, which offered larger private hospital groups more weight, 
resulted in the OHSAD’s emergence as the strongest and most active 
representative of the private sector in health care provision. Despite the 
fact that the private hospital sector is heterogeneous concerning the sizes 
of private hospitals, the pricing policy of the SGK strengthens the 
oligopolisation tendency in the sector by favouring larger hospitals that can 
use economies of scale. This oligopolisation tendency also delegitimises the 
structure of representation of the Health Sector Union of the TOBB and 
puts the OHSAD in a more favourable position in the eyes of the larger 
entrepreneurs. As discussed in Chapter 8, while particularistic relations 
between business and the government have been influential (Heper, 1991), 
one should note that this study only examined the interaction between 
private health care provider organisations and the government. The 
analysis of the composition of the executive board and the honorary board 
 257 
 
of the OHSAD, however, demonstrates the interpenetration of the health 
care bureaucracy and the business organisation as well as the governing 
political party and the business organisation. 
Both the interest formation of private health care provider 
organisations and their interaction with the government diverges from the 
pluralist understanding of health care politics. Historically, the 
relationship between the state and the business was not conflict-ridden; 
governments used the state capacity to create a national bourgeoisie that 
was generally politically allied with the government in power (Buğra, 1997). 
Against this background, Buğra and Savaşkan suggest that the AK Party 
followed the historical path of state-business relations in Turkey and 
initiated a politically guided process of class transformation with health 
care as a significant component of this project (2014).  
As a result of the above-mentioned historical structure, and drawing 
on the discourses and strategies used by private health care provider 
organisations throughout the reform process, here it is argued that these 
organisations did not engage in open conflicts with the government, even in 
the cases where their economic interests were in conflict with the policies 
intact. While neither the corporatist Health Sector Union of the TOBB nor 
the voluntary OHSAD had any veto points over the decision making 
process, both the government as well as the health care bureaucracy were 
much more open to listening to their demands.  
From 2005 to 2008—after the inclusion of private health care 
providers into the public health insurance plan, but before the introduction 
of strict restrictions on private health care delivery sector—the relations 
between private health care provider organisations and the government 
were smooth. To exemplify, as discussed in Chapter 8, both private health 
care providers and the government referred to private hospitals as “national 
resources”, which were portrayed no differently from public hospitals. 
However, relations became tense after the government introduced new 
regulations that gave an end to the uncontrolled growth of private health 
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care provision and its ability to attract a significant share of specialist 
medical doctors.  
The introduction of strict regulations on the opportunities of capital 
accumulation in health care delivery resulted in the consolidation of private 
sector interests and a more active role for the private health care provide 
organisations to advocate for these interests. The OHSAD has three areas 
of concentration in its strategy to influence the reform, which are listed as 
follows: the pricing policy of the SGK, the level of cap on additional 
payments that private hospitals are allowed to charge the patients, and the 
number of specialist medical doctors that private hospitals are allowed to 
hire. Given the fact that public opinion is still in favour of public sector 
dominance over health care delivery, the OHSAD could not employ a 
strategy to reach out to the public to put pressure upon the government. 
Alternatively, the OHSAD chose to express its demands to the health care 
bureaucracy and the representatives of the government without using a 
confrontational discourse. While the OHSAD may have used a conciliatory 
discourse to express its demands due to the mutual dependency of the 
OHSAD and the government in their shared endeavour for the politically 
motivated class transformation process, another reason might be the fact 
that the government still had the upper hand vis-à-vis the private sector in 
health care delivery due to the dominance of public hospitals. 
In fact, over the course of the reform, private health care provider 
organisations in general and the OHSAD in particular could be considered 
partially successful in influencing the components of the reform that 
affected them the most. For instance, private health care provider 
organisations succeeded in altering the limits that the reform put on their 
opportunities for capital accumulation to their benefit. Throughout the 
implementation of the HTP, as shown in Chapter 8, the level of cap on 
additional payments and the number of available positions for specialist 
medical doctors in private hospitals significantly increased.  
However, private health care provider organisations failed to succeed 
in realising their demands when the demands were in conflict with the 
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government’s priorities. For instance, despite the persistence of private 
health care provider organisations to improve the pricing policy of the SGK, 
neither the pricing policy nor the level of prices changed substantially. It 
might be argued that the failure of this demand is mainly due to the fact 
that the realisation of this demand would directly increase the financial 
burden on the public budget. Alternatively, the government chose to 
transfer the financial burden originating from the private health care 
providers’ demand for better revenues to patients willing to use private 
hospitals with their public health insurance. In other words, the 
government prioritised meeting its targets on public budget over keeping 
the level of out-of-pocket payments that patients make and the level of 
income-based inequalities in citizens’ access to health care services low. 
Given that the AK Party has been transforming into a ‘cartel party’ and 
there are very few other channels that would allow for representation of the 
patients’ interests in health care policy making, it could be argued that 
patients’ interests, which were before partially represented by political 
parties in a competitive electoral atmosphere, are now increasingly 
becoming ‘repressed structural interests’. 
In conclusion, the HTP was a common product of the controlled 
populism of the AK Party and the pro-market health care reform approach 
of the WB, the latter of which was institutionalised in Turkey’s health care 
bureaucracy in the mid-1980s. With the introduction of the HTP, the power 
distribution upon which Turkey’s health care system is based has been 
changing. While governments had always been the strongest party in 
health care politics before the reform, medical doctors and their 
organisation also used to have significant leverage. However, after the 
reform, private health care provider organisations appeared as actors with 
considerable leverage and the ability to make changes in the reform. In 
contrast to the collaboration of the government with private health care 
provider organisations, the government excluded the TTB from the reform 
process. Despite the broader aspiration of the TTB’s leading cadre to 
struggle for a universalist public health care system, the changes 
 260 
 
introduced by the HTP concerning the control over medical doctors’ labour 
pushed the TTB into the political position of an interest-based organisation. 
Full time work requirement proposal of the government was the only reform 
component in which the TTB, in collaboration with the judiciary, succeeded 
in making changes or delaying changes. Finally, advances in Turkey’s 
health care system always came into being as a result of political parties’ 
attempts to appeal to the public in fierce electoral competition. However, 
the cartelisation of the AK Party, which HTP’s success in the public eye 
might have contributed to, puts the representation of the citizens’ interests 
on health care policies at risk.   
Private actors are not newcomers to the domain of health care. They 
have been the major global actors in pharmaceuticals and health technology 
sectors. While private actors in health care delivery were not significant 
actors in most state and societal health care systems, including Turkey’s, 
they were already strong in private health care systems like the U.S. health 
care system. A recent general trend, which has manifested in the global 
wave of reforms leading to the privatisation in health care delivery, 
strengthens private actors in health care market and politics. This trend, 
which is also visible in the case of Turkey, brings forward the politics of 
regulation as the main mode of health care politics in the near future. This 
suggestion is in compliance with Béland’s insight stated as follows: 
“exploring the changing assumptions of policy makers about the proper 
public-private mix is only one potential aspect of the ideational analysis of 
the role of ideas in public-private health care” (Béland, 2010, p.629). Taking 
a step forward, here it is suggested that political contexts where the control 
of citizens’ and other actors’ health care policies is weak (i.e. professional 
actors, trade unions, etc.) might pave the way to the loss of these actors’ say 
and the strengthening of private sectors’ input on health care policies. 
For further research, the students of health care politics willing to 
work on the case of Turkey might consider examining the following issues: 
the changing political dynamics that the pharmaceutical policy of Turkey 
has been based on after the rise of the AK Party to power, the 
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transformation of the medical profession and its impacts on professional 
politics within the TTB, the transnationalisation trend in the health care 
delivery market, and the emerging alliances between private health care 
insurance organisations and private health care provider organisations and 
possible impacts of these alliances on health care policies.  
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